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PREFACE 
This book attempts to trace the process by which the novel replaced the 
epic as the major literary form in English. It explores the hows and whys 
of this process by an analysis of the subject matter of epic rather than its 
form or manner; that is, it attempts to find out what post-classical readers 
understood when they read epic by examination of major commentaries 
on Virgil's Aeneid from the early Middle Ages through the Renaissance. 
After that it proceeds to the same goal by close reading of major English 
literary works that bear a parodic relation to epic. I understand the epic 
tradition this book talks about as a heterogeneous body of materials 
growing from a single root, always changing and transforming them­
selves, but changing in ways and directions indicated by their earliest 
shaping. What I think I am describing is an organic growth toward the 
novel, observing its own inner laws and rhythms; it is as if the genre of 
epic possessed a kind of autonomy that pushed its practitioners into 
channels and branches already potential within it. Innovations within the 
epic tradition seem almost always the product of internal realignments or 
mutation, almost never the result of grafting. 
In working method and critical position, I have chosen to follow 
Aristotle's example rather than his conclusions; I try to proceed from the 
critical description of a single text outward to more general conclusions, 
gathering evidence as I go. Generally speaking, the book is cumulative. 
Rather than overburden it at the outset with theory, I have left many 
things to be clarified and elaborated throughout. I hope that by its 
conclusion all of my sweeping assertions and cryptic phrases will have 
been supported and explained. Similarly, in the arrangement of chapters 
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I have occasionally disregarded chronology for the exposition of a clear 
logical development. Terminology I found a maddening problem, not 
yet resolved to my own satisfaction. In some cases, I invented or 
purloined useful words; in others, old and somewhat weak-hammed 
warhorses were trotted out for another go-round. This is particularly true 
of "form and content" — a distinction I find more and more artificial, but 
which seems rhetorically necessary to the clarity of my arguments. 
Beyond all this, this study because of its scope produces a great deal of 
fallout: it has something to say about the Medieval distinction between 
the allegory of the poets and the allegory of the theologians, about the 
meaning of ut pictura poesis, about poetic imagery and the 
seventeenth-century revival of atomic theory, about the meaning of 
narrative or plot in novels. I would call it an idiosyncratic book; others 
may think it merely cranky. Certainly I do not claim to be right in my 
conclusions in the sense of being exclusively right. What this book adds 
up to in my mind is one satisfactory mode of dealing with all of the factors 
I have examined. That there are other modes of so doing I have no doubt, 
but this one pleases me: it answers for me the basic questions of how and 
why the novel supplanted the epic, and it explains their essential relation 
— and those are the questions that pushed me to undertake this study in 
the first place. 
I am grateful to many institutions and individuals for support and 
encouragement: to Ohio State University for a quarter of assigned 
research duty; to the Humanities Center of Johns Hopkins University for 
the fellowship that enabled me to do the basic research for this book; to 
the State University of New York Research Foundation for two Summer 
Grants-in-Aid that allowed me to write it; to two (to me unknown) readers 
for Ohio State University Press, for numerous pertinent and helpful 
suggestions; to good friends, whose names would read like a litany of my 
colleagues at Stony Brook, for advice and occasional consent; and to the 
late Earl Wasserman, for help and for friendship over many years. My 
greatest debt I acknowledge in the dedication. 
oryden


N ABSALOM AND ACHITOPHEL , Dryden 
created the last traditional verse epic of any merit 
written in the English language. By the strictest 
canons of neoclassical criticism, it must be con­
sidered an epic poem — or, making allowance for 
its brevity, an epyllion. Dryden labels it Absalom 
and Achitophel: A Poem in the same succint fashion in which Milton 
called his work Paradise Lost; A Poem in Twelve Books. Indeed, 
Dryden's poem much more closely approximates contemporary notions 
of epic than does Milton's. It is tightly organized around a single great 
end, presented under the guise of historical truth; Le Bossu's definition 
of epic fits it exactly: 
The Epopea is a Discourse invented by Art, to form the 
Manners by such Instructions as are disguis'd under the 
Allegories of some one important Action, which is related in 
Verse, after a probable, diverting, and surprising Manner.1 
Generic definitions of this sort have no intrinsic importance; their value 
lies rather in what the properly identified particular example can tell us 
about the development of the form, and Dryden's poem, both in its 
excellences and in its limitations, provides a great deal of information 
about the crisis of epic poetry at this time. Paradise Lost had already 
contained the germ of serious mock epic (as opposed to epic burlesque) 
in the parodic relation in which Satan stands to God: in particular, his 
fraudulent self-examinations and false or mistaken recognitions of his 
''mission" offer the base on which Dryden builds the shaky edifice of 
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Absalom's self-created mission, to establish the "dominion of grace" that 
grotesquely and profoundly parodies David's merciful rule. From this to 
the full-blown inversions of Pope's Dunciad is a short step ideologically 
but a great one literarily and culturally. Before we get there, we will have 
to examine in some detail exactly what Dryden accomplishes in 
Absalom and Achitophel. 
With very few exceptions, Absalom and Achitophel maintains a 
narrative integrity that few political allegories ever reach; its fable (in our 
terms, its vehicle) achieves a kind of autonomy that renders it complete 
and satisfying in itself and perfectly transparent as a vehicle for other 
things. These very qualities hide the real achievement of the fable of 
Absalom and Achitophel by cloaking it with an inevitability that it by no 
means possesses. We are sufficiently aware of the frequency with which 
seventeenth-century political writers compared Charles to David to 
accept without demur the appropriateness of the biblical tale to the 
English situation. If we remember piously that Dryden has really re­
versed the roles of the biblical Absalom and Achitophel, the fact does 
little to alter our acceptance of Dryden's fable as donnee rather than 
aperqu, semi-fact rather than full-fiction. Yet the imaginative reordering 
of history, both Jewish and English, constitutes the excellence of 
Dryden's poem, and the "fabulous" (in the root sense) nature of Dryden's 
narrative makes it so inevitable a vehicle of his meaning. 
In general terms, the most significant change Dryden has made in the 
biblical narrative lies in his radical transformation of its temporal and 
conceptual contexts, both of which he wrenches into a rich ambiguity. 
To clarify this, we shall have to examine the much-worked-over opening 
lines of the poem: 
In pious times, e'r Priest-craft did begin, 
Before Polygamy was made a sin; 
When man, on many, multiply'd his kind, 
E'r one to one was, cursedly, confind: 
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When Nature prompted, and no law deny'd 
Promiscuous use of Concubine and Bride; 
Then, Israel's Monarch, after Heaven's own heart, 
His vigorous warmth did, variously, impart 
To Wives and Slaves: And, wide as his Command, 
Scatter'd his Maker's Image through the Land. 
(1-10) 
Let us put aside at the outset the idea that this passage serves only as a 
witty justification for, or palliation of, Charles's promiscuity; that is 
certainly true, but I doubt that Dryden needed ten lines for only that. The 
passage establishes an explicit temporal and conceptual context for the 
whole poem, a context that the remainder of the poem will treat with the 
same irony and ambiguity that Dryden provides for the biblical narrative 
on which the poem as a whole is based. "Pious times, e'r Priest-craft did 
begin" were technically the patriarchal period before the establishing of 
the Levitical priesthood, the period between God's covenant with Ab­
raham and the more explicitly codified covenant established with the 
people of Israel through Moses.2 Obviously, chronological difficulties 
present themselves from the beginning: the biblical David did not live in 
those pious times, and Dryden's "Before Polygamy was made a sin" 
ignores the pointed injunction of Deuteronomy 17:17 that kings should 
not multiply horses, wives, or concubines. Indeed, before the end of this 
same first verse paragraph Dryden also indicates that priestcraft of some 
sort already had begun: 
Gods they had tri'd of every shape and size 
That God-smiths could produce, or Priests devise 
(49-50) 
Later sections of the poem of course confirm this fact: 
This set the Heathen Priesthood in a flame, 
For Priests of all Religions are the same 
(98-99) 
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Hot Levites Headed these; who pul'd before 
From the1Ark, which in the Judges days they bore, 
Resum'd their Cant, and with a Zealous Cry. 
Pursu'd their old belov'd Theocracy. 
(519-22) 
The solution to these apparent contradictions can be found in careful 
consideration of the first lines of the poem. Pious times contrast with 
those after priesthood began. Priesthood itself Dryden associates with 
the institution of law and consequently of sin: polygamy is made a sin; 
man is cursedly (the word has links with the Fall that we cannot now 
discuss) confined; laws deny nature's promptings. The conception of law 
herein contained, particularly the conception of the law of Moses, would 
have been quite familiar to Dryden's audience, since it is Saint Paul's 
conception of the nature and function of the Mosaic law as he lengthily 
argues it in the Epistle to the Romans. Here is a brief extract of his 
argument: 
What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I 
had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, 
except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking 
occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of 
concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead. For I was 
alive without the law once: but when the commandment 
came, sin revived, and I died. (7:7-9) 
Dryden's appropriation of this conception at the beginning of his poem 
forces a revaluation, a relocation of the conceptual context in which we 
understand David. By placing him firmly in "pious times," Dryden leads 
us to see him as sharing the same sort of direct relationship to God as the 
patriarchs and Moses possessed; the language of the opening lines, with 
their emphasis on David as the monarch "after Heaven's own heart" (7), 
reinforces this. In fact, Dryden depicts David's sexuality as analogous to 
God's own creativity: it is his maker's image, not his own, that he scatters 
through the land.3 Dryden here exploits a distinction familiar to his 
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readers as the difference between the dominion of law, as exemplified by 
the Mosaic code, and the dominion of grace, as established by the 
crucifixion of Christ.4 The pivotal point that allows him to turn this neat 
inversion is the traditional conception of David as a type of Christ, a 
conception that Achitophel recalls for us at a crucial point in the poem 
(line 416; cf. John 11:60) and that Dryden obviously exploits as a careful 
counterpoint to the dominion of grace his conspirators and Levites — 
and English puritans — hope to attain. David lives under the dominion 
of grace, in a kind of golden world where what nature prompts is after 
God's own heart: he embodies the conception of the divinely appointed 
king to whom law is irrelevant, who founds his dominion in God's will, 
in grace, and in his literal and metaphoric paternity of his people. 
David's own comments, at the end of the poem, make quite explicit this 
dichotomy between the dominion of law and the dominion of grace, and 
argue moreover that in rejecting him his rebels reject grace itself and 
demand the rigor of the law — which as Saint Paul says, is death. 
Law they require, let Law then shew her Face; 
They could not be content to look on Grace, 
Her hinder parts, but with a daring Eye 
To tempt the terror of her Front, and Dye. 
(1006-9) 
And these lines also complete the conception of David as a patriarchal 
king possessing direct access to the Deity by their overt allusion to 
Moses' vision of the hinder parts of God, whose face no man can look 
upon and live (Exodus 33:18-23) 
Into this context Dryden has fitted the action of Absalom and Achito­
phel. All of his rebels oppose not just kingship but grace; monarchy and 
divinity are at least parallel and probably interchangeable terms. "No 
King could govern, nor no God could please" (48) the Jews; they are 
called "a Headstrong, Moody, Murmuring race" who try, not the limits 
of law, but "th' extent and stretch of grace" (45-46). David becomes in 
their minds "An Idoll Monarch which their hands had made" (64), and 
they think to "melt him to that Golden Calf, a State" (66). Achitophel's 
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temptation of Absalom adopts the form of the satanic temptation of 
Christ because it is simultaneously a temptation from grace, from filial 
devotion, and from political loyalty. But Achitophel and the other rebels 
do not reject the grounds of David's authority; rather, they seek to imitate 
them. Achitophel thus tempts Absalom to accept the role of Messiah, to 
falsely assume the guise of a bringer of the new and full dispensation of 
grace. The "Hot Levites" who head the "Solyniaean Rout" parody 
exactly, the basis of David's reign: 
Hot Levites Headed these; who puPd before 
From th'Ark, which in the Judges days they bore, 
Resum'd their Cant, and with a Zealous Cry, 
Pursu'd their old belov'd Theocracy. 
Where Sanhedrin and Priest inslav'd the Nation, 
And justifi'd their Spoils by Inspiration; 
For who so fit for Reign as Aaron's Race, 
If once Dominion they could found in Grace? 
(519-26) 
Shimei, "who Heavens Annointed dar'd to Curse" (583), grotesquely 
parodies Christ's promise of abiding grace: 
When two or three were gather'd to declaim 
Against the Monarch of Jerusalem, 
Shimei was always in the midst of them. 
(601-6; cf. Matthew 18:20) 
Corah, too, among all his other accomplishments, manages a travesty of 
Christ: Dryden applies to him the imagery of the brazen serpent set up in 
the desert to preserve the Israelites (633-35) — the image, of course, 
was traditionally accepted as a type of the crucifixion of Christ. All of 
these distortions of the true reign of grace simply repeat in David's 
kingdom the same sort of satanic parody of God's dominion that Milton 
described in Paradise Lost; the devil's party constantly tries to repro­
duce God's power, and constantly lapses into vulgar burlesque. This is 
the essential basis of serious mock epic; Satan is the paradigm mock-epic 
hero. Paradise Lost already contains the seeds of mock epic; the 
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triumph of "Satan's party" on earth provided the soil for their germina­
tion, as we will see when we come to discuss MacFlecknoe. 
Within the overall framework of the dichotomy between the dominion 
of law and the dominion of grace, the opening lines of the poem establish 
a subsidiary dialectic of grace, law, and nature. Nature prompts, and no 
law denies "Promiscuous use of Concubine and Bride" (5-6). While in 
Absalom alone "'twas Natural to please" (2S), still "His motions" were 
"all accompanied with grace; / And Paradise was open'd in his face" 
(29-30). And the Jews, though minimally bound by law, still "led their 
wild desires to Woods and Caves, / And thought that all but Savages were 
Slaves" (55-56). This threefold battery of themes, grace, law, and 
nature, governs the ideological progression of the poem: "Religion, 
Common-wealth, and Liberty" (292) form, as Achitophel says, the 
general cry. 
This dialectic operates in the poem in curious and often paradoxical 
ways. For David, to follow nature is to follow grace; at nature's prompt­
ing he scatters his maker's image through the land. His "native mercy" 
(939) Absalom admits is "God's beloved Attribute" (328). Yet even for 
him conflict occurs, especially when law and justice enter the case: 
If my young Samson will pretend a Call 
To shake the Column, let him share the Fall: 
But oh that yet he would repent and live! 
How easie 'tis for Parents to forgive! 
With how few Tears a Pardon might be won 
From Nature, pleading for a Darling Son! 
(955-60) 
Dryden presents David as torn between two natures, between the king's 
two bodies, if you will:5 as man, he grieves for his wayward son; as king, 
he punishes his wayward subject. The beginning of the poem 
schematized this paradox of kingship brilliantly. Initially, "Godlike 
David" (14), prompted by nature, scattered his maker's image through 
the land. The lines immediately following transform the procreative 
process from the semi-divine imparting of warmth it had been to a more 
earthy and natural — in a lesser sense — husbandry through an extended 
farming-seed metaphor. At the end of this, Dryden for the first time 
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introduces Absalom and offers the following rationale for his physical 
beauty: 
Whether, inspir'd by some diviner Lust, 
His Father got him with a greater Gust; 
Or that his Conscious destiny made way 
By manly beauty to Imperiall sway. 
(19-22) 
The contrast between Absalom's amanly beauty" and David's eminence 
as "Israel's Monarch, after Heaven's own heart" (7) explains itself, while 
the concise oxymoron "diviner Lust" sums up both David's dilemma and 
what is wrong with Absalom's conception. Dryden then makes of Ab­
salom a baser — a more natural — version of David; he too follows 
nature, and his motions are "all accompanied with grace" (29), but what 
David and the reader see in him is not his maker's image, but rather 
With secret joy, indulgent David view'd 
His Youthfiill Image in his Son renew'd 
(31-32) 
Absalom bears the image of David as man, not of David as king; he is, as 
was the Duke of Monmouth, a natural son, an illegitimate — one born 
according to the order of nature rather than the order of law or grace. 
Dryden needs nowhere to stress either the irony of the unnatural conduct 
of this natural son or the paradox that the illegtimate should call for law. 
Flawed human nature, as epitomized in the poem by Absalom, 
provides the possibility for the disruption of the dominion of grace in 
David's kingdom, just as it did in the garden: 
But, when to Sin our byast Nature leans, 
The carefull Devil is still at hand with means; 
And providently Pimps for ill desires. 
(79-81) 
The brief paradox of the devil's providential pimping reminds us of the 
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overarching dominion of divine law and grace within which human 
nature acts out its "ill desires"; it recalls an ultimate law, nature, and 
grace that are not in conflict but are in fact identical — but in the world of 
fallen nature, these are only hints. More immediately apparent in this 
world is the "natural Instinct" by which the Jews every twenty years 
rebel (218-19). Achitophel appeals shrewdly to this baser nature when 
he urges Absalom to set aside filial regard for David— 
Nor let his Love Enchant your generous Mind; 
7Tis Natures trick to Propagate her Kind. 
Our fond Begetters, who woud never dye, 
Love but themselves in their Posterity. 
(423-26) 
And again when he urges him to open rebellion: 
Resolve on Death, or Conquest by the Sword. 
Which for no less a Stake than Life, you Draw; 
And Self-defence is Natures Eldest Law. 
(456-58) 
And I presume Dryden refers ironically to this same nature when he ends 
AchitopheFs speech with "He said, And this Advice above the rest, / 
With Absalom's Mild nature suited best" (477-78). Yet even within this 
generally sinful context paradox occurs, and this same "byast Nature" 
also works to ironic good among the poem's villains: 
But far more numerous was the herd of such, 
Who think too little, and who talk too much. 
These, out of meer instinct, they knew not why, 
Ador'd their fathers God, and Property: 
And, by the same blind benefit of Fate, 
The Devil and the Jebusite did hate: 
Born to be sav'd, even in their own despight; 
Because they could not help believing right. 
(532-40) 
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Dryden focuses all of these paradoxes in his disquisition on the social 
contract, where he raises a whole series of questions about the nature of 
governor and governed and the scope of law (753-810). Men are natur­
ally prone to rebellion against both kings and god; but isn't something to 
be said for their natural rights, "their Native sway" (760)? May kings 
abrogate law? If not, are kings only trustees? If so, how can any man 
claim any natural right other than what can be defended by brute power? 
The result of such a process must be a Hobbesian state of nature "where 
all have Right to all" (794), and that is anarchy. Alteration of existing 
social structures always ends that way: 
To change Foundations, cast the Frame anew, 
Is work for Rebels who base Ends pursue: 
At once Divine and Humane Laws controul; 
And mend the Parts by mine of the Whole. 
(805-8) 
Dryden has carefully suppressed overt mention of grace from this argu­
ment to present fully the dilemma into which unaided nature and merely 
human law lead; as Dryden argues it, the political problem of the one and 
the many is unresolvable in human terms. 
The poem, however, does offer a solution to this problem in terms of 
its major metaphor. Absalom and Achitophel contains an image cluster 
that sums up fully all the ramifications of this dialectic of grace, law, and 
nature: the relations of fathers and sons operate simultaneously in all 
three categories, and the images of fathers and sons, the metaphors of 
paternity and sonship, offer the key to the totality of the poem. The poem 
specifically labels kings as "the Godheads Images" (792) and consis­
tently describes David in particular as "Godlike." The beginning of the 
poem explicitly links David and God through David's sexual potency: 
the "vigorous warmth" he indiscriminately imparts makes him the sun of 
the human world, analogous to the creative warmth of the sun in the 
physical .universe and the overflowing being of God in the metaphysical. 
David the King and God the Father stand in almost one-to-one relation to 
each other, and this analogous relationship provides the resolution of the 
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problem of government. Dryden signals us that this is the case when7 
near the beginning of his discussion of the problem of government, he 
makes choosing heirs for monarchs and decreeing for God parallel and 
almost cognate acts (758). He undercuts his own question about the 
contractual nature of kingship by referring to it as a "resuming Cov'nant" 
(767), and so linking it with God's covenant with the Israelites and 
implying the consequent parallel between God's dominion and the king's 
— and since the poem has argued from the very beginning that David's 
kingship constitutes the dominion of grace, this necessarily implies also 
that David's authority is as irrevocable as God's. Dryden clinches his 
argument by appeal to Adam's sin, a stock argument of the theorists of 
patriarchal government:6 
If those who gave the Scepter, coud not tye 
By their own deed their own Posterity, 
How then coud Adam bind his future Race? 
How coud his forfeit on mankind take place? 
Or how coud heavenly Justice damn us all, 
Who nere consented to our Fathers fall? 
(769-74) 
Dryden's rhetorical questions amalgamate all three areas of the poem's 
dialectic and convict the rebels of the heresy of challenging divine 
justice. Adam's simple status as the natural father of the human race 
nullifies all questions of the people's "Native sway" (760): they have 
none, since it was all vested in him as the father of human nature. His 
rebellion against the kingship of God is symbolically reenacted in the 
poem in the temptation and fall of Absalom, an act that, like Adam's, will 
once again bring mankind under the dominion of law and death until the 
second Adam can restore the dominion of grace. David thus stands in the 
poem as God's vice-regent, king by divine right and patriarchal descent 
— a fact even Achitophel admits in his sneering reference to David's 
"Successive Title, Long, and Dark, / Drawn from the Mouldy Rolls of 
Noah's Ark" (301-2). Dryden's whole argument throughout this section 
of the poem draws heavily upon the patriarchal theorists and constantly 
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employs their language. He states the basic problem in terms of the rights 
of fathers and sons: 
What shall we think! can People give away 
Both for themselves and Sons, their Native sway? 
(759-60) 
And his citation of Adam uses the same terms of reference — tying 
posterity, binding one's future race, consenting to our father's fall 
(769-74). His subsequent critique of the problem of individual rights in 
a democracy follows quite closely the arguments of Sir Robert Filmer's 
Patriarcha and other similar tracts.7 His implicit conclusion is inescap­
able: David exercises authority just as does a father in his family or God 
in the universe. Rebellion against him equals apostacy from God — 
setting up the golden calf of a state (66). Logically then, when "Godlike 
David" speaks at the end of the poem, "His Train their Maker in their 
Master hear" (938); and the paternal, creative David of the opening lines 
brings forth one more image of his maker in the land. And equally 
logically, the final lines of the poem harmonize grace, law, and nature in 
the restoration of "Godlike David" as "Lawfull Lord" presiding over "a 
Series of new time" (1026-31); Dryden alludes to Virgil's supposedly 
messianic eclogue, with its promise of the birth of the wonder child, the 
restoration of a golden world, and the reestablishment of the reign of 
justice and grace. The end of the poem fulfills its beginning; David's 
kingship and paternity are transformed into symbols of the reestablish­
ment of universal order and the undoing of Adam's fall. The paradise that 
was metaphorically opened in Absalom's face (30) reaches its fulfillment 
in the advent of the second Adam who is to be born of David's line; the 
dominion of grace his rebels mistakenly seek through the son of his 
mortal body will be established by the son of his divine body. 
Given the paramount importance of the idea of paternity in this 
scheme, the sort of son produced becomes a major index of the Tightness 
or wrongness, the morality or immorality, of the father and his activities. 
The poem juxtaposes and contrasts the sons of its various actors for the 
purpose of illustrating the presence of proper hierarchical order or the 
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absence of it. The comely Absalom, ambiguously graceful, starkly 
contrasts with the ugly, unformed progeny of Achitophel, the physical 
image of his father's mind. 
. . . that unfeather'd, two Leg'd thing, a Son: 
Got, while his Soul did hudled Notions try; 
And born a shapeless Lump, like Anarchy. 
(170-72) 
Immediately after presenting the essentially patriarchal argument about 
government that we have already discussed, Dryden illustrates it by his 
encomium of Barzillai's son, who fulfilled all parts of the parallel duties 
"of Subject and of Son" (836). Such acceptance and fulfillment of the 
obligations of a hierarchical and patriarchal state produce another, 
metaphoric, image of the maker: 
Oh Narrow Circle, but of Pow'r Divine, 
Scanted in Space, but perfect in thy Line! 
(838-39) 
This encomium of Barzillai's son thus forms an integral unit in the 
poem's imagistic structure, point by point damning Absalom for his 
dereliction of the duties "of Subject and of Son." David himself places 
this image in its most important perspective when he refers to his 
rebellious subjects as Jacob and Esau: 
True, they petition me t'approve their Choise, 
But Esau's Hands suite ill with Jacob's Voice. 
(981-82) 
Jacob, the younger son and inferior by the order of nature, achieved 
priority according to the order of grace; as Bishop Hall expressed it, 
"Esau got the right of nature, Jacob of grace."8 These two sons, contend­
ing for a paternal blessing, sum up the image of sonship in the poem: 
nature and grace struggle for dominion, nature with Esau's hands, simple 
power and bodily strength, grace with Jacob's voice, reason and prayer. 
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Dryden characterizes all of the poem's Esaus by marked physical 
descriptions; this process makes them primarily corporeal, while leaving 
the poem's Jacobs relatively untouched by the taint of fallen bodily 
nature. Absalom and AchitopheVs villains exist in our imaginations 
primarily as physical entities — "that unfeather'd, two Leg'd thing," 
Achitophel's son (170); Achitophel himself, 
A fiery Soul, which working out its way, 
Fretted the Pigmy Body to decay: 
And o'r informed the Tenement of Clay; 
(156-58) 
Corah, 
Sunk were his Eyes, his Voyce was harsh and loud, 
Sure signs he neither Cholerick was, nor Proud: 
His long Chin prov'd his Wit; his Saintlike Grace 
A Church Vermilion, and a Moses's Face; 
(646-49) 
and even "The well hung Balaam"(574). Corporeal imagery marks all 
the rebels and their activities, dragging them down from the realm of 
spirit they would usurp to the world of matter, much as Satan's rebellion 
in Paradise Lost degraded him to the material form of the serpent. 
Images of eating and of food particularly abound in the poem, frequently 
in semi-blasphemous contexts. Jewish rabbis and Jebusites agree that it 
is their duty "T'espouse his Cause by whom they eat and drink" (107). 
The plot itself is "swallow'd in the Mass, unchew'd and Crude" (113). 
Dryden describes the beliefs of the Jebusites as follows: 
TtiEgyptian Rites the Jebusites imbrac'd; 
Where Gods were recommended by their Tast. 
Such savory Deities must needs be good, 
As serv'd at once for Worship and for Food. 
(118-21) 
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Nadab, in addition to canting, "made new porridge for the Paschal 
Lamb" (S76). Dryden even uses such imagery negatively, and paradoxi­
cally corporealizes even his most abstemious villain, Shimei: 
And, that his nobel Stile he might refine, 
No Rechabite more shund the fumes of Wine. 
Chast were his Cellars, and his Shrieval Board 
The Grossness of a City Feast abhor'd: 
His Cooks, with long disuse, their Trade forgot; 
Cool was his Kitchen, tho his Brains were hot. 
(616-21) 
This whole image pattern culminates in Absalom's offering himself to the 
mob: 
Th'admiring Croud are dazled with surprise, 
And on his goodly person feed their eyes. 
(686-87) 
Naturally enough, Dryden also metamorphoses his speech into one 
more meal: his words are "More slow than Hybla drops, and far more 
sweet" (697). But the final transformation of the image, and its ideologi­
cal climax in the poem, occur in David's speech: the process of cor­
porealization to which the rebels have all been subjected here reaches its 
nadir in a symbolic cannibalism: 
Against themselves their Witnesses will Swear, 
Till Viper-like their Mother Plot they tear: 
And suck for Nutriment that bloody gore 
Which was their Principle of Life before. 
(1012-15) 
Dryden binds his rebels together with still other material links; an 
ubiquitous pattern of references to blood, humors, lakes, and seas ties 
leaders and mob together in a common allegiance to the moon, which 
governs the motions of all such changeable bodies. 
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For, govern'd by the Moon, the giddy Jews 
Tread the same track when she the Prime renews: 
And once in twenty Years, their Scribes Record, 
By natural Instinct they change their Lord. 
(216-19) 
Zimri, "in the course of one revolving Moon, / Was Chymist, Fidler, 
States-Man, and Buffoon" (549-50). Sanhedrins and crowds are "In­
fected with this publick Lunacy" (788); both lack stability: they flow to 
the mark and run faster out (786). Achitophel hopes that David's power, 
"thus ebbing out, might be / Drawn to the dregs of a Democracy" 
(226-27). But the most important use of the image occurs quite early in 
the poem; it links Absalom even then with the fickle mob and sets up a 
loose parallel between his warm excess in murdering Amnon and the 
people's feverish propensity to rebellion. Absalom's "warm excesses" 
(37), Dryden tells us, "Were constru'd Youth that purg'd by boyling o'r" 
(38). He shortly after employs the analogy of the human body and the 
body politic to apply this same image, in much greater detail, to the 
consequences of the Popish Plot in the mob: 
This Plot, which fail'd for want of common Sense, 
Had yet a deep and dangerous Consequence: 
For, as when raging Fevers boyl the Blood, 
The standing Lake soon floats into a Flood; 
And every hostile Humour, which before 
Slept quite in its Channels, bubbles o'r: 
So, several Factions from this first Ferment, 
Work up to Foam, and threat the Government. 
(134-41) 
This last use of the image once again forces a more serious revaluation of 
Absalom's excesses, and at the same time degrades him by linking him 
with the mob in a common subservience to passion and irrationality, to 
the lowest common denominators of human nature. All of these images 
of food, eating, and humors achieve a common effect in the poem: they 
constitute the symbolic enactment, in the moral and individual realm, of 
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the public rebellion. They debase the image of his maker that David 
bears by reducing that image in the individual and in society to a mere 
physical effigy — they are, if you will, simply other versions of the 
golden calf to which the rebels would reduce David and God. 
II 
As opposed to the striking corporeality of the rebels, David and his 
party seem somewhat ethereal. Dryden employs no physical description 
whatever in his catalogue of the royalists, and his opening encomium of 
Barzillai's sainted and angelic son casts a protective cloak of spirituality 
and immateriality over all the members of the group. Indeed, Dryden 
does not even have the royalists do very much; in contrast to the rebels, 
who slide, rush, ebb, flow, and so on, the royalists merely stand and 
speak — thereby making a minor but effective imagistic point about 
stability and motion that David capitalizes upon in the very final lines of 
his speech (1018-25). But speech itself figures as the most important 
attribute of David's followers — honest speech as opposed to 
Achitophel's lies, rational argument as opposed to the rebels' prop­
aganda, poetry as opposed to the fictions of Corah, Jacob's voice versus 
Esau's hands. The rebels curse and cant; the heroes pray and reason. 
This whole final section of the poem, from line 811 to the end, centers 
itself upon the right use of language as a criterion of loyalty, intelligence, 
and morality. The poem climaxes in David's speech precisely because 
only the enunciation of clear truth can conclude such a parade of lies and 
misrepresentations as the rebels have enacted. In a precisely parallel 
way, Dryden at this point in the poem begins emphasizing the fictive and 
artificial nature ofAbsalom and Achitophel itself, reminding us that it is 
a poem and exploiting the paradox of discovering truth through falsehood 
and fiction. The personality of the poet, as a kind of magical recorder of 
praise or blame for all future time, appears at the very beginning of this 
section; speaking of David's friends, Dryden says 
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Yet some there were, ev'n in the worst of days, 
Some let me name, and Naming is to praise. 
(815-16) 
He sustains this emphasis on the personal role of the poet and his 
personal involvement in his fiction all through the section on Barzillai 
and Barzillai's son: 
His Edlest Hope, with every Grace adorn'd, 
By me (so Heav'n will have it) always Mourn'd, 
And always honoured . . . 
(831-33) 
The apostrophe to the dead hero, beginning at line 838 with "Oh Narrow 
Circle" continues this tone, allowing us to hear the narrator's personal 
grief paradoxically set within the artificial framework of formal eulogy — 
a point reinforced by the poet's address to his muse and reference to what 
he has just spoken as "this Verse / To hang on her departed Patron's 
Hearse" (858-59). Barzillai himself Dryden praises for his discrimina­
tion and generosity in honoring "The Fighting Warriour, and Recording 
Muse" (828). He similarly commends "Him of the Western dome" for 
sense and eloquence (868-69), and pointedly adds the following: 
The Prophets Sons by such example led, 
To Learning and to Loyalty were bred: 
For Colleges on bounteous Kings depend, 
And never Rebell was to Arts a friend. 
(1870-73) 
Dryden likewise distinguishes Adriel as "the Muses friend, / Himself a 
Muse" (877-78). He lauds Jotham for his ability "To move Assemblies" 
(884) and Amiel for his skill in leading the Sanhedrin — 
So dexterous was he in the Crown's defence, 
So form'd to speak a Loyal Nation's Sense, 
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That as their band was Israel's Tribes in small, 
So fit was he to represent them all. 
(904-7) 
Dryden's long satiric portrait of Corah offers the best perspective from 
which to view this concern with language, since Corah commits the 
poem's greatest perversion of words. Dryden contrasts him tellingly with 
Saint Stephen, who bore witness to the truth with his life; the bilingual 
pun on martyr and witness enables him somewhat less than covertly to 
warn Corah of the fate that awaits him: 
Who ever ask'd the Witnesses high race, 
Whose Oath with Martyrdom did Stephen grace? 
(642-43) 
And again, later in the passage: 
Let Israels foes suspect his heav'nly call, 
And rashly judge his Writ Apocryphal; 
Our Laws for such affronts have forfeits made: 
He takes his life, who takes away his trade. 
(664-67) 
But other aspects of Stephen's story serve Dryden's purposes as well; 
certainly the fact that the protomartyr was brought to trial in the first 
place by the suborned testimony of false witnesses bears heavily on 
Dryden's irony here. In another way, too, Stephen provides a norm 
against which to judge Corah: he enjoys a vision of Christ in glory (Acts 
7:55-56) that Corah's lies grossly parody — 
Some future Truths are mingled in his Book; 
But, where the witness faild, the Prophet Spoke: 
Some things like Visionary flights appear; 
The Spirit caught him up, the Lord knows where. 
(654-57) 
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Dryden's mention of Corah's "Moses's Face" (649) and Stephen's 
actual citation of Moses in his defense provide further clues to the 
significance of this passage. Stephen described Moses as a precursor of 
Christ, and as such he has already appeared in Absalom and 
Achitophel; Achitophel initially hailed Absalom as the Jews' "second 
Moses, whose extended Wand / Divides the Seas, and shews the 
promis'd Land" (234-35). Moses as the leader of the exodus from Egypt 
has of course been subliminally present in the poem from the first 
mention of the golden calf in line 66, or perhaps even from the first line of 
the poem, with its implicit reference to the founding of the Levitical 
priesthood under Moses' direction. However that may be, the figure of 
Moses as a divinely appointed ruler having direct access to the Deity has 
operated up to this point in the poem as a minor analogue to David. Here 
Dryden chooses to make this analogue explicit and important. The final 
lines of the passage on Shimei, which immediately precede the portrait 
of Corah, start the process in motion: 
And Moses's Laws he held in more account, 
For forty days of Fasting in the Mount. 
(628-29) 
The fact of God's dispensing law to the Israelites obviously has in itself 
considerable importance to Absalom and Achitophel, but I want to 
concentrate for the moment upon the idea of Moses' vision of God on the 
mount, since Corah bears a parodic version of the outward effects of that 
vision in his "Moses's Face": 
And it came to pass, when Moses came down from mount 
Sinai with the two tables of testimony in Moses7 hand, when 
he came down from the mount, that Moses wist not that the 
skin of his face shone while he talked with him. (Exodus 
34:29) 
Corah too has his visions, but they sound oddly more like Saint Paul's 
than Moses': "The Spirit caught him up, the Lord knows where" (657). 
The line recalls Paul's famous account in 2 Corinthians: 
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I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in 
the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot 
tell: God knoweth;) such an one was caught up to the third 
heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body or out of 
the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth;) How that he was 
caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which 
it is not lawful for a man to utter. (12:2-4) 
And there, I think we have the crux of the matter: he "heard unspeakable 
words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." Corah debases that 
vision with his imaginary plots and malicious lies; he perjures himself, 
quite literally speaking "words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." 
Dryden's description of him as the brazen serpent raised in the desert 
continues and completes the travesty: Corah, like Absalom, plays false 
prophet, false Moses, false Messiah. He leads not to the dominion of 
grace that the brazen serpent tokens but only to the same sort of parody of 
it that Absalom and Achitophel offer, and ultimately to the oblivion from 
which he rose. Corah, as a uLevite" and one of "Godalmightys Gentle­
men" (644-45), pursues what Dryden has earlier described as "their old 
belov'd Theocracy" (552), 
Where Sanhedrin and Priest inslav'd the Nation, 
And justifi'd their Spoils by Inspiration; 
For who so fit for Reign as Aaron's Race, 
If once Dominion they could found in Grace? 
(523-26) 
The parody is perfect and complete, for the biblical Corah — also a 
Levite — rebelled against Moses for precisely the same reasons: 
And they gathered themselves together against Moses and 
against Aaron, and said unto them, Ye take too much upon 
you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, 
and the Lord is among them: wherefore then lift ye up your­
selves above the congregation of the Lord? (Numbers 16:3) 
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Needless to say, the predictive value of historical allusion would once 
again warn this Corah about the exemplary punishments God visits upon 
those who challenge his appointed rulers, even in the name of grace. 
Dry den draws Corah as a total hypocrite, one who perverts the offices 
of priest, prophet, and witness to his own ends by base lies. His first 
couplet of direct address to Corah 
Yet, Corah, thou shalt from Oblivion pass; 
Erect thy self thou Monumental Brass 
(632-33) 
seems to me to recall the famous opening of the last ode of Horace's third 
book, "Exegi monumentum aere perennius," "I have built a monument 
more lasting than brass."9 The conception of Corah as anti-poet, as one 
who uses language to deceive and disorder, contrasts coherently in the 
poem with the emphasis Dryden will later place, and which we have 
already partially discussed, upon himself as poet: opposed to Corah 
stands, as loyal member of the king's party, the king's poet laureate 
(more accurately, and more to the point, the historiographer royal), who 
employs words to impose order, who uses fictions only for their inherent 
truth. Corah's lies constitute another debased image of the maker; 
Dryden, as a lesser maker in his own right, creates a true image of reality. 
So too does David, when he promises the speedy advent of law: 
Law they require, let Law then shew her Face; 
They could not be content to look on Grace 
Her hinder parts, but with a daring Eye 
To tempt the terror of her Front, and Dye. 
By their own arts 'tis Righteously decreed, 
Those dire Artificers of Death shall bleed. 
Against themselves their Witnesses will Swear 
Till Viper-like their Mother Plot they tear: 
And suck for Nutriment that bloody gore 
Which was their Principle of Life before. 
(1006-15) 
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His reference to the hinder parts of grace returns us to Moses' vision on 
the mount of the glory of God; now David, like Moses, acts as the bringer 
of divine law to men who have fallen from grace to depraved nature. In 
"Viper-like their Mother Plot they tear" we see the inevitable end to 
which unaided nature leads, as well as the end of that part of the paternal 
and filial images of the poem: nature can only turn upon itself; it can 
never rise above itself to law or grace, both of which are the free 
dispensations of God and his anointed kings. But the reference to the 
hinder parts of grace implies more than this. If David is now functioning 
properly as an intermediary between God and man, as the second Moses 
Achitophel claimed Absalom to be, then he is not merely imposing law 
upon his unruly subjects but offering them access to grace as well —that 
is, at the very moment when the operations of grace seem about to be 
suspended in the face of the "curst Effects of necessary Law" (1003), 
God and David paradoxically offer fresh gifts of grace. David stands as a 
hinge between the two great dispensations, that of law in Moses and that 
of grace in Christ. The dominion of law contains, in embryo, the 
dominion of grace. What Moses saw on the mount when he viewed the 
hinder parts of God most biblical commentators of Dryden's time agreed 
upon: he saw an image of the glory of God — the Shechinah some called 
it, others the Word, others Christ.10 But it amounts to the same thing: at 
the moment of receiving the law, which brings death, Moses received a 
vision of the grace that brings life and of which he himself served as a 
type. That image of God's glory that he saw David here reproduces in 
himself and in his speech, using words as the agent of the divine will to 
create an image of the divine justice and mercy, just as the poet Dryden 
employs words to create yet another image of divine providence and just 
as the divine Word himself is that justice and mercy. And God himself 
guarantees the veracity of these images and words — not just by his 
consenting nod and thunder, but in the "Series of new time" (1028) that 
here begins. These new times will witness the divine birth, as Virgil's 
eclogue tells us: "iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto" (4.7). The 
event there described Dryden and his audience knew to be the birth of 
Christ, the advent of the dominion of grace, the incarnation of the Word. 
That entrance of the eternal Word into human time establishes both the 
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historicity and the essential truth of Dryden's fiction. It confirms the 
validity of God's own poem, which is creation in general and David in 
particular, and provides the ground for the human maker John Dryden's 
partial image of that creation. Absalom and Achitophel goes full circle, 
and "Godlike David" at the end of the poem is once more reproducing 
his maker's image in the land. Even the metaphor of paternity is restored 
to honor through the divine paternity and the divine sonship that will 
flow from David's line. Language too is restored after the abuse heaped 
on it by Absalom, Achitophel, and Corah: in the laconic "He said" that 
concludes David's speech, to which "Th'Almighty, nodding, gave Con­
sent" (1026), and in the birth of the Word lie the restitution of all words 
and the vindication of all poetry — including this present fiction — as a 
true image of realtiy. 
Il  l 
Absalom and Achitophel concludes as Fielding's Amelia concludes, 
with freedom from law and renewed access to grace, because both are 
works written in the epic tradition. That tradition is not just a vague 
group of themes and devices but a precise body of subject matter and 
form capable of manifesting itself in many guises. Absalom and 
Achitophel incarnates it for the last time, in English, as serious verse 
composition. After this, it will metamorphose itself into many parodic 
forms, both verse and prose, before Fielding once again seriously gives it 
flesh in his last (what we call) novel. To begin to understand those 
transformations, and to grasp the reasons for the necessary death of 
epic's poetic body, we must first comprehend the changes epic under­
went before Dryden used it. What happened to the idea of epic between 
Virgil and Dryden — between the Aeneid andAbsalom and Achitophel 
— accounts in may ways for its protean avatars afterward. 
The Aeneid forms the core of the English epic tradition. From it 
sprout all of the ramifications of that tradition, in prose or verse, whether 
labeled romance or epic or novel. The Iliad and the Odyssey, no matter 
how largely they may figure in an individual writer's imagination, remain 
in comparison to the Aeneid peripheral to the growth and development 
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of the genre in English. Even in the works of Pope, who was probably 
more familiar with the Greek epics than any major English writer before 
or since, the Aeneid provides the essential material upon which his 
imagination primarily works wherever he approaches the precincts of 
epic. This does not deny that Homer is important to the development of 
epic; it only says that in the English tradition he is less important than 
Virgil. This book will offer many occasions to speak of Homer; it will 
demand on many more that I talk of Virgil. 
There are good reasons for this, the primary ones obviously being 
linguistic. Latin was the uniform language of learned men; Greek was 
not. The Middle Ages largely lost contact with Greek language and 
learning, and even after the Renaissance, knowledge of Greek belonged 
to the few among educated men rather than to the mass of them. Greek 
texts were published with Latin translations and Latin notes, and it is 
probable that it was through the Latin rather than directly from the Greek 
that most readers who encountered Greek literature at all made their 
contact. The second, and I think equally important, reason lies in the 
elaborate and prestigious body of commentary that gathered around the 
Aeneid and that found in that poem the paradigm of its genre. 
I propose to discuss here a chronological selection of what strike me as 
key commentaries on the Aeneid — interpretative commentaries, not 
philological scholia. By so doing, it is not my intention to give the 
impression that there ever existed a uniform, unvarying, and never-
broken tradition of Virgilian exegesis — a great chain of Virgil. Rather, I 
simply want to demonstrate the existence, ubiquity, and persistence of 
certain attitudes toward Virgil and his poem along with what seem to me 
the important qualifications and modifications of those attitudes. Par­
ticular attitudes toward epic poetry, particular ideas about the Aeneid, 
occur in strikingly similar forms in commentators from Macrobius to Le 
Bossu. That in itself is important, but the light such ideas cast upon the 
fate of epic is even more so. 
In a very real sense, Macrobius presents whatever "Virgilian tradi­
tion" there is already fully formed.11 His notion of Virgil and his poem 
contain already all of the attitudes that the Renaissance will see in poets 
and epic poetry. Let me, for the sake of illustration, simply juxtapose a 
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passage from the Saturnalia with one from Tasso's Discourses of the 
Epic Poem: 
You see — do you not? — that the use of all these varied 
styles is a distinctive characteristic of VergiPs language. 
Indeed, I think it not without a kind of foreknowledge that he 
was preparing himself to serve as a model for all, that he 
intentionally blended his styles, acting with a prescience born 
of a disposition divine rather than mortal. And thus it was that 
with the universal mother, Nature, for his only guide he wove 
the pattern of his work —just as in music different sounds are 
combined to form a single harmony. For in fact, if you look 
closely into the nature of the universe, you will find a striking 
resemblance between the handiwork of the divine craftsman 
and that of our poet. Thus, just as Vergil's language is per­
fectly adapted to every kind of character, being now concise, 
now copious, now dry, now ornate, and now a combination of 
all these qualities, sometimes flowing smoothly or at other 
times raging like a torrent; so it is with the earth itself, for here 
it is rich with crops and meadows, there rough with forests 
and crags, here you have dry sand, here, again, flowing 
streams, and parts lie open to the boundless sea. I beg you to 
pardon me and not charge me with exaggeration in thus 
comparing Vergil with nature, for I think that I might fairly 
say that he has combined in his single self the diverse styles of 
the ten Attic orators, and yet not say enough.12 
Yet for all that, the world, which includes in its bosom so 
many and so diverse things, is one, one in its form and 
essence, one the knot with which its parts are joined and 
bound together in discordant concord; and while there is 
nothing lacking in it, yet there is nothing there that does not 
serve either for necessity or ornament. I judge that in the 
same way the great poet (who is called divine for no other 
reason but that, because he resembles in his works the su­
preme architect, he comes to participate in his divinity) is 
able to form a poem in which as in a little world can be read in 
one passage how armies are drawn up, and in various others 
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there are battles by land and sea, attacks on cities, skir­
mishes, duels, jousts, descriptions of hunger and thirst, tem­
pests, conflagrations, prodigies; there are a variety of celes­
tial and infernal councils, and the reader encounters sedi­
tions, discords, wanderings, adventures, incantations, works 
of cruelty, audacity, courtesy, and generosity, and actions of 
love, now unhappy, now happy, now pleasing, now causing 
compassion. Yet in spite of all, the poem that contains so 
great variety of matter is one, one is its form and its soul; and 
all these things are put together in such a way that one has 
relation to the other, one corresponds to the other, the one 
necessarily or apparently so depends on the other that if one 
part is taken away or changed in position the whole is de­
stroyed. And if this is true, the art of composing a poem is like 
the nature of the universe, which is composed of contraries, 
such as appear in the law of music, for it there were no 
multiplicity there would be no whole, and no law, as Plotinus 
13 says.
This exalted vision of the poet corresponds in Macrobius to the 
canonization of Virgil as philosopher and source of truth. Macrobius (in 
his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis) links Virgil and Homer 
with Cicero and Plato as "doctrinal authorities."14 (The association with 
Plato will be lengthily exploited by Cristoforo Landino a thousand years 
later.) At roughly the same historical moment, Servius, in his commen­
tary on the Aeneid, pictures Virgil as the same sort of polymath and 
warns at the beginning of the sixth book that "All Virgil is full of wisdom, 
but especially this book, the chief part of which is taken from Homer. 
Some things in it are stated simply, others are taken from history, many 
from the exalted sciences of Egyptian philosophy and theology, so that 
several passages of this book have had entire treatises devoted to them." 
Admittedly, this is not specific. Servius, although filled with admiration 
for VirgiPs wisdom, rarely and seemingly reluctantly allegorizes or 
expounds that wisdom (his explanation of the golden bough is an impor­
tant exception). Neither did Macrobius compile a systematic exegesis of 
the Aeneid, although he does in the course of the Saturnalia expound 
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many specific points. What is important about the work of these men is 
the kind of attitude they set up toward, and the sort of expectations they 
generate about, Virgil and his Aeneid, The poet is a kind of demigod, 
and builds his poem with the same sort of wisdom that built the greater 
creation in which we dwell. It stands to reason then — especially since 
the poet is also a teacher of the order of Cicero and Plato — that in his 
poem we can, if we look rightly, discover profound moral and 
philosophical truths about that larger creation. 
Later commentators addressed themselves directly to the specific 
nature of those truths. The commentary of Fulgentius (De Continentia 
Virgiliana) may strike us as crude and even silly, but it established 
patterns (or simply followed patterns already established) in Virgilian 
exegesis that persisted through and after the Middle Ages. Its expecta­
tions about the Aeneid remain, with some differences in terminology, 
the expectations of the seventeenth century. In Fulgentius's view, 
Virgil's minor poems allegorically reveal the secrets of the physical uni­
verse; the Aeneid concerns itself with "the condition of human life."15 
The subject matter of the poem is the acquisition, management, and per­
fection of wisdom. The shade of Virgil kindly explains to Fulgentius that 
this corresponds in human development to birth, learning, and happi­
ness. (At this point in Fulgentius's commentary, Virgil compares these 
stages to the corresponding stages in the educational process. This link 
between the epic and the process of formal education is a facet of the 
genre that also figures largely in the commentary of Bernardus Silvestris 
and less prominently but still importantly in almost all subsequent read­
ings of the Aeneid.) The kind of wisdom in question Fulgentius's Virgil 
very clearly defines as a philosophical rather than a theological virtue; 
Virgil himself was, as Fulgentius several times has him point out, a pagan 
and not a Christian. This explicit denial of Christian content offers an im­
portant clue not just to the understanding of epic (that seems bound up in 
the notion of wisdom and its affiliations with the educational process) but 
to the medieval approach to secular or profane poetry generally. Fulgen­
tius several times interjects to draw parallels between Virgil's exegesis of 
his own poem and some Christian doctrines; in each case, Virgil firmly 
denies that the specific doctrine was known to him. The parallels remain 
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only parallels, not coincidences or foreshadowings; and what ought to be 
discussed in profane poetry, Virgil implies, is not Christian dogma but 
the highest philosophic and scientific knowledge of the pagan world. 
From this point on, Fulgentius's interpretation of the Aeneid — or 
rather, the interpretation he puts in Virgil's mouth — sets a pattern from 
which later commentaries will scarcely deviate. The philosophical core 
of the Aeneid begins not in medias res but ab ovo, with the birth of man 
into the storms and dangers of the temporal world (the storm and 
shipwreck of book one). The first, second, and third books describe the 
various vagaries and physical and mental imperfections of infancy and 
childhood, up to the point at which Anchises dies. The burial of An­
chises represents Aeneas's release from parental control and his entrance 
into the life of the passions, symbolized by hunting, the storm (violent 
emotional disturbances), and his affair with Dido. At the urging of 
intelligence (Mercury), he abandons love, which then falls to ashes 
(Dido on the funeral pyre). Having reached a more prudent age, he 
follows the memory of parental example and engages in exercises proper 
to a cultured man (the funeral games). In the sixth book, Aeneas ap­
proaches the temple of Apollo, that is, he begins to study the mysteries of 
wisdom. He buries Misenus at this point because Misenus etymologi­
cally means vainglory, and this false pride must be abandoned before he 
can acquire the secrets of wisdom. The entrance of the underworld is his 
entrance into knowledge; here he contemplates the punishments of 
evildoers, the rewards of good men, and the follies of youth. Later, in 
seeing Dido among the shades, he reflects upon his former lust and is 
moved to repentance. He sees many being punished for the dreadful sin 
of pride. His planting the golden bough at the entrance of Elysium 
indicates that when the task of learning is accomplished, it must be 
planted forever in the memory. Elysium means release, a life freed from 
the fear of teachers. 
In the Elysian fields he sees Musaeus first. Musaeus means 
the gift of the Muses, the best poet of them all, who points out 
to him his father and the river, Lethe; the father, that is to say, 
that he may adopt a habit of seriousness, and Lethe, that he 
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may forget childish levity. Just reflect on the name itself of 
Anchises; in Greek Anchises is ano scenon, that is, inhabit­
ing the fatherland. Now there is one God who is the father and 
the king of all, dwelling alone in the heavens who is known 
with the aid of the gift of knowledge. For note what Anchises 
teaches his son: "First, the heaven and earth, and the watery 
plains, the shining globe of the moon and Titan's star."16 
In the seventh book, he arrives at Ausonia (growth in virtue) and 
chooses Lavinia (the way of labors) for his wife. In the eighth book, he 
seeks the help of Evander (the good man or human goodness) and arms 
himself against the attacks of evil. The ninth book describes his struggle 
with Turnus, who represents a violent mind (turos nus). Juturna is the 
sister of Turnus and represents destruction (which lasts long: diuturna), 
both of which Aeneas must overcome. Generally speaking, the second 
six books show the good man, having acquired wisdom, actively struggl­
ing against vice. (For this reason, in commentaries such as Landino's, 
where the wisdom acquired by the hero is defined as an essentially 
contemplative virtue, the last six books have no real place. Landino 
almost totally ignores them and concentrates his attention and the 
emphasis of his interpretation on Aeneas's journey, culminating in the 
achievement of contemplative wisdom in the sixth book.) 
Thus badly condensed and baldly stated, Fulgentius's reading of the 
Aeneid must sound far more absurd than it actually is. His ignoring of 
narrative causality and sequence and his consequent treatment of each 
book as a self-contained unit account for the greatest divergences be­
tween his interpretation and Virgil's text; but the ages-of-man theory, the 
view of epic as a step-by-step examination of the growth and maturation 
of man, that he derived from this method persuaded and satisfied most of 
the Middle Ages — including such eminent minds as Petrarch's and 
Dante's — no doubt because he is not entirely wrong. Tracing the growth 
process from infancy on up may be a distortion, but it is a distortion of a 
process of intellectual maturation that is genuinely present in Virgil's 
text. The Aeneid is most definitely about — among many other things — 
growth in wisdom, and Fulgentius in linking that growth with formal 
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education and with the ages of man simply expressed a sound insight in 
terms congenial to his times. Moreover, though his commentary may 
wander fairly far from the literal meaning of Virgil's text, it is still tied to 
it by two main facts. The first is the assumption, shared by late classical 
culture and the Christian Middle Ages, that Virgil was indeed a 
polymath, and that consequently the Aeneid covertly incorporated a 
great deal of esoteric knowledge that the man seeking true wisdom was 
under every obligation to unearth in every way possible. The second is 
Fulgentius's consistently etymological mode of procedure. For him, 
names — proper names particularly — provide the clues to the deeper 
meaning of the poem, and by etymological analysis (some farfetched in 
the extreme, some sound) he works out the allegory of the poem. A small 
example: the storm in book one is stirred up by Juno through the agency 
of Eolus. Here is Fulgentius's VirgiPs explanation of that event. 
I introduced a shipwreck to represent the danger of birth in 
which there is a risk for the mother in giving birth and a danger 
for the infant in birth itself. The human race is universally 
involved in this necessity. And that you might understand this 
more clearly, this shipwreck was stirred up by Juno who is the 
goddess of birth. She sends Eolus; in Greek Eolus is eon 
that is, destruction of life.17 
Similarly, Fulgentius explains Palinurus as "wandering vision," Mis­
enus as "vainglory," Anchises as "the inhabitor of the fatherland," and 
uses all of these etymologies as clues to the real meaning of the episode. 
It seems important to point out here that, unlike the allegory of 
Scripture, the allegory of the poets, as Fulgentius explains it, is a 
self-enclosed linguistic system. God's word is polysemous, because God 
in effect speaks things as well as words, so that for the interpretation of 
Scripture one can appeal to the nature of the thing as well as to the 
meaning of the word. For poets, only the meaning of the word is 
available, and they must build their microcosms, and critics must pursue 
their meanings, through the shadow of language.18 Narrative, the story, 
is the fie turn, the made-up; the meanings of words are the real — and in 
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poetry at least there is an intrinsic and essential continuity between the 
name and the thing, between the shadow and the body casting the 
shadow, between verbum and verum. For this reason, the hinge of the 
comparison Macrobius draws between the Aeneid and the world turns 
on Virgil's eloquence — his style recreates the variety of the world, and 
that worldly variety itself is implicitly understood to be God's rhetoric of 
things. 
Fulgentius both insists on, and struggles against, the linguistic enclos­
ure of epic. Virgil's earliest remarks in his commentary violate most of 
the rules of grammar and logic to isolate individual words as atoms of 
meaning, the essential seeds of the significance of the whole poem. 
And to satisfy your curiosity more fully on this point, I say 
that there are three stages in human life, the first is to have, 
then to rule over what one has, and thirdly to adorn what one 
rules. Therefore notice that these three stages are set down in 
the one line of ours, that is, arma, virum, and primus. 
Arma} that is, strength, refers to the bodily substance; virum, 
that is, wisdom, refers to the intellectual substance and 
primus, that is, prince, refers to the judging substance. Thus 
you have the three in their proper order, having, ruling, and 
adorning. Therefore under the figure of a narrative (sub 
figuralitatem historiae) I have shown the full condition of 
human life; first, being born, then learning, and finally 
happiness.19 
Bernardus Silvestris's commentary will do the same thing to Virgil's 
sixth book: there Bernardus sets out to explain every word of the text, so 
that his work becomes almost an allegorical lexicon. But both commen­
tators also push against the trap of language and attempt to break through 
the enclosure of epic to the reality outside it. Bernardus tries this by 
using analogy — of which more later — and Fulgentius by his frequent 
appeals to the spectral Virgil to admit cognates with the truths of 
revelation — that is to say, with Scripture. In either case, the poem 
would then be susceptible of analysis according to the methods of 
biblical allegoresis, and the linguistic trap would be successfully sprung. 
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The trick is not a contemptible one: Dante in his Commedia makes the 
claim for his poem that Virgil here implicitly rejects for his, and the 
results prove that the game is worth the candle. This kind of self-
consciousness about its limitations — its style, its rhetoric, its form, its 
dependence on so inadequate a vehicle as language — seems to me 
absolutely characteristic of epic. As the supreme genre of classical and 
neoclassical literary theory, it is the most literary genre in its conscious­
ness of its materials and its desire to transcend them. What epic seems 
always to want to do, and what the writers of epic always to try, is not to 
manipulate words but to shape reality. At least half of the works I am 
going to talk about in this book concern themselves with the way 
literature spills over into life — the way art transmutes itself into reality 
and in the process transforms reality. 
The most important and extensive commentary on the Aeneid 
produced in the Middle Ages, that of Bernardus Silvestris, continues 
quite clearly the attitudes and techniques of Fulgentius.20 Bemardus's 
mode of reading the Aeneid bears close relation to Fulgentius's (and to 
Prudentius's Psychomachia). The name of the character, place, or 
object furnishes the primary clue to its essence; its role in the poem is 
thus examined in this light, and its meaning almost invariably located (as 
in Fulgentius) in a kind of psychomachy — Aeneas the human soul, and 
everything else its affections, virtues, vices, or the temptations or 
maturational stages through which it must pass. The subject matter of 
epic is still, roughly, "the condition of human life." This is by no means 
to belittle Bernardus's work; on the contrary, it is a thoroughly sophisti­
cated piece of literary criticism that shows tact and insight, respect for 
the literal meaning of Virgil's poem, and a consistent logic of exegesis. It 
may be the most important literary critical document of the Middle Ages 
for what it tells us about poetry and the way it was read. The commentary 
is really a tractate on education (cf. the educational concerns of 
Fulgentius's commentary), filled with remarks on the parts and functions 
of the trivium and quadrivium, with special attention devoted to the 
character and office of poetry. 
Since Bernardus's commentary seems to me so crucial a document, I 
propose to discuss it here in some detail.211 will not attempt to point out 
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all the lines of indebtedness to Fulgentius and Macrobius; it is enough to 
know that Bernardus borrowed freely from them and apparently felt few 
qualms about reshaping their ideas for his own purposes. He will quickly 
reveal himself as a further expositor of their general attitude and ap­
proach to Virgil. Bernardus's tone — at least initially — is that of an 
experienced teacher or lecturer expounding familiar or basic material: he 
is jocular, orderly; he makes transitions easily and clearly. One could 
speculate that his Commentum is compiled from lecture notes without 
being at all false to its tone or uncomplimentary to Bernardus. He was 
clearly an excellent teacher. 
He begins by citing Macrobius to the effect that we are to observe two 
kinds of doctrine in the Aeneid, the truth of philosophy and the poetic 
fiction (figmentum). He proceeds to investigate "whence it proceeds and 
how and why [unde agat et qualiter et cur]." Unde provides the poet's 
intention, in this case to tell the story of the Trojan exiles, not according 
to the truth of history (which is found in Dares), but in order to please 
Augustus. He also writes to imitate Homer, book 2 being the equivalent 
of the Iliad, books 1 and 3-12, the Odyssey. Qualiter explains the 
mode of the narration: Virgil employs artificial (in medias res) rather 
than natural (sequential) order. To explain cur, Bernardus remarks that 
poets write for the sake of utility (satirists) or delight (comic poets) or 
both (historic poets). We delight in seeing human experiences imitated, 
and we leam from these examples to seek honesta and to flee illicita. 
For example: from the labors of Aeneas we draw an example of endur­
ance, from his love for Anchises and Ascanius, an example of piety; from 
the veneration he shows toward the gods and from the oracles he seeks, 
from the sacrifices he offers, from the vows and prayers he pours out, we 
are invited to religion. Through his immoderate love for Dido we are 
recalled from desire for illicit things. It is worth noting that for Bernardus 
these form the overt moral of the fictum and explain why the poet is 
narrating these events in the first place; Bernardus has not yet begun 
talking about the covert allegory. 
These three items also serve the office of proem (to both the poem and 
the Commentum, apparently): unde renders the reader docile, qualiter 
benevolent, cur attentive. This accomplished, Bernardus turns his at­
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tention to the philosophic truth of the Aeneid, which is about the nature 
of human life. The mode of procedure is this: sub integumento, Virgil 
describes what the human spirit, temporarily placed in the human body, 
does or suffers. In this writing, he employs natural order and thus 
observes both orders in his work, the poetic using artificial, the 
philosophic natural — as, seemingly, is appropriate to each. "In­
tegumentum vero est genus demonstrationis sub fabulosa narratione 
veritatis involvens intellectum, unde et involucrum dicitur [In fact, the 
integument is a kind of presentation that wraps the significance of the 
truth under a fabulous narrative, whence it is also called the envelope]" 
(p. 3.17-20). We find the usefulness of such a work according to our 
knowledge of ourselves, for as Macrobius says, it is of great utility for a 
man to know himself. These facts explain for Bernardus the "unde et 
qualiter et cur7' of the philosophic doctrine of the poem, and he now 
announces his intention of opening the integument of the twelve single 
books in sequence (in point of fact, his Commentum as we now have it 
breaks off in the middle of book 6). 
Bernardus's mode of procedure is to begin his discussion of each book 
by a summation of the narrative content and to follow that by a summary 
statement of the philosophic content, in a manner similar to Fulgentius's 
Virgil's demands for a summary of the content of each book before his 
exposition of it. Bernardus then goes into greater or lesser detail in his 
explanation according to no pattern that I have been able to discover. 
Indeed, his treatment of book 6 varies even from the simple formal 
pattern just described: it contains little summation of any kind and takes 
the form of an examination of almost every important word of the text. A 
few generalizations are safe however. Bemardus's exegetical technique, 
though refining on Fulgentius's in thoroughness, subtlety, and literary 
sensitivity, resembles the latter's both in ignoring the causality and 
sequence of the plot and in being primarily etymological. The word, the 
name, still furnishes the essential clue to meaning. And like both 
Fulgentius and Macrobius, Bernardus has a strong tendency to platonize 
Virgil and to interpret the poem in the light of Neoplatonic conceptions. 
It will not be possible to reproduce here all or even a large part of 
Bernardus's exegesis, but I will try to give samples of his working 
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method and his critical bias. I hope, too, to demonstrate the extreme 
sophistication of Bernardus's criticism: the Commentum is no naive 
document but (always granting its basic premises) an extremely supple 
piece of analysis. 
For Bernardus, the first book of the Aeneid tells of man's first age. 
Through Eolus, the king of the winds who here evokes the storm at sea, 
we are brought to understand the birth of the child. He is called Eolus 
(eon olus = seculi interitus) because at the birth of man, seculum, that 
is, the life of the soul (vita animae) perishes, while depressed by the 
heaviness (gravitas, but used by Bernardus throughout with the obvious 
etymological connection with pregnancy, gravidus) of the flesh it de­
scends from its divinity and assents to fleshly desire (libidini carnis). 
Thus Eolus sends forth the winds because the birth of man begets 
commotions, that is, vices. With these he attacks the sea, that is, the 
human body, which is a gulf of trackless and uncrossable humors. Here 
already Fulgentius's techniques have been subtilized and refined. The 
whole phenomenon of birth has been worked out linguistically by a 
group of verbs possessing a common sense of producing, begetting, 
bringing forth, which are in turn linked to the entrance of the soul 
(anima, spiritus) into the flesh (carnis, humor, mare) that Bernardus 
expresses succinctly by the meaningful gravitas-gravidus pun. 
Moreover, Bernardus reinforces the purely linguistic link by employing 
a whole body of analogies, the most prominent of which in this section of 
the Commentum is that of the four elements of the universe to the four 
humors of the body — thus the humor of the sea is the humor of the 
body, and the whole seemingly farfetched allegoresis is linked finally to 
VirgiPs text by the touchstones of wind and sea, spiritus and humor, 
present in the text itself. By means of this sort of interpretation, the whole 
poem becomes, in effect, a giant synechdoche, and Bernardus in inter­
preting simply enlarges from part to whole, from particular to general. 
Allegory does not impose itself from without but generates itself from 
within: because for the Middle Ages analogy is true, allegory is neces­
sary. That is to say, allegory is simply the rhetorical mode that embodies 
the dialectical mode of analogy; the two are literary and philosophical 
avatars of each other and are properly fused in a work like the Aeneid 
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that is both literary and philosophical. Parts, as Aquinas says, corre­
spond to parts, and every medieval poet or commentator anticipates 
Ramus in what he makes of images. Analogy and allegory both offer 
imagistic shorthands, particulars that stand in relation to other particu­
lars and to universals beyond them. More important, they validate each 
other: the rhetorical structure reproduces the logical structure of thought, 
and that very correspondence is a further validation of both. In this 
system, the meaning of the thing works to support the interpretation of 
the word, and Bernardus's criticism comes very close to escaping the 
confines of purely linguistic systematizing. It appeals outside itself — 
through analogy — for confirmation, even though it is finally still a 
closed linguistic system. The analogies themselves arise from language, 
and the whole interpretation depends in its totality on language: this 
explains the prominence and importance of Bernardus's synthetic puns 
— puns like gravitas-gravidus or anima as wind and soul or humor as 
sea and element — that linguistically join together disparate areas of 
reference. In the Tale of a Tub, Swift's narrator, Peter and Jack, the 
Sartorists and the Aeolists, will all join forces to turn this mode of 
analysis on its head. 
Bernardus applies these logical and critical categories with some care. 
He knows that circumstances change cases, and his allegorizing almost 
never falls into the wooden equations characteristic of the psychomachy 
as genre. His remarks about the meaning of Aeneas and what these give 
rise to indicate clearly the self-consciousness of his interpretation. 
Aeneas is called the son of Anchises and Venus. Anchises Bernardus 
interprets as celsa inhabitans (loosely, the high-dweller), which we 
understand to be the father of all presiding over all. We understand that 
there are two Venuses, the lawful goddess and the goddess of wanton­
ness. We say that the lawful Venus is 
mundanam musicam i.e. aequalem mundanorum propor­
tionem, quam alii Astraeam, alii naturalem iustitiam vocant. 
Haec enim est in elementis, in sideribus, in temporibus, in 
animantibus [the harmony of the created world, that is, the 
even symmetry of wordly things, which some call Astrea and 
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others call natural justice. This Venus subsists in the ele­
ments, in the stars, in time, in living things], (p. 9.16-18) 
However, we call the shameless Venus, the goddess of wantonness, 
concupiscence of the flesh because she is the mother of all fornications. 
Note here that in this as in other mystical volumes equivo­
cations and multivocations and diverse applications of the 
integument are found. According to Martianus' book, you 
take Jove sometimes for the superior fire, sometimes the star, 
sometimes even the creator himself, Saturn now for time and 
now for the planet, Mercury here for eloquence and there for a 
star. This multiplex signification with respect to the diverse 
meanings of the integument should be observed in all mysti­
cal works, since truth is not static [sin vero stare veritas non 
poterit]. Therefore in this work these things are discovered 
because the same name indicates diverse natures and on the 
other hand different names indicate the same; as when Apollo 
sometimes designates divine wisdom, sometimes human, 
Jupiter sometimes fire, sometimes God [summum deum\ 
Venus sometimes concupiscence of the flesh, sometimes the 
harmony of the world [mundi concordiam]; or when Jupiter 
and Anchises designate the creator. Therefore when you find 
Venus, the wife of Vulcan, the mother of locus and Cupido, 
understand the pleasure of the flesh, because she is joined to 
natural heat and produces levity and sexual desire. Whenever 
you read that Venus and Anchises had a son Aeneas, under­
stand through Venus the harmony of the world, through 
Aeneas the human spirit. For Aeneas is so called because 
ennos demas is the inhabitant of the body [habitator 
corporis]. . . . Demas, the chain, is identified with the 
body because it is the prison of the soul. Therefore Aeneas is 
the son of Venus and Anchises because the human spirit, from 
God, through concord begins to enter and live in the body. 
We say these things about Anchises, Aeneas, and Venus 
because in many places in this book we see they are neces­
sary, (pp. 9.21-10.19) 
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In this manner, Bernardus continues to explain the first book of the 
Aeneid in terms of the tribulations of infancy. The second book he 
interprets briefly as describing boyhood and the acquisition of speech. 
The third book displays the weaknesses and passions of adolescence. 
After various misadventures, Aeneas arrives at Delos, where he is 
warned by Apollo "to seek his ancient mother." 
Two ancient mothers, two regions, Crete and Italy, are the 
two beginnings of Aeneas, the nature of the body and the 
nature of the soul. For by Crete we understand bodily nature, 
which is the beginning of the temporal life of Aeneas. And 
Crete is called by antiphrasis crasis theos, that is, divine 
judgment. For carnal nature judges badly about divine 
things when it places them after temporal. Through Italy, 
which is interpreted ''increase," we understand the nature of 
the soul, which is rationality and immortality, virtue, knowl­
edge. He is ordered to seek these things by Apollo, that is, 
wisdom. For wisdom warns him to love that divinity he 
possesses. But because Aeneas mistakes the oracle, he seeks 
Crete when ordered to go to Italy. He mistook the oracle of 
Apollo in this manner: he sought wisdom from man as you 
read in Boethius [Bernardus here quotes from the 
Consolation of Philosophy, 2 A.12 ft]. . . .(p. 20.3-18) 
Thus misdirected, Aeneas continues wandering and encountering vari­
ous vices until his father dies. 
He buries his father in Drepanum. Drepanum (drimos pes) 
is interpreted puerile acerbity, which is wrath which cus­
tomarily infests boys with excessive fervor. In wrath his 
father is buried, that is, God is given to oblivion. For the 
wrathful are almost apostates. Burial is forgetfulness. (p. 
23.16-21) 
Bernardus's treatment of book 4 provides a good example of both the 
subtlety and implications of his method. The whole interpretation holds 
together by virtue of an elaborate series of physical, emotional, and 
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intellectual analogies that are expressed simultaneously and inter­
changeably by the linguistic relations of the coct-word forms Bernardus 
ubiquitously employs. 
In this fourth book the nature of youth is mystically ex­
pressed. But first we give the narrative summation, then the 
exposition. 
Having buried his father he goes hunting. Driven by storms 
into a cave, he diverts himself with Dido and then commits 
adultery. Which shameful habit he abandons by the counsel 
of Mercury. Dido, having been left behind, withdraws and 
dies, cooked to ashes [Dido vero deserta in cineres excocta 
et demigrat]. 
By manifest and mystic narration the nature of youth is 
described. Burial of the father designates forgetfulness of the 
creator; he assiduously occupies himself in hunting and other 
occupations which pertain to youth. . .  . By storm and rain 
he is forced to the cave, that is, by the commotions of the flesh 
and profusion of humor arising from the superfluity of food 
and drink he is led to the impurity of flesh and libido. Which 
carnal impurity is called cave, because it obscures serenity of 
mind and discretion. The profusion of humor from food and 
drink leads to impurity in this manner: in decoctione there 
are four humors: liquor, fumus, spuma etfaex. After the 
humors of food and drink have been cooked [Decoctis . . . 
humoribus] in the cauldron of the stomach, the fumus thence 
resulting and ascending as the nature of lightness demands 
and by ascending and by purification through the arteries 
made rarer, comes to the brain and produces animal powers 
[animales virtutes]. By liquor the members grow strong. 
Faex is sent out into departure through the lower passages, 
spuma partly through perspiration, partly through the caves 
of the senses \foramina sensuum]. When however there is an 
excessive superfluity of spuma, which occurs in drunken 
feasts and drinking sessions, it is emitted through the male 
organ, which is nearest and subject to the stomach, converted 
into sperm, that is, male seed. Whence you read that Venus is 
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born from the spuma of the sea and so is called "frodon." 
Therefore the rains lead Aeneas to the cave. He is joined to 
Dido and delays a long while with her. The shameful crying of 
rumor does not recall him because youth ensnared in libido 
seeks neither what is lovely, or useful, or shameful, or not. At 
length, after a long deviation, he is warned by Mercury to 
leave. . . . 
He warns and rebukes Aeneas because he finds him not 
regarding any useful task. . . . Aeneas departs from Dido 
and puts aside libido. Dido, abandoned, perishes and parts 
from this life burned into ashes [in cineres excocta]. For 
disused libido fails, and consumed by the fervor of manhood 
falls into ashes, that is, into solitary cogitations, (pp. 23.23-
25.27) 
Superfluity of humor in nature produces rain, in man, physiologically, 
sperm, emotionally, lust, intellectually, sin. All of these result from 
some form of decoction, and the ultimate fate of the libido produced is to 
be consumed in yet another — different and better — decoction. 
Book 5, according to Bernardus, describes the nature of manhood. 
Having abandoned the indulgence of youth, Aeneas now offers four 
exercises in virtue to God (the funeral games in Anchises' honor). The 
games illustrate the virtues of temperance, fortitude, prudence, and 
justice. At the conclusion of this book, Aeneas is warned by the image of 
his father that he will have to descend to hell to see him there. This 
means, says Bernardus, that Aeneas will have to descend to mundane 
things through cogitation, and thus he will see the creator (his father) 
because although the creator is not in creatures, he may be known by the 
cogitation of creatures. At this point in the narrative, the helmsman 
Palinurus (whom Bernardus etymologically interprets as "wandering 
vision") dies. Until now, wandering vision steered the will (ship) of 
Aeneas; but when Aeneas guides it, Palinurus perishes. 
As prologue to his explanation of the sixth book, Bernardus discusses 
the possible meanings of the descensus ad inferos, drawing heavily on 
Macrobius's notions in his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis. 
Essentially, he understands four different kinds of descensus: the way of 
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nature, the way of virtue, the way of vice, and the way of artifice. The 
natural way is birth, the descent of the soul into the body that, he explains 
at length, is properly called infernum. The virtuous way is that of the 
wise man who descends to creatures through contemplation in order to 
better know the creator; such were Hercules and Orpheus. The vicious 
way is to serve temporalia with the whole mind; such was Eurydice. The 
artificial way is, simply, magic. The integument of the sixth book 
describes the fourth way (Bernardus sees the death and cremation of 
Misenus as a magical rite, a sacrifice to demons), while the substrate of 
the book describes the second. Bernardus also links Aeneas's activities 
at this point to the process of formal education: the grove of Trivia is the 
study of eloquence; the three ways equal the three arts — grammar, 
dialectic, and rhetoric. The golden roofs of the temple are the four 
mathematical arts in which the gold of philosophy is contained. The 
faithful Achates is the habit of study. Like Servius, Bernardus links the 
golden bough with the study of philosophy in its two branches, theoretic 
and practical; and like Fulgentius, he sees Aeneas's journey through hell 
as some sort of educational tour. 
Bernardus glosses almost every word of the text in a detailed expan­
sion and explanation of Aeneas's descent as the contemplative descent of 
the wise man to an examination of creatures. It is not possible to 
reproduce this in any great detail; his incomplete commentary on the 
sixth book is more than three times as long as his commentaries on the 
first five books combined. Essentially — and this is perhaps the most 
important aspect of his Commentum — he sees Aeneas's descent with 
the Sybil and his progress through the lower world up to his entrance into 
the Elysian fields as a recapitulation of what has preceded in the poem. 
Just as the spirit descended into matter at birth (a descent to hell in itself: 
the natural way), the mind now descends to a contemplation of creatures 
and reviews the paths it has taken and the errors it has committed: thus 
the meetings with Trojan heroes, thus the encounter with Dido. The 
Sybil herself functions as, and is to be understood in a way similar to7 
Boethius's Lady Philosophy, guiding Aeneas to an understanding of his 
past mistakes. The purpose of this journey is to free Aeneas from his 
bondage to creatures by a thorough knowledge of them, so that he may 
Dryden 45 
pass on to see the creator (i.e., Anchises). This is the circular motion of 
thought as conceived by medieval speculation: the mind descends from 
God into creatures and proceeds through a contemplation of creatures to 
return to God again.22 This circular pattern forms the core of Bernardus's 
understanding of the Aeneid: it is for him a poem about the acquisition of 
wisdom that re-creates in itself the form of the process it describes. This 
notion provides the basis for his explanation of the first half of the poem, 
and he recapitulates it in his interpretation of the first half of book 6 and 
again7 more briefly, in his allegorizations of the myths of Orpheus and 
Eurydice and of Castor and Pollux, both of which he understands as 
expressing the relations of soul and body, divine mind and infernal 
matter. Bernardus's Commentum breaks off before Aeneas enters the 
fields of the blessed and sees Anchises, but from its similarities to 
Fulgentius and from the exegetical patterns he has already set up, we can 
readily see the probable outlines of his allegory: having acquired know­
ledge of terrestrial matters, Aeneas will obtain from Anchises the requis­
ite celestial lore to return to his earthly life and, in yet another recapitula­
tion, triumph over those vices and material forces to which he had earlier 
fallen victim so that, after the conclusion of VirgiPs poem, he will be 
ready to ascend once again to God as the reward of his achieved virtues 
(so at least Maphius Vegius understood the poem in the fifteenth century 
when he wrote a thirteenth book, explicitly giving Aeneas the apotheosis 
he seems to have earned). Aeneas will choose as his wife Lavinia, the 
way of labors, rather than Dido, the way of pleasure. The pattern seems 
quite simple, quite clear. Aeneas accomplishes his first descensus ad 
inferos by birth, as all men must, and he continues it throughout his 
minority by succumbing to a series of vices: these are Bernardus's first 
and third ways. In the sixth book, he once again descends to hell, this 
time according to Bemardus's second and fourth ways, by contemplation 
and by magic. This time of course a conversion takes place, and Aeneas 
comes to a recognition of his failings and begins to mend them. Conse­
quently, in the same book he begins an ascent to God — contemplatively 
here — that will be later continued and confirmed when he returns to 
active life and triumphs over the vices and trials that previously defeated 
him. The Sybil makes this aspect of things explicit when she warns 
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Aeneas that he shall again have to fight Greeks, again encounter an 
Achilles, see another Simois and Xanthus and Doric camp, again be­
cause of a foreign bride, another Helen (Aeneid 6.83-94). So the 
second half of the Aeneid is in effect a repetition of the first half, with the 
important difference that the direction of the narrative and of Aeneas's 
fortunes is upward rather than downward, ascent toward God rather than 
descent to creatures. This sixth book functions as the nexus, the conver­
sion point, that terminates one journey and transforms it into its mirror 
image — all of which, by the way, is not in any structural particular 
untrue to Virgil's text. However much our understanding of the events of 
the Aeneid may differ from Bernardus's, we can hardly quarrel with his 
perception of its structure. 
Cristoforo Landino's immensely important Disputationes Camal­
dulenses continues and refines this kind of reading of the Aeneid.23 Like 
Fulgentius and Bernardus, Landino begins his allegorization ab ovo, 
with "the first age of man." Unlike the earlier commentators, Landino 
does not start with book one of the poem, but rather with the chronologi­
cally earliest events in the poem, Aeneas's recollections of Troy. From 
that point, he proceeds through the sequence of events contained in 
books 1-6, following the loose pattern of the maturation of the hero. 
Landino's hero, however, is not the Everyman of Fulgentius and Ber­
nardus; he is a particularly gifted man working toward a full achievement 
of his traditional epithet, pius — a word that in Landino's reading comes 
to embrace the whole range of relations of fathers and sons, king and 
subject, mind and body, individual intelligence and eternal wisdom (this 
emphasis, by the way, bears very directly on Absalom and Achitophel, 
which Dryden carefully locates "inpious times"). Aeneas's goal is Italy, 
which Landino flatly equates with contemplation, and he struggles to 
free himself from the attractions of corporeal existence and to achieve the 
stability of the contemplative life. Although Landino differs slightly from 
his predecessors in his more careful attention to details of the text (he 
occasionally understands as the allegory of a passage what Bernardus 
would identify as only the overt moral) and in his interpretation of some 
of those details (Anchises, for example, he understands as sensuality 
because he is Aeneas's mortal parent, the father of his body), and 
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although his platonizing of the text is distinctly Renaissance and much 
marked by the thought of his friend Marsilio Ficino (he identifies 
Aeneas's mother Venus with the angelic intelligence discussed in the 
Symposium), the broad outlines of his interpretation still follow those of 
Fulgentius and Bernardus. Aeneas's descent into hell is still the descent 
of the mindm sensualitatem that it may gain knowledge of what ought to 
be sought and what to be avoided. Misenus still remains, etymologi­
cally, false glory, and must be buried before the mind can free itself to 
pursue true knowledge. And however much he ignores the last six books, 
Landino still implicitly preserves Bernardus's mirroring structure in his 
explanation of the Sybil's warning to Aeneas of the graver dangers yet 
before him: having passed through the storms of the active life, he must 
yet face the resurgence of memory and desire for those things that the life 
devoted to contemplation must put aside. 
Since Landino's reading of the Aeneid is discussed in rather great 
detail by Don Cameron Allen in his Mysteriously Meant, and since the 
major points of Landino's exegesis are not that radically different from 
those of his predecessors, it would be just as well here to examine his 
departures from them. Landino makes three really important changes in 
the interpretative tradition: first, he raises his hero to the status of 
exceptional man, destined for glory; second, he focuses attention almost 
exclusively on Aeneas's journey and makes that central to his reading; 
and third, he explains the Dido episode, in accordance with his active-
contemplative dialectic, not as the attraction of carnality but as the lure 
of the active, civic life that distracts man from his progress toward the 
true summum bonum, the contemplation and possession of wisdom. 
This last is completely consistent with Landino's overall view of the 
Aeneid and with the positions taken by the participants in the discus­
sions that form the first two books of the Disputationes Camaldulenses: 
the contemplative life is superior to, and provides the norms for, the 
active life. But consistent or not, these changes put the formal verse epic 
on an unswervable path toward extinction. They set up a crucial disjunc­
tion between tenor and vehicle, between the almost mutually exclusive 
demands of an "executive" story — the journey — and a "deliberative" 
meaning — the growth of a superior mind in contemplative virtue.24 
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Landino's reading of the Aeneid completes a process that began with 
Macrobius by completely externalizing the epic plot and internalizing 
the real action. Faced with this bifurcation, would-be writers of epic had 
two choices: to perpetuate the split but utilize it through allegory, as 
Spenser did (who, incidentally, also disposes of contemplation as an 
ultimate goal in his first book when he has the holy hermit point out to 
Red Crosse Knight that he is not called to contemplation, that he must 
return to the world and the active life); or to jettison the external action 
and redefine human heroism in purely internal terms, as Milton did.25 In 
any event, after Landino the breach must have been apparent. Epic was 
inextricably tied up with notions of education, of knowledge, of wisdom. 
That did not change, but the meanings of those words most emphatically 
did. If in the Middle Ages the words knowledge and wisdom could 
encompass the whole range of human consciousness, from what we 
would consider basic common sense through to the theological entity 
Wisdom, by the Renaissance those meanings had flown apart, and 
contemplative wisdom grew steadily more remote from life. The aesthe­
tics of the sublime, tied onto epic in the course of the revival of 
Longinus, perhaps only raised two notes higher what had become an "  0 
Altitudo" already beyond the range of human hearing. 
So too with the epic hero. Following Landino's lead, later commen­
tators and critics increased his stature from exceptional man to impossi­
ble man; they made a paragon of him. At the logical conclusion of this 
process, neoclassical epic theory demanded a perfect hero whose charac­
ter is a constant, who is the absolutely devoted and aware servant of a 
cause that is really the subject of the poem. The hero became personali­
tyless, identified with and desiring only the cause. He became the 
commander-in-chief, the leader of the cause. His supremacy of rank was 
the prerequisite of his being the chosen hero. His nobility now meant the 
end of his freedom of action, the subordination of his high qualities to the 
will of the cause. As a character symbolizing the beliefs and endeavors of 
a whole people or culture, he had to concern himself with the govern­
ment of a state in its religious, political, and cultural aspects.26 For 
illustration of the literal truth of all this, one need only read Fenelon. His 
Telemaque is totally personalityless — indeed, comes at last to the 
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explicit realization that the ideal ruler must be totally selfless, having no 
desires whatever that spring from himself. Telemaque is a good illustra­
tion of the absolute irrelevance of neoclassical conceptions of epic: it 
could only possibly apply to one man, or a very few men, in a whole 
society; and what it demands of them, or would teach them, is simply 
beyond the reach of human nature. 
Most of these notions are simply exaggerations or literalizations of 
traditional, and in many cases quite sound, insights into epic. They 
result, it seems to me, from a confusion of the interpretation and the 
poem, or — at worst — from a substitution of the interpretation for the 
poem. Epic, at the close of the Renaissance, had to bear the burden of its 
own hermeneutics. What I want to explore in the rest of this book is the 
process by which epicists first exploited that burden and then freed 
themselves of it, the process by which they restored epic to itself. 
IV 
Absalom and Achitophel provides a small-scale, straightforward 
adaptation of epic materials and a synopsis of the state of traditional epic 
poetry in the late seventeenth century. Central to it is the hero's recogni­
tion of his identity and goal, just as the revelations of book 6 are crucial 
to Aeneas's knowledge of himself and his goal, both in the fable and in 
the allegory. Dryden depicts this twice: parodically, as Achitophel 
tempts Absalom to assume a false messianic role,27 and straightfor­
wardly, as David abandons the indulgence of the doting father and 
accepts his proper role as divinely appointed ruler. The hero's self-
knowledge — the kind of wisdom he is to attain and consequently the 
kind of person he is to be — determines the direction and shape of epic. 
David, as "godlike" ruler, must abandon his fatherly feelings and human 
compassion for his divine role. He must raise himself above human 
vicissitude to divine immutability. In the poem, David does not change, 
he only repeats; his mortal paternity is reiterated in his implicit divine 
paternity at the end of the poem and i;Once more the Godlike David was 
Restored" (1030). 
The poem takes its shape from this static conception of David. For 
50 Epic to Novel 
one thing, in Absalom and Achitophel — even the title is revealing in 
this respect — only the villains act. David and his party literally do 
nothing. Dryden identifies David so closely with the God whose image 
he bears that he seems to share in the divine immutability: he is so 
tightly linked to the cause he personifies, the reflection in the good order 
of human society of God's providential governing of the universe, that 
Dryden is forced in the poem to present him as essentially inhuman — 
personalityless, actionless, almost passionless, a mere exponent of the 
office he occupies. Everything about the fable assumes a necessity, an 
immutability, that is at once historical and ontological: given such and 
such evil men, given such and such a hero with such virtues, given a just 
and watchful God, given such historical precedent, then such a conclu­
sion follows of necessity. 
Even with Dry den's skillful handling, the static nature of the narrative 
stands out sorely and perhaps explains the many critical complaints 
about the incompleteness of the poem and the unrelatedness of its 
conclusion. Dryden has made of the allegorical epic fable and the 
exemplary hero that prescriptive criticism required of him an extended 
metaphysical conceit, in which the important factors are not what the 
human characters do but the changes that can be rung on the ideas they 
embody. He has structured the poem out of a series of antinomies that 
are finally resolved into oxymoric unities — the rebels and the 
royalists, motion and stability, time and eternity, flesh and spirit, idol 
and God, nature and grace, lie and truth. The Davids of the beginning 
and the end of the poem remain the same person: what changes is only 
our perspective on him, which of the king's two bodies Dryden directs 
our attention to. This process wrenches the epic out of the area of even 
ritualized human drama or even the formalized interactions of per­
sonalities and wills and moves it closer to the domain of psychomachy 
where ideas and virtues act directly upon each other with the essentially 
passive human soul as prize rather than protagonist: the ultimate hero of 
such an epic must become one of Swift's Houyhnhnms. 
But Dryden also exploits several facets of the traditional epic that 
continue after him to play a large and important role, principally in the 
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development of the novel. His shifting of perspective from time to 
eternity, from the here-and-now to the over-arching providential plan 
and its consequent escape from motion into rest — these, for instance, 
become of increasing importance to Fielding, until they find their natural 
scope in Amelia, the last important attempt to write a "regular" epic in 
English. More important, Dryden clearly preserves and transmits the 
same sort of symmetrical structural pattern the commentators saw in the 
Aeneid: across the central nexus of the disquisition on government, 
parts correspond to parts — David's human paternity and divine, 
Absalom's false messianic role and David's true one, a catalogue of 
villains and a catalogue of heroes, the descending action of the conspi­
racy and near-rebellion and the ascending action of the loyalists and the 
king's stand.28 Neither do I think it farfetched to see in Dryden's detailed 
analogy between particular bodies and the body politic, between what 
boils in Absalom and what ferments in the mob, a strong similarity to the 
Virgilian commentators' concern with the "physiology" of intellectual 
and emotional processes: Swift's Tale of a Tub will exploit this aspect of 
epic. In addition, Dryden preserves the self-consciousness of epic about 
its own limitations: his implicit appeal outside the poem to the divine 
Word for verification is of a piece with the commentators' attempts to 
break through fiction into reality — an eruption that Pope will render 
chillingly in Dulness's "uncreating word." The emphasis Dryden conse­
quently puts upon the central position of verbal truth, the right use of 
words, also looms large in mock epics and novels, from his own 
MacFlecknoe through A Tale of A Tub and The Dunciad and into 
Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones. But Dryden's poetic revitalization of 
the conservative ideas of a patriarchal, patrilinear society forms his 
greatest contribution to the tradition that will culminate in Fielding's 
novels. In Absalom and Achitophel, the structural pivot point is the 
disquisition on government, which is couched in terms of the relations of 
fathers and sons, and David's paternity is the source of the poem's major 
problem. Virgil never let his reader forget the importance of Aeneas's 
paternity or of the race that will succeed him, from lulus down to Julius 
and Augustus Caesar; and Homer drew a concise picture of the restora­
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tion of proper patriarchal order and government when he showed, at the 
end of the Odyssey, Odysseus standing between his father Laertes and 
his son Telemachus, preparing to assert their hegemony over the island 
kingdom of Ithaca — a picture not greatly different, ideologically, from 
the scene at the end of Absalom and Achitophel where David stands 
between his God and his ultimate progeny to assert hegemony over his 
island kingdom. Neither does that scene differ greatly from the conclu­
sion of another allegorical epic, Torn, Jones, where Tom, at last restored 
to his proper relation with the paternal Squire Allworthy, is last seen 
founding his own family on his newly acquired private Hesperia, Squire 
Western's estate. The image of paternity and its associated ideas of 
fertility and birth lend themselves readily to parody, too, as Dry den 
shows in MacFlecknoe, where misuse of language leads to miscreation 
of all sorts. Such ideas crop up with an insistence that demonstrates their 
importance in A Tale of A Tub, Gulliver's Travels, The Dunciad, and 
Tristram Shandy, in all cases owing greater or lesser debts to the pattern 
established by Dryden. At any rate, all of this provides the final context 
in which it is necessary to see Dryden's poem: if we can see in David's 
stand against the rebels the same definitive stand against the forces of 
social disorder that Virgil portrayed in Aeneas's struggle with Turnus or 
Homer in Odysseus's battle with the suitors; if we can see in David's 
verbal assertion of the order of law and grace the same imposition of 
physical and metaphysical order that the divine fiat fixed upon chaos, 
then we are that much closer to a true understanding of Dryden's fiction 
and the resonances it held for its seventeenth-century audience. 
V 
Although chronologically prior, MacFlecknoe logically succeeds 
Absalom and Achitophel. It is full-blown mock epic: its protagonists, 
Flecknoe and Shadwell, stand in the same debased parodic relation to 
the conventional epic hero — to Aeneas, say — as Satan does to God. 
MacFlecknoe, moreover, bites the tail of epic and turns it upon itself. 
Its obsessive concern with literature, with language, with words, per­
verts the closed linquistic system of epic and transforms the container of 
the highest wisdom into a sterile bag of wind — literally and figuratively. 
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It begins the demonstration, which The Dunciad will complete, of the 
manner in which bad art and dullness debase life. 
London appears in MacFlecknoe as Augusta — "The fair Augusta 
much to fears inclin'd" of lines 64-65. Dryden's few descriptive details 
pertinently link the city with Flecknoe and Shadwell and transform it 
from a place, the mere locus of their empire, to an actual extension of 
them and an embodiment of their art. The name Augusta itself connects 
the city with Flecknoe, whom the opening of the poem compared to 
Augustus (3). The Barbican and its surroundings (66-84) share, in their 
collapse, in the general decay to which all human things are subject and 
which, in Flecknoe's particular case, provides the occasion of the poem. 
It, too, like Flecknoe, is anow flouishing in Peace, / And blest with 
issue of a large increase" (7-8; cf. 72-78); and its mother-strumpets, 
infant punks, future heroes, and little Maximins provide a handy gloss on 
the nature of Flecknoe's progeny and confuse artistic and sexual produc­
tion in exactly the same way that he and Shadwell do. Augusta's inclina­
tion to political fears parallels ShadwelPs inclination to artistic dullness 
(65; cf. 189-90), and the line describing the Barbican — "An ancient 
fabrick, rais'd t'inform the sight" (66) — significantly reproduces the 
language and thought of one of Flecknoe's tributes to Shadwell: "his 
goodly Fabrick fills the eye" (25). Dryden metamorphoses Augusta into 
a body of which Flecknoe and Shadwell are the mind and soul. 
Flecknoe chooses the city as the site of Shadwell's throne because it is 
receptive to the kind of empire he seeks to found there: city taste is ready 
for Shadwell. The genealogy Dryden has Flecknoe so carefully provide 
for his successor — Dekker, Heywood, Shirley, Ogilby — forces us to 
see Shadwell as the culmination of a long line of vulgar, inept poets who 
stand as representative of, and spokesmen for, the tastes of the city 
audience.29 That taste preferred masque, music, and spectacle to 
poetry, pageantry and opera to heroic drama;30 and this, I think, exp­
lains the appropriateness of the moldering "fabrick, rais'd t'inform the 
sight" as the location of Shadwell's throne: it physically recreates 
Shadwell's and the city's aesthetic. For this same reason, Shadwell is 
described in identical terms: the style is the man (and that, I may say 
prematurely, is the secret of MacFlecknoe.) 
Shadwell's city genealogy reflects more than bad taste, however: it 
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also possesses a political aspect that illuminates another facet of 
London's role in the poem. By placing Shadwell in succession from a 
string of city poets and from Ogilby, who had managed the city's 
ceremonies at the coronation of Charles II, Dryden identifies him with 
the fluctuations of London's political allegiance — a trick that Shadwell 
himself made easier by his fawning dedication of Psyche (to which 
MacFlecknoe frequently alludes) to the Duke of Monmouth.31 The 
political aspects of Flecknoe's and Shadwell's roles have been present 
fairly explicitly from the beginning of the poem, of course, in the overt 
analogy of Flecknoe's kingdom of nonsense. More particularly, the 
comparison of him to Augustus would serve to call to mind the contem­
porary comparisons of the restoration of the Stuarts to the accession of 
Augustus and thus link Flecknoe in some strained way with Charles II. 
More explicitly, of course, Flecknoe's confrontation of the problem of 
succession aligns him with Charles and the Exclusion Crisis and makes 
the whole situation of MacFlecknoe roughly — very roughly — analo­
gous to the contemporary political situation. 
Neither Flecknoe nor Shadwell is Charles, however, and there are in 
Dryden's presentation of his case some significant differences that enable 
us to see them as the opposite in art of what Charles is in politics. 
Flecknoe's succession problem, for instance, involves not the fact that 
he has no legitimate son but that he has too many. And again unlike 
Charles, although Flecknoe rules "Through all the Realms of 
Nonsense, absolute" (6), his is also paradoxically an elective monar­
chy, as is shown by his choice of successor (rather than succession on the 
basis of primogeniture) and by his people's ratification of that choice: 
"He paus'd, and all the people cry 'd^m^'1 (144). All this tends to make 
him a figure more like Cromwell than like Charles and to tighten the 
bonds among Flecknoe, Shadwell, and the city. 
This identification of the protagonists with their scene appears to be 
part of the overall strategy of the poem. Dryden on the one hand makes of 
Flecknoe, Shadwell, and Augusta (the use of the literary name rather 
than its common one has value too) interchangeable counters, signs of 
and for each other: in the most literal sense, Augusta embodies what 
Flecknoe and Shadwell stand for. On the other hand, this identification 
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enables Dryden to blur distinctions, to force the various theoretically 
("in real life") distinct characters of the satire actually ("in art") to merge 
together: that is, Dryden erases the border line between art and reality, 
between person and thing, mind and matter, just as Flecknoe's empire 
ignores it. One bad poet, in such a world, can be the equivalent of a 
Whiggish city just as easily as he can be an example of simple dullness; it 
is, after all, just a matter of words. For example: the queens and future 
heroes, unfledged actors and infant punks of the Nursery (74-78) mingle 
promiscuity and rant just as Shadwell, "SwelFd with the Pride of thy 
Celestial charge; / And big with Hymn'1 (40-41), graphically merges 
two kinds of miscreation. The distinction between sexual and artistic 
creativity (and/or sterility) has been completely lost. 
Against this background, the central action of MacFlecknoe, the 
coronation, acquires new depth of meaning. Dryden leads us to see in it 
not just the passing on of empire but the founding of a city, apolis, with 
all that that implies about the building of a civilization and a culture. His 
allusions to the Aeneid draw almost exclusively on the Virgilian preoc­
cupation with the founding of Rome: his references to Shadwell as "our 
young Ascanius" (108) and uRom,e's other hope" (109) recall precisely 
this emphasis of the Aeneid. Dryden draws the analogy quite overtly 
when Shadwell, at his coronation, sees "twelve reverend Owls1' (129): 
So Romulus, 'tis sung, by Tyber*s Brook, 
Presage of. Sway from twice six Vultures took. 
(130-31) 
The vultures, as Plutarch reports, indicated not only that Romulus 
should rule but also where the city should be built.32 This is the main 
action that MacFlecknoe imitates, the founding of Rome, the city of 
Augustus, the new Troy: Shadwell is founding Augusta, the English 
Troynovant.33 
If the similarity I earlier suggested between Sh&dwell and the city is at 
all true, their likenesses should extend beyond their mutual "thoughtless 
majesty" to more substantial flaws. This, I think, is the case. Dryden 
presents both Flecknoe and Shadwell on one hand and Augusta on the 
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other as essentially self-contradictory: he embodies in them opposing 
characteristics that reflect their mutual confusions of value and role. 
Augusta is Rome, but it is also Carthage; Dryden calls Shadwell As­
canius, but he casts him as Hannibal. 
At his right hand our young Ascanius sate, 
Rome's other hope, and pillar of the State. 
His Brows thick fogs, instead of glories, grace, 
And lambent dullness plaid around his face. 
As Hannibal did to the Altars come, 
Sworn by his Syre a mortal Foe to Rome; 
So Sh— swore, nor should his Vow bee vain, 
That he till Death true dullness would maintain; 
And in his father's Right, and Realms defence, 
Ne'er to have peace with Wit, nor truce with Sense. 
(108-17) 
The "lambent dullness" recalls the lambent flames that played around 
Ascanius's brow and convinced Anchises of Aeneas's mission, thus 
initiating the journey that brought them to Italy (Aeneid 3.166-68). 
Immediately after this in MacFlecknoe follows the vow that brought 
Hannibal to Rome for very opposite reasons: Silius Italicus's description 
of the scene has Hannibal explicitly swearing to once again destroy Troy 
— "Rhoeteaquefatarevolvam" (Punica 1.115). All of these contradic­
tions, however, are absorbed into the overriding reversal of the idea of 
Rome: the eternal city becomes the site of temporal decay; the Rome of 
law and culture dwindles to an Augusta of disorder and dullness. In the 
Flecknoe-Shadwell version of nature and art, there is nothing else. As 
Shadwell bears Flecknoe's "perfect image" (15), and as ShadwelFs 
characters are "All full of [him], and differing but in name" (162), so, 
too, Dryden makes their city in their own image, and renders the act of 
crowning Shadwell identical to the act of founding Augusta: they are in 
fact tautological. 
Image — both the word and the conception — brings us closer to the 
center of MacFlecknoe. Flecknoe's quandary about the succession and 
the basis of his resolution of that problem provide the first major use of 
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the word in the poem and invoke most of the ideas about it which the rest 
of the poem will reverberate. 
'tis resolv'd; for Nature pleads that He 
Should onely rule, who most resembles me: 
Sh-— alone my perfect image bears, 
Mature in dullness from his tender years. 
Sh— alone, of all my Sons, is he 
Who stands confirmed in full stupidity. 
(13-18) 
Although nature may plead for Shadwell ("What share have we in Nature 
or in Art?" Flecknoe will later ask), Flecknoe's argument is ultimately 
drawn from supernature. His language rather obviously echoes the 
scriptural description of God's creation of man: "So God created man in 
his own image, in the image of God created he him" (Genesis 1:27). If 
this is the case, of course, then Flecknoe becomes a figure of God the 
Father — a preposterous enough idea, even if we accept it metaphori­
cally as referring to him in his capacities as playwright and king: that then 
makes of Shadwell a creature with the same level of existence as 
Flecknoe's plays (most of which, appropriately, have not survived). 
This confusion of Shadwell's status is, I think, deliberate on Dry den's 
part and useful for his purposes, but discussion of this aspect of the 
passage will have to wait until other elements in the poem are clarified. 
More important than the reminiscence of the language of Genesis is 
Dryden's appropriation of ideas drawn from the theology of the Logos, 
the second person of the Trinity, who bears the "perfect image" of the 
Father. The situation at this point most resembles Milton's descriptions 
of the Father's promulgation of the regency of his Son {Paradise Lost, 
book 5), but it also draws upon the same sort of conceptions that Milton 
utilizes in Book 3, the dialogue in heaven between the Father and Son 
about the fate of man. There the second person is presented in his 
capacity as the Logos, the perfect expression of the Father: "in him all 
his Father shone, / Substantially express'd . . .  " (Paradise Lost, 
3.139-40). This particular locus makes more than this clear, however, 
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since the dialogue between the two persons necessarily dramatizes 
explicitly the implicit relationship between them. That relationship is, in 
human terms, tautological. What the Father speaks, the Son embodies 
and repeats. For example, after announcing that man will fall and be 
punished, God concludes, "But Mercy first and last shall brightest 
shine" (3.134). Here is what follows that statement: 
Beyond compare the Son of God was seen 
Most glorious, in him all his Father shone 
Substantially express'd, and in his face 
Divine compassion visibly appear'd, 
Love without end, and without measure Grace, 
Which uttering thus he to his Father spake. 
O Father, gracious was that word which clos'd 
Thy sovran sentence, that Man should find grace 
{Paradise Lost, 3.138-45) 
To make the relationship even more clear, Milton has built Christ's 
speech out of almost every device of repetition known to Renaissance 
rhetoric — again, for example: 
For should Man finally be lost, should Man 
Thy creature late so lov'd, thy youngest Son 
Fall circumvented thus by fraud, though join'd 
With his own folly? that be from thee far, 
That far be from thee, Father, who art Judge 
Of all things made, and judgest only right. 
Or shall the Adversary thus obtain 
His end, and frustrate thine, shall he fulfil 
His malice, and thy goodness bring to naught. . .? 
(Paridise Lost, 3.150-58) 
The whole dialogue is formed from just such dramatization of the basic 
theological relationship, and I suggest that Dryden here draws upon this 
same relationship for his own ends. A few lines further on in this passage, 
Dryden makes this explicit when he has Flecknoe refer to Shadwell as a 
Christie anti-type of his "Old Testament" precursors: 
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Heywood and Shirley were but Types of thee, 
Thou last great Prophet of Tautology: 
(29-30) 
To finish the parallel, Dryden reverts to it once more at the crucial point 
of the anointing of Shadwell, the climax of the coronation ceremony: 
The Syre then shook the honours of his head, 
And from his brows damps of oblivion shed 
Full on the filial dullness . . . 
(134-36) 
He here alludes to a specific text in Paradise Lost:34 
He said, and on his Son with Rays direct 
Shone full; hee all his Father full exprest 
Ineffably into his face receiv'd, 
And thus the filial Godhead answering spake. 
(Paradise Lost, 6.719-22) 
Immediately before this, God has transferred to Christ power to defeat 
Satan and to teach him and his followers what it means "to despise / God 
and Messiah his annointed King" (6.717-18). 
The logical question to ask at this point is, of course, what all this 
means. It means, on one very simple level, the obvious charge that 
Flecknoe and Shadwell are tautological writers, that their plays are filled 
with repetitions both of themselves and of other writers — hackwork and 
plagiarism. And it means, equally obviously, that the relation between 
Flecknoe and Shadwell is tautological, that they are repetitions of each 
other, mirror images of dullness. But the text says that explicitly, and we 
certainly do not need an elaborate theological framework for the com­
monplaces of a literary quarrel. What all this really implies is that the 
relationship among Flecknoe, Shadwell, and their respective plays is 
totally tautological, not just literarily, but onto logically as well: the 
"issue of a large increase" with which Flecknoe is blessed (8) — and this 
includes Shadwell as well as Flecknoe's plays — is (not "is like") a 
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repetition of himself, just as ShadwelPs plays are "Not Copies drawn, 
but Issue of thy own" (160) and so repeat him — "All full of thee, and 
differing but in name" (162). Flecknoe explicitly counsels Shadwell 
about his foolish characters: 
Let 'em be all by thy own model made 
Of dullness, and desire no foreign aid 
(157-58) 
This creation in Shadwell's own image returns us to our starting point in 
Genesis and completely rounds out the tautology by now casting Shad-
well as God the Father. 
The fundamental point of this elaborate analogy rests on the role of the 
Logos in creation. God creates by and through the Word: the Word is the 
agent and model of creation. What Flecknoe and Shadwell produce 
amounts to a travesty of the divine creativity. Their version of it reduces 
it to the all-too-human level of simple foolishness. If tautology is 
meaningful in God — and in orthodox Christianity it is the one meaning­
ful act that provides the ground for all other acts — in man it is boring. 
God is tautological: his existence and essence are identical, as Aquinas 
and many others point out. He expresses himself in tautologies: in the 
Logos, who mirrors him; in his tautological declaration to Moses, "I am 
that I am77; in his creation of man in his own image. But God is 
tautological because there is nothing outside of himself to which he can 
refer; he encompasses all being and provides its ground and source. In 
this sense, God is a closed ontological system, just as epic is a closed 
linguistic system: in both, tautology is the ground of being and meaning. 
God creates out of this fullness of being; Flecknoe and Shadwell create 
out of their vacuity. Shadwell, bearing Flecknoe's "perfect image," 
"never deviates into sense" (20). His fools "stand in [his] defence, / And 
justifie their Author's want of sense" (155-56); that last pentameter 
beautifully and pointedly parodies Milton's "And justify the ways of God 
to men." There is no distinction between them and their creations, just as 
there can be no distinction between them as persons. Here, of course, 
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lies the total difference between their creativity and God's: his creation is 
really distinct from him, just as the Son is really distinct from the Father. 
The divine tautology results in infinite variety, the human one in mere 
repetition. God unites three in one, but Flecknoe and Shadwell repeat 
one in two. 
Theologically and literarily, in Genesis and in epic, the word bridges 
the gap between human and divine, between material and spiritual, and 
herein lies the enormity of what Flecknoe and Shadwell do. They 
reverse that process and use the word to divide, to subtract soul from 
body. Their creations are marked not by life but by corporeality; sheer 
physical bulk is their distinguishing characteristic, inertness their chief 
glory: Flecknoe calls Shadwell "A Tun of Man" (195); "his goodly 
Fabrick fills the eye" (25); "loads of Sh-~ almost choakt the way" (103). 
Appropriately, Dryden depicts this by means of an essentially blighted 
sexuality and ubiquitous scatology. ShadwelPs throne is erected on the 
scene "of lewd loves, and of polluted joys" (71); he early practiced the 
lore of Love's Kingdom (124); Psyche sprung from his loins (125) — 
surely an unlikely source for Psyche.35 Even "his Sceptre and his rule of 
Sway" (123) priapically and perhaps autoerotically comments on the 
sterile bawdry of his plays. Flecknoe offers to teach him "Pangs without 
birth, and fruitless Industry" (148), a lesson he seems not to need, since 
he begins the poem "big with Hymn" (41) and ends it still flatulent and 
swollen, a "mountain belly" with "a tympany of sense" (193-94) — 
certainly the longest false pregnancy in literature.36 I presume it is only 
academic squeamishness that has prevented someone from pointing out 
that Dryden's consistent use of uSh—" frequently demands, despite the 
meter, a moiiosyllabic reading. I doubt that when the echoes call from 
"Pissing-Ally" (47). it is "Shadwell" they are saying. Surely, after we 
have been told that "neglected Authors" are "Martyrs of Pies, and 
Reliques of the Bum" (100-101), we must read "Loads of 5A—" (103) 
scatologically. And it seems to me equally clear that the "double portion 
of his Father's Art" (2 17) that Shadwell inherits shares this same taint. At 
any rate, all of this exactly defines the nature of Flecknoe's and 
Shadwell's art. Quintessential^ material, it represents the overflow of 
life and energy only in the most grossly parodic sense; it is formed from 
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the remnants of life rather than from life itself. The metaphor is precise, 
and quite unanswerable. 
Imagery of this sort enables Dry den to make maximum use of bodies 
as a debasing device, as he did in Absalom and Achitophel, since all 
flesh becomes tainted by association with its least reputable uses. This 
results in the poem in the pronounced emphasis upon the physical 
representation of what is not necessarily perceived as physical. The 
dwelling on ShadwelPs enormous size is straightforward and obvious 
enough, but Dryden continues to employ the language of physical 
properties when talking about what should be intellectual or artistic 
matters. Flecknoe warns Shadwell not to let "alien S-dl-y interpose, / To 
lard with wit thy hungry Epsom prose" (163-64). Sir Formal fills his 
dedications (169-70) just as his characters — once more tautologically 
— are full of him (162). Shadwell "whole Eth'ridg dost transfuse" (184) 
to his plays. His "writings lean on one side still" (191); he himself is "A 
Tun of Man" and "a Kilderkin of wit" (195-96). In the same way too the 
kingdom of letters is reified. Dryden accomplishes this in part by 
localizing it for the moment in London and suggesting thereby that it 
actually possesses physical extension. Flecknoe, with his insistent 
materialization of all metaphor, finishes the task: 
Heavens bless my Son, from Ireland let him reign 
To farr Barbadoes on the Western main: 
Of his Dominion may no end be known, 
And greater than his Father's be his Throne. 
Beyond loves Kingdom let him stretch his Pen. 
(139-43) 
Such a process as this inevitably leads to a blurring of distinctions 
between fictions and facts and among people, places, and plays. Fleck­
noe consistently fails to differentiate between his artistic and his actual (if 
any) progeny; and Shadwell, as we have already seen, falls somewhere in 
a shadowy area between the two. In this same manner, at the coronation 
the path of the procession is strewn with "scatter'd Limbs of mangled 
Poets" (99), an image that drastically reifies Horace's already metaphor­
ically concrete "disjecta membra poetae ,"37 In the same passage, the 
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neglected authors who come from dusty shops, "Martyrs of Pies, and 
Reliques of the Bum" (100-101) are equally ambiguous: they could just 
as easily be books or people. The same confusion holds true when 
Flecknoe speaks of Shadwell's characters, who are his ambiguous issue: 
Yet still thy fools shall stand in thy defence, 
And justifie their Author's want of sense. 
Let 'em be all by thy own model made 
Of dullness, and desire no foreign aid: 
That they to future ages may be known, 
Not Copies drawn, but Issue of thy own. 
Nay let thy men of wit too be the same, 
All full of thee, and differing but in name. 
(155-62) 
In another instance of this, Sir Formal attends his pen (169-70) just as 
earlier in the poem Dekker foretold that his pen would bring forth 
"Humorists and Hypocrites . . . I Whole Raymond families, and 
Tribes of Bruce" (92-93). This whole process culminates, of course, in 
the mad science-fiction moment when the creatures slip from the 
creator's control, assume autonomy, and turn on their inventor: 
He said, but his last words were scarcely heard, 
For Bruce and Longvil had a Trap prepar'd, 
And down they sent the yet declaiming Bard. 
(211-13) 
Here the artifact has achieved the same level of existence as the artist — 
or vice versa — and the artist pays the price for his own hack work. His 
inability to make clear distinctions in the realm of art produces, in the 
realm of being, a world that is all Love's Kingdom, populated only by 
Humorists, Hypocrites, andVirtuosos. Sloppy art, Dryden is arguing, 
effects a confusion in reality; or, put another way, since our art embodies 
the reality we live in, confusion in art and reality are necessary corol­
laries of each other. This relation between art and reality goes far beyond 
a simplistic mirror-to-nature conception: it is essentially the relation­
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ship of the first and second persons of the Trinity, tautological, two 
versions of the same thing. Thus the incoherence of Flecknoe's and 
ShadwelPs minds is the incoherence of the world they create around 
them, and they themselves are no more or less real than their characters 
Bruce or Longvil.38 From this point of view, MacFlecknoe is a poem as 
much about ontology as about literature — as indeed epic has always 
been. 
Once again the hapless Shadwell bears the burden of this unreality. 
Flecknoe presents him to us as the incarnation of this tautology, as what 
Pope will later call the anti-Christ of wit: 
Heywood and Shirley were but Types of thee, 
Thou last great Prophet of Tautology: 
Even I, a dunce of more renown than they, 
Was sent before but to prepare thy way; 
And coursly clad in Norwich Drugget came 
To teach the Nations in thy greater name. 
My warbling Lute, the Lute I whilom strung 
When to King John of Portugal I sung, 
Was but the prelude to that glorious day, 
When thou on silver Thames did'st cut thy way, 
With well tim'd Oars before the Royal Barge, 
Swell'd with the Pride of thy Celestial charge; 
And big with Hymn, Commander of an Host, 
The like was ne'er in Epsom Blankets tost. 
(29-42) 
Dryden conglomerates a good many traditional motifs here, all of them 
pointing with greater or lesser precision to Shadwell as poet, prophet, 
and messiah. The reference to Heywood and Shirley as types of Shad-
well, Flecknoe's description of himself as John the Baptist and his 
parody of the inspired harpist and poet David (another type of Christ), all 
force us to see Shadwell as a travesty of Christ, areductio ad absurdum 
of the divine tautology. The divine Word was made flesh, and this was 
paradox enough for seventeen centuries of Christianity; but Dryden 
provides us in MacFlecknoe with paradoxes on top of that: the satire 
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makes ShadwelPs flesh, his mode of existence, exclusively verbal, while 
at the same time demonstrating how he converts all words to flesh, 
reduces them to inert matter. Shadwell, tautological in every respect, 
becomes the vehicle for his own very literal incarnation of the word: he is 
"Swell'd with the Pride of [his] Celestial charge"; he bears the word 
within him, "big with Hymn." Another aspect of this confusion of 
literature and reality, spirit and matter, can be seen in Flecknoe's later 
description of Shadwell, "A Tun of Man in thy Large bulk is writ" (195), 
where the word once again merges into the flesh. Here, of course, we are 
dealing explicitly with a parody, a debasement, of the central moment of 
Christian history. If the Incarnation of Christ actualizes the nexus of 
human and divine, ShadwelPs false pregnancy shatters that connection. 
What he produces is the complete reification, the total corporealization, 
of word and spirit. His flatulence parodies inspiration, and his verbal and 
physical constipation for the duration of the poem (Shadwell never 
speaks in MacFlecknoe) again quite literally embody Dryden's final 
judgment on the man and his works. 
All of this elaborate theological paraphernalia provides the basis for 
the poem's mode of procedure: the playing with the theology of the Logos 
subverts the framework of reality and brings into being an exclusively 
verbal world — but a verbal world that is paradoxically trapped in 
matter. If God, creating through the Word, made a material world 
capable of rising to spirit, Shadwell through the degradation of the word 
creates an immaterial, verbal world that is quickly sinking into matter. 
In an ambivalent sense, this world possesses no reality outside the 
printed page. It exists as literature exists and draws its sustenance from 
— and only from — literature; this explains the superabundant allusions 
that punctuate the poem. On the other hand, literature exists in this world 
as only the physical reality of the printed page — "loads of Sh— almost 
choakt the way" (103). Such a world closes upon itself. It cannot have 
reference to any reality outside itself and so must be tautological. 
Neither can it transcend in any way the limitations of finite, physical 
existence: "All humane things are subject to decay" (1). 
Dryden knows that to carry a joke too far is to make it very serious 
indeed, and he consciously carries MacFlecknoe to extremes. He 
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makes of tautology one of the governing structural principles of the 
poem, thereby illustrating in the world of MacFlecknoe the world of 
Flecknoe and Shadwell and at the same time creating the poem (and 
cosmos) they are incapable of. For example: Flecknoe's second speech 
repeats and amplifies the characteristics of Shadwell and the motifs 
presented in his first speech and in the coronation episode. The two 
speeches in themselves constitute variations on the same theme: both 
consider the facts that prove that Shadwell was destined for "annointed 
dullness" (63). The imagery of prophets and of Flecknoe's drugget robe 
(29-33) reappears at the end of the poem; Flecknoe's lute and Shadwell's 
music of lines 35-56 recur in lines 209-10. The emphasis on mere 
words, which first occurs inclines 53-59 and surfaces again in lines 
83-84, the garrulous Flecknoe expands upon in lines 197-208. Charac­
ters from several of Shadwell's plays pop up frequently throughout the 
poem (56-59, 75-78, 151-70, 211-13), and mention of related or rival 
playwrights occurs even more ubiquitously (29, 79-93, 142, 151-52, 
163-64, 171-85), all within the framework of a simple dichotomy: 
abhor Jonson, Etherege, Sedley; follow Dekker, Heywood, Shirley, and 
Ogilby. Dryden packs the poem even more frequently and repetitiously 
with references or allusions to plays, almost all of them ShadwelPs (42, 
53, 58, 62, 81, 84, 90-93, 122-25, 143, 148, 164, 179-80, 187-90, 
198, 211-13). In addition to all this, Dryden amply increases the 
tautology and the sense of a closed, purely verbal world by a wealth of 
allusions, frequently repeated, to Genesis, Deuteronomy, Nehemiah, 
the Book of Kings, the New Testament accounts of John the Baptist, 
Cowley's Davideis, Davenant's Gondibert, Milton's Paradise Lost, 
Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra, VirgiYsAeneid, Horace's Satire 
I.iv and Ars Poetica, Plutarch's and Livy's account of the founding of 
Rome, and Shadwell's own Epilogue to The Humorists. 
But Dryden has managed this material more artfully than merely by 
heaping up repetitions. He has carefully arranged these parts into an 
integral, if redundant, whole that bears a parodic relation to the symme­
tries of epic. The second half of the poem mirrors exactly the first. The 
nature that pleaded for Shadwell at the beginning reappears as the nature 
to which he is to trust at the end; Shadwell himself is described in exactly 
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the same way at beginning and end — massive, swollen, obese. His 
initial false pregnancy is further mirrored in the "Pangs without birth, 
and fruitless Industry" (148) that Flecknoe offers to teach him. The long 
section on Shadwell's "want of sense" (156) simply magnifies Flecknoe's 
opening remarks about ShadwelPs "full stupidity" (18). The very "ac­
tion" of the poem also reflects this pattern of repetition: the first third 
(roughly) of the satire contains Flecknoe's monologue about the succes­
sion to the throne and the reasons why Shadwell should inherit; the next 
part dramatizes, in a symbolic landscape that links Flecknoe's two 
speeches and Shadwell's virtues with their political environment, the 
fact of that succession and some of Shadwell's qualifications; the final 
third of the poem is once again Flecknoe's speech, this time in the genre 
of instructions to the prince, advising Shadwell how to do the things he 
has already done well enough to earn the crown. In such a framework, 
Shadwell logically inherits Flecknoe's drugget robe; he is, after all, a 
repetition of Flecknoe. And equally logically, his last acquisition is a 
"double portion of his Father's Art" (217); since that art is nothing if not 
tautology, a double portion is only appropriate. 
MacFlecknoe superimposes a variety of structures upon each other. 
One of the most obvious, of course, is the tautological structure we have 
just been discussing, the repetitious correspondence of parts to parts, 
which can only be described as static — a parody of the sort of structure 
Dryden used in Absalom and Achitophel. In terms of this structure, the 
poem goes nowhere: the beginning contains the end, and nothing is 
changed. In other terms, the poem does progress, from the deliberations 
about the problem of succession through the act of succession to the 
young king's assumption of his powers. This essentially linear, 
straightforward structure involves simply the handing on of power from 
one generation to another — the translatio imperii or, more exactly 
here, a parody of the translatio studii. But the poem's opening 
aphorism sets in motion another and this time circular structure — the 
recurrent cycle of human mutability and decay. The process of decay is 
illustrated repeatedly throughout MacFlecknoe: in Flecknoe himself, 
who, when fate summons, must obey (2); in the ruin of the Barbican 
(66-69); in the quality of the plays, players, and playwrights spawned 
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there (74-92). The repeated contrasts between the founding of Aeneas's 
city and ShadwelPs evidence once again the consistent cycle of degener­
ation. Even Flecknoe's final speech, which begins by praying, 
Heavens bless my Son, from Ireland let him reign 
To farr Barbadoes on the Western main; 
Of his Dominion may no end be known, 
And greater than his Father's be his Throne, 
(139-42) 
ends by pathetically urging him to 
Leave writing Plays, and chuse for thy command 
Some peacefull Province in Acrostick Land. 
(205-6) 
In fact, Flecknoe's final speech details an extended process of diminish­
ment as Shadwell receives advice that ranges downward from 
Let Virtuouso's in five years be Writ; 
Yet not one thought accuse thy toyl of wit, 
(149-50) 
to the creation of individual characters, to the rhetoric of his dedications, 
to his use of bawdry. It pauses briefly to sum up his artistic practice as 
promising a play and dwindling to a farce (181-82), but from that point 
on enumerates the steps of an even more drastic decline. ShadwelPs 
province shrinks to "New Humours to invent for each new Play" 
(187-88), and Flecknoe quickly proceeds to disqualify him from 
tragedy, comedy, and satire (197-2 02), urging him now to "chuse for thy 
command / Some peacefull Province in Acrostick Land" (205-6). But 
even this is not the end, and Flecknoe's last suggestion, which is scarcely 
heard, exhorts Shadwell to become completely like him and "Set thy 
own Songs, and sing them to thy lute" (210). The rest, of course, is 
silence, the logical conclusion to that rapid declension through genres, 
words, and mere sounds. Fittingly, Flecknoe's final action — if it can be 
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called that — brings the poem full circle: the fall that leaves Shadwell 
"Through all the Realms of Nonsense, absolute" (6) is a literal realiza­
tion of the poem's opening sentiment, "All humane things are subject to 
decay" — decay, of course, being derived from decadere, to fall down. 
This combination of literalism and vulgar slapstick functions, to my 
mind, as the ultimate symbol of the cosmos of Flecknoe and Shadwell: it 
sums them up in the act of putting them down. Debased word realizes 
itself in debased thing. 
From one final perspective, nothing in the poem progresses: once we 
have seen Flecknoe as Shadwell's precursor, the poem freezes. All else 
becomes a repetition of that relationship. The situation remains the 
same; only our point of view, shifted by allusions and references, 
changes and returns. Shadwell, the obscene bearer of his own travesty 
incarnation, remains exactly so until the end of the poem, and Flecknoe, 
now as Aeneas, now Melchisedek, now God the Father, goes on precurs­
ing, preparing Shadwell's way, until the end of the poem. And even there 
nothing changes: Shadwell is not delivered, and the precursing goes on. 
Shadwell assumes Flecknoe's lute and the drugget robe that Flecknoe-
as-John-the-Baptist wore. He receives as well the double portion of his 
master's art that Elias biblically bequeathed to his successor, and since 
the New Testament identifies Elias with John the Baptist,39 all this can 
only mean that Shadwell has now taken over the role of precursor for 
some one — or something — that will never come. He merely repeats 
Flecknoe — thus his name, MacFlecknoe — repeats the precursing, 
which is, in the most succinct paradox of the poem, all that can be 
expected of the "last great Prophet of Tautology." 
VI 
Dryden's two epics embrace both ranges of allegorical reading, public 
and private, political and philosophical. But — as their similarities of 
image and theme (fertility, paternity, sonship, succession, bodies, lan­
guage and its contents) should already have hinted — there is no division 
in epic between politics and philosophy or between public and private 
life. They are all encompassed by varying conceptions of wisdom; they 
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axe all included in epic's concern for right order in every sphere. 
MacFlecknoe's parodic versions of the external epic action — the 
founding of a kingdom — and the internal — the hero's recognition of the 
full dimensions of his calling and attainment of the requisite knowledge 
— unite them all the more firmly in order to undo them. The epic 
tradition as Dryden received it already included within its spacious 
confines a concern for philosophic truths about human life as well as for 
the fate of kingdoms. It embraced a private aspect that elaborated the 
difficulties of attaining personal tranquillity — whether that was con­
strued as philosophic calm or Christian salvation — as well as its more 
obvious public interests in good order in government and the working-
out of the (or a) providential design in history. That archetypal epic 
wanderer, Odysseus, already illustrated many of these concerns at the 
very beginnings of the tradition. His devotion to Athena, his long series 
of trials, his sustaining desire for return to his domestic comforts and for 
reunion with his wife, son, and father, all readily lent themselves to the 
most patent of interpretations as a moral journey toward personal salva­
tion. At the same time, his reestablishment of the proper order of 
succession on Ithaca equally easily defined his journey as a political 
allegory, a Bildungsroman for princes. In the Aeneid, Anchises' vari­
ous discourses in the underworld and Aeneas's adventures in the upper 
just as readily served as exempla for a whole battery of moral, metaphys­
ical, and political truisms. And, in any event, an English poet writing 
after Spenser and Milton would have needed very little prompting to see 
that the epic form was most properly concerned with physics and 
metaphysics, politics and morality. If all these come, literature, as the 
conservator of them all, cannot be far behind. In fact a concern for 
literature, for the arts in general, already held a place in formal epic 
explicitly, as we have already seen in the Virgilian commentators, and 
implicitly through the analogous ideas of the transference of empire and 
the transference of studies. Arts followed arms, and the course of both 
was, along with the epic journey, everwestward. Dryden's conception of 
all these concerns as not only simultaneous but as intimately and 
essentially related derived from the simple realization that the epic, a 
literary form, was the vehicle for them. Epic, in simple fact, occupied an 
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absolutely central cultural position as the formulator and preserver of 
civilization's highest knowledge and belief; it and the Bible shaped the 
reality men lived. 
From this logically flowed the fusion of ontology and aesthetics that 
MacFlecknoe illustrates. To tamper with language, to abuse the word, 
must, in such a view, produce ontological consequences — conse­
quences that are symbolically illustrated in MacFlecknoe when Shad-
well's creatures take control. That action embodies the Renaissance's 
version of the results of the mad scientist's labors, the reign of the mon­
sters. Renaissance culture differed from ours in being still basically a 
literary culture, and the results of world-tampering presented themselves 
to it sub specie verbi, but the vision that MacFlecknoe sardonically pre­
sents remains the vision of cultural annihilation we still share and in our 
own terms fear. At any rate, Dryden's vision of the creatures run mad, of 
man assimilated to, and controlled by, the forces of his own unreason, 
established the pattern for this type of writing from that time forward. It 
informed Swift's Tale of a Tub, which collapses into the morass of its 
own metaphorics, leaving its mad author to write out the contents of his 
own brain, nothing. It can be seen behind Gulliver's submission to the 
superiority of the horses, a surrender to the autonomy of a definition — 
animal rationale — that man originally made for, not against, himself. 
And it most assuredly inspired the fiction of the fourth book of The 
Dunciad; it is clearly visible in the apocalyptic closing scene, when 
Dulness reestablishes her power over the no longer animate world. This 
same fear of the consequences of the literary imagination misused, of art 
and consequently of life deformed, provided the impulse for Fielding's 
responding to Pamela first with Shamela and then with Joseph An­
drews. It explains why Parson Adams must, at a crucial moment in 
areal" life, throw his Aeschylus into the fire, why, in Tom J onesy Sophia 
drops her sentimental romance at the entrance of Lord Fellamar, and 
why, in Fielding's last attempt to make epic an ontological force in 
human life, a pamphlet converts Captain Booth to true belief. It all ends 
in the futility of Walter Shandy's hopelessly irrelevant Tristrapaedia, 
which cannot even keep up with the life it was meant to control. 
Tristram Shandy realizes the world Dryden feared, though it decks it 
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with a brilliance he would never have guessed it capable of. The 
disjunctive punning, the bawdry held in check only by the pervasive 
impotence of the characters, the dissolution of knowledge into mere 
words in Walter's theory of the auxiliary verb, the collapse of the whole 
world of the novel into a cock-and-bull story — "and one of the best of its 
kind, I ever heard" — all these demonstrate the radical dissociation of 
literature from the framework of ideas in which Dryden conceived 
MacFlecknoe. Sterne accepts as goods — or at least as facts — the 
things that Dryden rejected in advance. Neoclassical literature polarizes 
neatly around these two points — at one, concern for the establishment 
of a cosmos, for order, for society; at the other, an attempt to write a 
knowing self into existence. Somewhere between these two points, 
Shadwell, with Colley Cibber as midwife, had given birth to the "modem 
sensibility." The continuity that epic sought between art and reality had 
been established, but the price of the establishment was the death of the 
world that spawned epic, the world that made clear distinctions between 
matter and spirit while it saw clear connections between them.40 Just as 
epic's allegory tended to replace epic's action, the success of epic's 
linkings destroyed the reality of its distinctions. 
1. Monsieur Bossu's Treatise of the Epick Poem . . . Made English, by W.J., 2 
vols. (London, 1719), 1:11. 
2. See Barbara Lewalski's "The Scope and Function of Biblical Allusion in Absalom 
and Achitophel," ELN 3 (1965-66): 30. Various points in my discussion of Dryden's 
poem have been influenced by this article and by Morris Freedman's "Dryden's Minia­
ture Epic," JEGP 57 (1958): 211-19, and by A. B. Chambers's "Absalom and 
Achitophel: Christ and Satan," MLN 74 (1959): 592-96. 
3. The implicit image of the scattering of seed the rest of the poem capitalizes upon by 
linking it with the parable (Matthew 13:1-12) as in lines 194-95. 
4. See the Epistle to the Romans, 5:12-21. 
5. See Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton, N.J., 1957). 
Kantorowicz's contention that the doctrine of the king's two bodies developed out of the 
theology of the mystical body of Christ seems to me to have genuine relevance to 
Dryden's poem. 
6. See especially Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford, 1949), 
pp. 57-60 and 74-78. Patriarcha was published in 1680 after circulating in manuscript 
for many years; obviously it was brought out as a document in support of the royalist 
cause. 
Dryden 73 
7. See Filmer, Patriarcha, pp. 81-82. It is also worth pointing out, as Filmer does, 
that the seventeenth century believed that the duty of obedience to magistrates and kings 
was biblically enjoined by the fourth commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother." 
8. The Works of Joseph Hall, D.D., 12 vols. (Oxford, 1837), 1:41. Some reference 
to Jacob and Esau may also appear in lines 405-6, "His Right, for Sums of necessary 
Gold, / Shall first be Pawn'd, and afterwards be Sold." In general, Dryden seems to have 
drawn many ideas and some phrases from Hall's various Contemplations on the Old 
Testament: compare Absalom and Achitophel, 1030—31, and Hall, 1:106, for in­
stance. 
9. Dryden's reference to Corah's obscure birth parallels Horace's own mention in the 
ode of the obscurity of his birth. 
10. See for instance the commentary of Simon Patrick on the passage: A Commen­
tary upon the Historical Books of the Old Testament, 2 vols. (5th ed., London, 1694). 
11. See Ernst Robert Curtius's treatment of Macrobius, to which my discussion is 
heavily indebted, in European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard 
R. Trask (New York, 1953), pp. 443-45. 
12. Macrobius, The Saturnalia, 5.1.18-20, trans. P. V. Davies (New York and 
London, 1969), p. 285. 
13. "Discourses on the Heroic Poem," in A. H. Gilbert, Literary Criticism: Plato 
to Dryden (Detroit, 1962), pp. 500-501. 
14. The phrase is Curtius's, p. 443. 
15. The phrase is Terence McVeigh's. I have throughout my discussion of 
Fulgentius's commentary availed myself of the language of his translation in "The 
Allegory of the Poets: A Study of Classical Tradition in Medieval Interpretation of 
Virgil" (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1964). 
16. Fulgentius 25, McVeigh, p. 220. 
17. Fulgentius 12, McVeigh, p. 209. 
18. McVeigh's discussion of Fulgentius's allegoresis makes this point also. 
19. Fulgentius 10, McVeigh, p. 207. 
20. McVeigh, pp. 142 ff., discusses some of the similarities between Fulgentius and 
Bernardus. 
21. The text used is Commentum Bernardi Silvestris super sex libros Eneidos 
Virgilii. Nunc primum edidit Guilielmes Reidel. Gryphiswaldae, typis Julli Abel, 
MDCCCCXXIV. Since the completion of this study, two important works dealing with 
Bernardus have appeared whose findings I was unfortunately unable to incorporate into 
this book; they are Brian Stock's Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 
N J .  , 1972) and Winthrop Wetherhee'sPlatonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century 
(Princeton, N J .  , 1972). 
22. Compare, for example, The Sphere ofSacrobosco, ed. and trans. Lynn Thorn­
dike (Chicago, 1949), p. 123: "Be it understood that the 'first movement' means the 
movement of the primum mobile, that is, of the ninth sphere or last heaven, which 
movement is from east through west back to east again, which is also called 'rational 
motion' from resemblance to the rational motion in the microcosm, that is, in man, when 
thought goes from the Creator through creatures to the Creator and there rests." 
2 3. The only modern edition of Landino's allegorization is the edition and translation 
of the second two books of the Disputationes Camaldulenses by Thomas H. Stahel, 
74 Epic to Novel 
"Cristoforo Landino's Allegorization of the Aeneid: Books III and IV of the Camal­
dolese Disputations" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1968). Some of my 
discussion of Landino draws on the introduction to this edition. A very full discussion of 
the nature of Renaissance allegoresis of Virgil can be found in the chapter "Undermean­
ings in Virgil's Aeneid" in Don Cameron Allen's Mysteriously Meant (Baltimore, 
1970). pp. 136-62. See especially his remarks on Filelfo as a transition from Bernardus 
to Landino, p. 155. 
An Italian edition of Virgil's works, first printed in 1576 and republished many times 
thereafter up until at least 1710, served as an important means of disseminating, with 
elaborations, Landino's allegorization of the Aeneid. See L'opere di Virgilio Man­
toano, commentate . . . da Fabrini, Malatesta, e Venuti. 
24. The terms executive and deliberative are borrowed (and slightly altered) from 
Thomas M. Greene's important work The Descent from Heaven: A Study in Epic 
Continuity (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1963). 
25. Ibid., p. 407. This process of internalization has also to do, of course, with the 
identification of beatitude (variously defined) as the end of epic poetry: see John M. 
Steadman's important and illuminating "Felicity and End in Renaissance Epic and 
Ethics," JHI 23 (1962): 117-32. 
26. I have here been badly condensing Peter Hagin's excellent argument in The Epic 
Hero and the Decline of Heroic Poetry, The Cooper Monographs, No. 8 (Bern, 1964). 
See especially pp. 39 ff. 
27. See Chambers. "Absalom and Achitophel." 
28. The persistence of this structure will be discussed more fully below, in connection 
with The Rape of the Lock. 
29. Rachel Trickett, reviewing Aubrey Williaims's Pope's Dunciad: A Study of Its 
Meaning in RES, n.s., 8 (1957): 318, succinctly establishes the Puritan, Whiggish 
nature of the city background Dryden assigns Shadwell. 
30. Tom H. Towers, in "The Lineage of Shadwell: An Approach to MacFlecknoe," 
SEL 3 (1963): 323-34, convincingly argues that in linking Shadwell with Flecknoe, 
Heywood, Dekker, Shirley, and Ogilby, Dryden is associating him with practitioners of 
vulgar theatrical spectacle. 
31. See Michael W. Alssid, "Shadwell's MacFlecknoe/' SEL 7 (1967): 387-402, 
for a full appraisal of this aspect of the poem. 
32. See Plutarch's Life of Romulus for the full account (cap. 9-10) and Livy, 1.7. 
33. Aubrey L. Williams, in his important book Pope's Dunciad: A Study of Its 
Meaning (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1955), has established the importance to 
epic and mock epic of the action of founding (or refounding) an empire and the related 
concepts of translatio imperil and translatio studii: see especially pp. 44—48. 
34. Earl Miner, in Dryden's Poetry (Bloomington, Ind., and London, 1967). has 
already pointed out this similarity. I want to acknowledge here that my argument about 
MacFlecknoe resembles and draws upon Miner's in several particulars, though we are 
ultimately working in different directions. 
35. This seems designed as an obscene parody of the emergence of Athena, goddess 
of wisdom, from the head of Zeus. 
36. Johnson's dictionary, as Kinsley's note on this line relates, defines tympany as 
"A kind of obstructed flatulence that swells the body like a drum." In this context, 
Shadwell's mountain belly may well recall Horace's line about inept poets from the Ars 
Poetica, "parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus" (139). 
Dry den 75 
37. Satire 1.4.62. The general context of this poem, a defense of satire and particular 
satiric examples, is relevant to MacFlecknoe; it may relate to Dryden's allusion to 
ShadwelFs Epilogue to The Humorists, which is, among other things, a defense of 
general, as opposed to particular, satire. Here, of course, the allusion points out the 
manglings that true poets suffer in the hacks' plagiarisms. 
38. It should be pointed out that Dryden has Flecknoe very carefully differentiate 
properly ordered art from the work of Shadwell by precisely the principle of distinction 
that the royal dunce violates. Etherege makes "Dorimant betray, and Loveit rage" 
(152); he controls them rather than they him. His fools "in their folly shew the Writers 
wit" (154); they do not reproduce his fatuity. 
39. Matthew 17:12-13. J. E. Tanner, in "The Messianic Image in MacFlecknoe," 
MLN 76 (1961): 220-23, makes this connection and argues very coherently for the 
importance of messianic imagery in the poem. 
40. I have discussed the changing relations of matter and spirit and words in "Lan­
guage and Body in Augustan Poetic," ELH 37 (1970): 374-88. 

$£


HE RAPE OF THE LOCK plays with epic in a 
much different way than MacFlecknoe. Traditional 
wisdom calls them both mock epic; the name is accu­
rate enough as long as we realize that the mock can 
attach itself in many fashions to the epic. The Rape 
of the Lock is not the same kind of mock epic as Mac-
Flecknoe, no more than it is the same kind of mock epic as The 
Dunciad. If we have been dealing, in MacFlecknoe and Abasalom 
(and, I plan to argue, in The Dunciad), with poems that appropriate to 
themselves a whole chunk of what we can legitimately describe as epic 
matter, the Rape aligns itself with epic essentially through its manner: 
its content is the "trivial things" from which "mighty contests rise." 
The poem announces its separation of form and content from the 
outset. If the first line's generality of reference prods us to think momen­
tarily of Troy and Helen and that "dire Offence" that "from am'rous 
Causes springs" (1), the second line quickly deflates that. The verse of 
The Rape characteristically proceeds in this manner, both in style and in 
substance. It jostles the reader back and forth between the contrary 
motions of epic expansion and mock-epic contraction. Ariel threatens 
his fellow sylphs with pseudo-Miltonic punishments if they fail their 
charge, concluding with an image that splendidly reconciles epic gran­
deur with the sylph's fragility: 
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Or as Ixion fix'd, the Wretch shall feel 
The giddy Motion of the whirling Mill, 
In Fumes of burning Chocolate shall glow, 
And tremble at the Sea that froaths below! 
(2A33-36) 
The rhetoric leaves no resting place, no firm ground from which to see 
and judge, but rather hurls us from one extreme viewpoint to another, 
from Ixion's hellish torment to the aroma of the tea table. This rhetoric 
provides the stylistic equivalent of what Pope's use of zeugma accom­
plishes grammatically and what Belinda's toilet, or the card game, or the 
battle of the belles and beaux, offers narratively. This manipulation of 
perspectives provides a sense of continuous flux, of constant becoming, 
in which the potentialities for grandeur and for absurdity exist simultane­
ously and can be realized at the same instant in the same act. It makes a 
world neither tragic nor comic, neither heroic nor silly — merely 
confused by its own capacity for all four. The Rape differs from almost 
all other mock epics in this way: even MacFlecknoe, for all of the 
multiplicities of possible vantage points it offers, never wavers in the 
value judgments it makes of its protagonists. The Rape does: The Rape 
insists on its own ambivalence. 
The Rape remains ambivalent toward its protagonists and its subject 
matter for a clear and explicable reason, because it treats in an epic 
manner things that are not epic matter. "Slight is the Subject" (5) it says 
overtly and covertly — overtly in its honest dismissal of importance, 
covertly in its allusive claim for a particular kind of importance. 
Slight is the Subject, but not so the Praise, 
If She inspire, and He approve my Lays. 
(1.5-6) 
Pope draws these lines (by way of Dryden's translation) from Virgil's 
fourth Georgic: 
Slight is the Subject, but the Praise not small, 
If Heav'n assist, and Phoebus hear my Call. 
(4.8-9) 
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In tenui labor; at tenius non gloria, si quern 
numina laeva sinunt auditque vocatus Apollo. 
(4.6-7) 
Pope reinforces the importance of the allusion to the fourth Georgic by 
using another in lines 11 and 12: 
In Tasks so bold, can Little Men engage, 
And in soft Bosoms dwells such mighty Rage? 
This seems to pick up Virgil's "ingentis animos angusto in pectore 
versant" (Georgic 4.83). The fourth is the apiary georgic, and Virgil's 
description of the colorful fragility of the bees and the ferocity of their 
quarrels — the last quoted Virgilian line describes the tiny warriors on 
the eve of battle — has a lovely ironic propriety as a framework for 
Pope's equally colorful, fragile, and fierce cast. There are other allusions 
to the Georgics in The Rape, notably during the game of Ombre (usually 
to Georgic 4, and frequently by way of Dryden's translation), but the 
position and prominence of these two make them the most important. 
What they both do, of course, is focus the poem and us on the disparity 
between — ignoring the pun — tenors and vehicles, forms and contents 
— slight subjects, great praise; bold tasks, little men; soft bosoms, 
mighty rage. They focus us as well on VirgiPs precedent in using epic 
language, epic style, to describe the mundane activities of the farm. 
Virgil used the Georgics as a dry run for his epic, as a chance to test his 
skills; Pope certainly knew of the precedent and his own georgic reflects 
it.1 I view Pope's use of these allusions here as a direct announcement 
that the poem that follows will use the epic manner to talk about things 
that are not epic matter, and that the central point of the poem is 
precisely the kind of disjunction that this initial separation of form and 
content accomplishes — the disjunction of artistic form from artistic 
content, of social form from social content, of sexual form from sexual 
content, of cosmological form from cosmological content. That is why 
he employs this sort of mock epic and invokes the Georgics — not 
because he is describing the perversion of an epic ideal or of anything 
that has any real connection with epic, but because he is delineating the 
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shattering of connections, the separation of ideas from the vehicles that 
should embody them. Like Swift's tub, The Rape is a container that 
contains nothing, a form deliberately inappropriate to its content. This is 
not to say that the poem is a failure. I hope to argue eventually that this 
inappropriateness is the highest form of propriety for Pope's purposes. 
Technically speaking, this sort of impropriety constitutes a formal 
breach of decorum, and the poem seems to devote a good deal of itself to 
the three related conceptions of inappropriateness, impropriety, and 
indecorousness and their positive opposites. That is to say, Pope makes 
an indecorous poem reflect an improper world, a world whose citizens 
behave according to inappropriate codes of conduct. When Belinda, 
triumphing at Ombre, lets out her war whoop, she — it needs no subtlety 
to see — is being unladylike; when the Baron compares the scissors that 
snipped Belinda's lock to the swords that leveled "th' Imperial Tow'rs of 
Troyv (3.174), he is appealing to an inappropriate standard; when the 
poem describes a queen who "Dost sometimes Counsel take — and 
sometimes Tea" (3.8), either the poem or the queen is guilty of impropri­
ety in distributing emphases. The Rape forms out of such disparities as 
these its own essential mode: it proceeds by exploring them, revealing 
their built-in tensions and showing their inevitable breakdown, and 
reassembling their shattered materials into a more decorous, more 
appropriate world that turns out to be, by Popean sleight-of-hand, itself. 
In Pope's view — at least Pope's view of 1714 — order always defeats 
chaos, and art triumphs over artifice. The problems presented by The 
Rape are, whose order and whose art? Belinda and her attendants, both 
physical and metaphysical, offer an order and a corollary aesthetic; these 
amount, in the poem, to an alternative cosmology, a Belindacentric 
universe competing with, and almost eclipsing, the heliocentric world of 
"reality." Belinda unquestionably replaces the sun in her world: she is 
"the Rival of his Beams" (2.3): 
Bright as the Sun, her Eyes the Gazers strike, 
And, like the Sun, they shine on all alike. 
(2.13-14) 
Pope S3 
All through the poem, Pope associates Belinda's actions with the 
motions of the sun: 
Sol thro' white Curtains shot a tim'rous Ray, 
And op'd those Eyes that must eclipse the Day 
(1.13-14) 
The sun "declining from the Noon of Day / . . . obliquely shoots his 
burning Ray" (3.19-20) while Belinda triumphs at the card table; and 
when she loses at the coffee table, at "that sad moment. . . /Umbriel, 
a dusky melancholy Spright, / As ever sully'd the fair face of Light" 
(4.11-14) does as his name implies and clouds Belinda's radiance. 
All that, of course, is no more than the extension into interesting detail 
of one of the most hackneyed metaphors of love poetry — but is it? Is the 
sun metaphor for Belinda? Or Belinda metaphor for the sun? Or both for 
something else? All the old analogies hover around this poem — man: 
woman::sun: earth:: reason: passion::head: body::king: state::god: uni­
verse — and Belinda dominates the puny males of the poem (she wins at 
cards and becomes the Ombre, the man) and is in turn dominated by the 
vicissitudes of her emotions; a queen rules England and strangely mixes 
matters of state and trivia, while statesmen divide their attention between 
foreign affairs and sexual affairs (3.1-8). Belinda momentarily becomes 
the god of this confused universe —"Let Spades be Trumps I she said, 
and Trumps they were" (3.46) — and creates an order she can almost 
perfectly dominate, in which she can almost literally become "the man," 
exulting over her fallen foe (3.99-100). But this is all false, and because 
it is false, Belinda cannot sustain it. She may win at cards, but the "real 
world" defeats her — the Baron cuts her lock; Umbriel uses her; her 
looks, as Clarissa warns, will fade; and she, too, as Pope warns, will die. 
Soles occidere et redire possunt, but for her, nox est perpetua una 
dormienda.2 The sun can set and rise again, but not Belinda, and 
therefore Belinda's eyes — and Belinda herself — are nothing like the 
sun. 
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For, after all the Murders of your Eye, 
When, after Millions slain, your self shall die; 
When those fair Suns shall sett, as sett they must, 
And all those Tresses shall be laid in Dust; 
This Lock, the Muse shall consecrate to Fame, 
And mid'st the Stars inscribe Belinda's name! 
(5.145-50) 
Belinda's immortality and her importance are peripheral, not central, 
and her place is as one star among many rather than as the single sun of 
the world. Pope's Muse, a woman with a better sense of order than 
Belinda, puts her in her place most firmly: we must "trust the Muse" 
(5.123) for the truth of the lock's metamorphosis, just as Belinda must 
trust the Muse's inscription of her name "mid'st the Stars" for the 
eminence she so woefully fails to attain for herself. 
The Muse and her "quick Poetic Eyes" (5.124) form the precise 
counterpoint to Belinda. Belinda, knowingly or not, espouses, defends, 
embodies an order and an aesthetic that Pope and his Muse connive at, 
display in this poem, only to transform as the lock is transformed. When 
Belinda takes her place before the mirror, she begins a creative act — an 
artistic act — that reaches its logical conclusion in the game of Ombre. 
And now, unveil'd the Toilet stands display'd, 
Each Silver Vase in mystic Order laid. 
First, rob'd in White, the Nymph intent adores 
With Head uncover'd, the Cosmetic Pow'rs. 
A heav'nly Image in the Glass appears, 
To that she bends, to that her Eyes she rears; 
Th' inferior Priestess, at her Altar's side, 
Trembling, begins the sacred Rites of Pride. 
Unnumber'd Treasures ope at once, and here 
The various Off rings of the World appear; 
From each she nicely culls with curious Toil, 
And decks the Goddess with the glitt'ring Spoil. 
This Casket India's glowing Gems unlocks, 
And all Arabia breaths from Yonder Box. 
The Tortoise here and Elephant unite, 
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Transform'd to Combs, the speckled and the white. 
Here Files of Pins extend their shining Rows, 
Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux. 
Now awful Beauty puts on all its Arms; 
The Fair each moment rises in her Charms, 
Repairs her Smiles, awakens ev'ry Grace, 
And calls forth all the Wonders of her Face; 
Sees by Degrees a purer Blush arise, 
And keener Lightnings quicken in her Eyes. 
The busy Sylphs surround their darling Care: 
These set the Head, and those divide the Hair, 
Some fold the sleeve, whilst others plait the Gown; 
And Betty's prais'd for Labours not her own. 
(1.121-48) 
This scene of Belinda's toilet furnishes an elaborate and important use 
of the mirror image. Here Belinda engages in a complex artifice that 
parodies the process of true art and produces a very corporeal version of 
the golden world of art as she "sees by Degrees a purer Blush arise, / And 
keener Lightnings quicken in her Eyes" (143-44). The "heav'nly 
Image" (125) she sees in the glass imitates and debases the idea seen in 
the mirror of the mind and reproduced in the mirror of art — a conception 
that forms the basis of most Neoplatonic aesthetics. The whole situation 
simply literalizes the metaphor of the mirror of art and reifies the art 
work. Significantly, the art work in this case is not the mirror itself, nor is 
it in the mirror, but is rather Belinda herself. She performs a completely 
tautological, reflexive act, beginning and ending in herself; she is both 
priestess and goddess of her own cult, worshiper and worshiped, artist 
and artifact. Such an artifact not only distorts Sidney's Neoplatonic 
version of the art work but re-creates quite exactly the kind of art that 
Plato banned from his republic. Belinda explictly imitates an imitation, 
the ironically "heav'nly Image" she sees in the mirror. We cannot forget 
at this point that Plato pejoratively linked art and the mirror as both 
illusory, both representers of a falsely seeming reality, so that Belinda's 
adornment of the mirror image removes her yet further from the ideally 
conceived real. Let me quote the concluding remarks of this section of 
Plato's argument: 
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We may conclude, then, that all poetry, from Homer on­
wards, consists in representing a semblance of its subject, 
whatever it may be, including any kind of human excellence, 
with no grasp of the reality. . . . Strip what the poet has to 
say of its poetical coloring, and I think you must have seen 
what it comes to in plain prose. It is like a face which was 
never really handsome, when it has lost the fresh bloom of 
youth.3 
Plato's judgment is far too harsh to be applied literally to the fragile 
Belinda, but it does force another perspective on Pope's ambiguous use 
of comparatives in "keener Lightnings" and "purer Blush." 
Taken in its widest implication, this passage parodies the whole late 
Renaissance notion of the poet and his relation to the corporeal and the 
ideal worlds. Belinda is explicitly a creator god whose fiat "calls forth all 
the Wonders of her Face" (42), and she engages in the same kind of 
world-building that Renaissance poets saw as the highest reach of their 
craft.4 This lies behind her invoking "the Cosmetic" — rather than 
cosmic — "Pow'rs" (124) and her selecting from "The various Off rings 
of the World" (130). It accounts, too, for the presence here of the united 
tortoise and elephant, miniaturized into combs: although they are only 
superficial artifacts here, they bring with them echoes of their famous 
appearance in Locke's discussion of false notions of substance as an 
illusory explanation of the structure of the universe.5 Here their union 
forms a step in the formation of a false world of false art that extends from 
the general disorder of "Unnumbered Treasures" (129) and "The various 
Off rings of the World" (130) to the fully realized but still disordered 
plenitude of "Here Files of Pins extend their shining Rows, / Puffs, 
Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux" (137-38). Belinda creates a 
Whiggish world, a highly ornamented, unpatterned plenitude of which 
she is center and exemplar — which is precisely, in small, her role in the 
whole of The Rape.6 
The same confusion of artist and artifact that we saw in MacFlecknoe 
lies at the core of Pope's passage: Belinda paints, and what she paints is 
herself. The mirror only returns a surface appearance: what is affected is 
not the intellectual vision, but only the corporeal surface, of Belinda's 
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face. Pope's lines make prominent also another aspect of this web of 
ideas: the reflexive nature of bad art. It is always, in the language of 
MacFlecknoe, tautological. It begins and ends in itself. I cannot ex­
phasize this point too much, because it is so antithetical to what we have 
all been taught to recognize as a virtue in poetry. By these standards of 
judgment, poetry fails when it does not go outside itself, when it is 
self-contained, when it is the subjective expression of a subjective world 
— like Belinda's — even when that world is internally consistent and 
self-supporting — like Belinda's. (Perhaps this is why epic tries so often 
to exceed its purely linguistic bounds: it is attempting to validate itself by 
contact and correspondence with reality.) Pope elegantly insists on this 
insufficiency at the end of The Rape when the Muse, with "quick Poetic 
Eyes," sees Belinda's lock metamorphosed into a star. Belinda, who has 
been the sun in her own miscreated universe, is moved by proper poetry, 
by Pope's own Muse, from center to circumference, from false divinity 
to true poetic immortality. The poem opens with "those Eyes that must 
eclipse the Day" (1.14) and Belinda's vision of the "heav'nly Image in 
the Glass" (1.125); it closes with the setting of "those fair Suns" (S. 147) 
and the inscription of Belinda's name "midst the Stars" (5.150) by the 
Muse. 
The game of Ombre shows the full extent of Belinda's ability to 
miscreate. Here she acts completely the part of the creator-god, calling 
into being an ordered and hierarchical cosmos, ludicrously 
miniaturized, by means of a parodically deflated version of the divine 
fiat: "Let Spades be Trumpsl she said, and Trumps they were" (3.46). 
The card game that follows is a model of order, as all such rigidly ruled 
games must be: card triumphs over card in proper hierarchical succes­
sion, and Belinda's paradoxical victory, the victory that makes her "the 
Man," is achieved by the king of hearts who "mourn'd his captive 
Queen" (3.96) and "springs to Vengeance with an eager pace" (3.97). In 
effect, the lesson is there for Belinda to learn in the world she has created: 
the cards act their parts properly — the queen's "hands sustain a flow'r, / 
Th' expressive Emblem of their softer Pow'r" (3.39-40); the kings are 
their consorts, protectors, and superiors. In the center of the pseudo-
mock-epic Rape lies a real mock epic, a heroic combat played out by 
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pasteboard kings and queens, that counterpoints and criticizes the later 
and disturbingly non-heroic combat Belinda will provoke. It offers us, in 
a single moment, a miniaturized remembrance of heroic grandeur, a 
glimpse of sensible, natural, and possible order, and the age's sad and 
funny insensitivity to these. 
An Ace of Hearts steps forth: The King unseen 
Lurk'd in her Hand, and mourn'd his captive Queen, 
He springs to Vengeance with an eager pace, 
And falls like Thunder on the prostrate Ace. 
The Nymph exulting fills with Shouts the Sky, 
The Walls, the Woods, and long Canals reply. 
(3.95-100) 
If the content, which is Belinda, is inappropriate to the form of epic 
heroism, this central point of the poem returns us to Pope's opening 
pronouncements of the disjunction of the tenor and the vehicle he intends 
to employ. Belinda herself is the trivial thing from which mighty contests 
rise, and the mighty contest that does in fact take place in the fifth canto 
enacts, in a fine Popean paradox, this radical separation of style and 
meaning. Its sustained doubleness of vision also beautifully typifies 
Belinda's "immortal longings"— 
No common Weapons in their Hands are found, 
Like Gods they fight, nor dread a mortal Wound. 
(5.43-44) 
Belinda's world reduces the battles of the Iliad to explicitly literary 
contests of cliche. She ignores Sarpedon's heroic rhetoric, transmitted 
and transmuted through the commonsensical Clarissa, and chooses the 
tired metaphors of shopworn love poetry — doubly ironic, of course, in 
the light of her reaction to her lover's advances. 
While thro' the Press enrag'd Thalestris flies, 
And scatters Deaths around from both her Eyes, 
A Beau and Witling perish'd in the Throng. 
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One dy'd in Metaphor, and one in Song. 
0 cruel Nymph! a living Death I bear, 
Cry'd Dapperwit, and sunk beside his Chair. 
A mournfiil Glance Sir Fopling upwards cast, 
Those Eyes are made so Killing — was his last: 
Thus on Meander's flow'ry Margin lies 
Th'expiring Swan, and as he sings he dies. 
When bold Sir Plume had drawn Clarissa down, 
Chloe stept in, and kill'd him with a Frown; 
She smil'd to see the doughty Hero slain, 
But at her Smile, the Beau reviv'd again 
See fierce Belinda on the Baron flies, 
With more than usual Lightning in her Eyes; 
Nor fear'd the Chief th'unequal Fight to try, 
Who sought no more than on his Foe to die. 
But this bold Lord, with manly Strength indu'd, 
She with one Finger and a Thumb subdu'd: 
Just where the Breath of Life his Nostrils drew, 
A Charge of Snuff the wily Virgin threw; 
The Gnomes direct, to ev'ry Atome just, 
The Pungent Gains of titillating Dust. 
Sudden, with starting Tears each Eye o'erflows, 
And the high Dome re-echoes to his Nose 
Boast not my Fall (he cry'd) insulting Foe! 
Thou by some other shalt be laid as low. 
Nor think, to die dejects my lofty Mind; 
All that I dread, is leaving you behind! 
Rather than so, ah let me still survive, 
And burn in Cupid's Flames, — but burn alive. 
(5.57-102) 
Double entendre is omnipresent, because the sexuality of Belinda's 
world is just as real as its heroism — and both are, in the most pejorative 
sense, literary. Epic is epic, and sex is sex, and rape is simple enough, 
except when artifice is substituted for art, sneezes for orgasms, and the 
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rape of a lock for "Hairs less in sight, or any Hairs but these" (4.176). 
What has come into being, in the course of The Rape, is a totally 
self-contained, totally artificial world, a literal reflection in large of 
Belinda at the mirror. "To die" is metaphor — death the vehicle, climax 
the tenor — but in this battle the metaphor "to die" is used reflexively: 
climax is the vehicle, death the tenor. The beaux and belles turn 
language upon itself as Belinda turned painting upon herself. Pope's 
awareness of the ironies he here heaps up runs deep, just as his own 
notion of the disjunction between artifice and art holds firm. He laconi­
cally annotates Sir Fopling's time-worn "Those Eyes are made so 
killing" (5.64) with "The Words in a Song in the Opera 0/Camilla." 
The Virgilian Camilla was a "fierce Virago" (5.37) not unlike Thalestris, 
which is quite appropriate since Fopling's line is addressed to her. But 
here are the lyrics of the song: 
Those eyes are made so killing, 
That all who look must dye; 
To art I'm nothing owing, 
From art I nothing want; 
These graces genuin flowing 
Despise the help of paint. 
Tis Musick but to hear me, 
'Tis fatal to come near me, 
For death is in my eyes.7 
Irony on ironies. A tissue of artificialities dispraises art, and the art 
described is the very one Belinda practiced when she "call[ed] forth all 
the Wonders of her Face" and saw "keener Lightnings quicken in her 
Eyes" (1.142, 144). Pope concentrates all of his awareness of what is 
wrong with his society here in this use of artifice to mock artifice. He 
does not damn Belinda; she is herself as much an artifact as an artificer, 
as fragile and perishable as the lock she lost. The blame — if there is any 
— is on something missing, an absence at the core: the failure of society 
at large to preserve the dignity and decorum that can be glimpsed, 
fleetingly and ironically, only in a game of cards. Belinda cannot sustain 
the weight of the roles she must play — worshiper and goddess, artist and 
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artwork, chaste maiden and coquette — no more than the baron can play 
virile Paris to her Helen or triumphant Odysseus to her Troy. They are 
too small, too vulnerable, like the lock itself — surrogate for Belinda's 
chastity, surrogate for Belinda, bait, snare, and victim in one: the lock 
must be severed and lost, as Belinda must age and die, because the 
demands made upon them are disproportionate to their strength. The 
continuing grandeur of heroic ideals in the face of simple human inability 
to realize them is the final and central impropriety of The Rape of the 
Lock. 
Only the Muse succeeds. The Muse can at least transform part of 
Belinda into what she would be, can move her out of this mutable 
sublunary world into "the shining Sphere" (5. 142) of the fixed stars. The 
Muse and her poet accomplish this by the one truly heroic act in the 
whole poem: by telling Belinda the truth — that she is not the center of 
the world, that she is not immortal — they restore the world and value. 
By their final, elegiac lines, they raise Belinda beyond the need for 
elegy. 
II 
The preceding remarks about The Rape of the Lock have contained 
several implications about its structure that now need elaboration. With 
disorder and disproportion occupying so much of his attention, Pope 
seems to have devoted understandable pains to eliminating both from his 
poem: The Rape is a masterpeice of achieved symmetry, of order 
imposed on chaos. Indeed, as I have hinted before, the final paradox and 
the ultimate triumph of The Rape lies in the simple fact that in it, while 
dealing with a whole world of disparities and disjunctions of form and 
content, Pope manages to fuse his own form and his own content into 
aesthetic unity. Belinda's world was reflexive in the precise sense that it 
mirrored only her; everywhere she looked she saw reflections of Be­
linda. The Rape is a transitive mirror: it reflects itself to enable us to pass 
through itself. The reflexive act provides the building blocks of the 
poem. 
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We can see this in the way in which the poem organizes itself around 
the nuclear events of the third canto, which function — to continue the 
terms I have used above — both as mirror and transition. There, at the 
heart of the poem, Belinda both triumphs and falls: the card game and the 
rape, Belinda and the Baron, dramatize the apparently polar extremities 
of the poem. This bifurcation of the canto both reflects the structure of 
the cantos that have gone before it and predicts that of those that will 
follow. 
To analyze the structure of The Rape properly, we must cast away 
notions of plot; it is far more useful to trace the articulation of episodes — 
taking that word in its broadest and most neutral sense — and their 
relation to each other. That is to say, rather than examining event A to 
determine how it gives rise to event B, we should examine the content 
and shape of event A to discover how it corresponds to, or differs from, 
events B? C, and D: that investigation will free us from the story and 
bring to light the structure of the piece. To this end, episodes — even 
when there are causal relationships among them — should be regarded as 
entities in themselves, subject to even further reductive analysis, right 
down to the level of stylistic and grammatical investigation. I am 
suggesting, in effect, that we imitate Fulgentius's and Bernardus's mode 
of treating the Aeneid. Such a notion will, I think, bring us much closer 
to what Augustan critics and their predecessors meant to designate by the 
word "episode." 
The Rape makes such analysis easy by the brevity and clarity of its 
episodes. Putting aside for the moment the short invocational and 
epilogous sections spoken directly by the poet, we can break down the 
content of the five cantos roughly as follows: 
Canto 1 
Belinda (briefly) / Ariel and the dream / Belinda's toilet 
Canto 2 
Belinda (briefly) / the Baron's prayer / Council of Sylphs / Belinda 
(briefly) 
Canto 3 
Hampton Court Setting / Ombre / Coffee setting / the Rape 
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Canto 4 
Belinda (briefly) / Umbriel and the Cave of Spleen / Thalestris 
and Sir Plume / Belinda 
Canto 5 
Belinda (briefly) / Clarissa / Battle / Transformation of Lock 
Mechanical though it is, such a schema helps us to consider in an 
isolated fashion the content of the various episodes. Canto 1 consists of 
three clearly distinct parts: the introduction of the heroine; Ariel's urging 
a course of conduct upon her; and her first action in the poem. Belinda's 
toilet, it must be remembered, is totally disjunct from Ariel's admoni­
tions: he tells her to "most beware of Man" (1.114),8 but he is then 
interrupted and totally forgotten as Belinda prepares herself for Man: 
He said: when Shock, who thought she slept too long, 
Leapt up, and wak'd his Mistress with his Tongue. 
'Twas then Belindal if Report say true, 
Thy Eyes first open'd on a Billet-doux; 
Wounds, Charms, and Ardors, were no sooner read, 
But all the Vision vanish'd from thy Head. 
(1.115-20) 
Belinda appears in this canto peripherally to the central action of 
Ariel's exegesis of the Rosicrucian system and warning to her, although 
she clearly remains the center of interest. The same state of affairs 
remains roughly true of canto 2: Belinda is the cause and source of all the 
actions of the canto even though, once again, her actual appearances in it 
are distinctly peripheral. The two major actions relate closely to each 
other: the Baron's prayer informs us of the nature of the threat to Belinda, 
and the Council of the Sylphs informs of the steps taken to meet the (to 
them still unknown) threat. In the first half of canto 3, Belinda acts in a 
manner parallel to her performance in canto 1. There she armed herself 
for battle; here she battles. There she played goddess; here she plays 
god. There she prepared for Man; here she becomes Man. And just as 
Belinda's careful tending of her locks in canto 1 may be said to provoke 
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the Baron's desire to cut them in canto 2, so here her action in the card 
game may legitimately be said to provoke the Baron's reaction in the 
second half of the canto. The actions are closely related, but are pre­
sented narratively as disjunct: Pope prefaces each, sets the scene for 
each, by a description of a ritualized setting (Hampton Court and the 
coffee table). His point, I believe, is to make us see them as separate in 
the way that Belinda no doubt sees them. Just as for Belinda the toilet 
was a self-contained reflexive act, for Belinda the game of Ombre is a 
completion of that act, equally reflexive and lacking meaning for anyone 
but herself. We, of course, who have heard the Baron's prayer, know that 
in this poem no act can be truly self-contained and therefore can perceive 
the connection between Belinda's action and the Baron's reaction. The 
snipping of the lock stands as direct counterpoint to the careful tending of 
it in the mirror episode and strips Belinda of her putative divinity. Canto 
4, as can be seen even in the outline, returns to the structural pattern of 
canto 2. Belinda appears once more only at the periphery, although she 
is still the passive source and cause of the two major actions. The 
appearance of Umbriel and his journey to the Cave of Spleen (carefully 
synchronized in the text with the appearance of the earthly lover in 
Belinda's heart and Ariel's withdrawal [4.11-16]) may at first glance 
appear to correspond with Ariel's appearance to Belinda in canto 1 or to 
the Council of the Sylphs in canto 2, but its actual content parallels much 
more closely the Baron's appearance in canto 2. Both episodes involve a 
prayer to a god or goddess; both involve designs upon Belinda. And the 
consequent episodes in each case — the Council of the Sylphs and the 
appearances of Thalestris and Sir Plume — involve actions taken 
ostensibly on behalf of Belinda. That is to say, canto 4 structurally 
answers canto 2 with a reverse or mirror image of itself — even down to 
the details of Belinda's role. Her depression in 4.1-10 reverses her 
exaltation in 2.1-18; her lament for what has already come to pass 
(4.147-76) parallels the anxiety about the future at the end of canto 2 
(137-42). Clarissa's speech in canto 5 tallies with Ariel's in canto 1 in 
that both offer Belinda advice about prudential modes of conduct — 
advice that is in both cases disregarded. The battle of the beaux and the 
belles antithesizes Belinda's toilet point for point. There she created an 
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arbitrary order; here disorder reigns — and the disappearance of the lock 
shows the impossibility of reestablishing that previous, fragile order. 
There "awful Beauty [put] on all its Arms" (1.139); here the metaphor is 
ludicrously realized. There Belinda saw "keener Lightnings quicken in 
her Eyes" (1.144); here "Fierce Belinda on the Baron flies, /With more 
than usual Lightning in her Eyes" (5. 75-76). Canto 1 raised its subject 
matter by metaphor; canto 5 reduces it by the facts that correspond to 
those metaphors. The metamorphosis of the lock into a comet9 and 
thence into a star offers Pope's alternative — and the only viable one — 
to Belinda's attempt to translate herself into divinity. This final trans­
formation answers fully the transformation Belinda attempted in canto 1 
and replaces the Belindacentric order that Ariel and Belinda attempted 
with a new and workable order, with Belinda factually and metaphori­
cally (star rather than sun) peripheral rather than central — as she has 
indeed been in the structure of the poem all along. The Rape has 
contained throughout and embodied throughout the order it finally 
establishes: its form and content, meaning and expression, are totally 
one. 
The mirror expresses the nature of this sort of structure wherein, in a 
curious scholastic manner, parts correspond to parts across the nexus of 
a central rearrangement or redefinition of those parts. The Rape 
schematizes in the following fashion: i ii (i-ii) II I. The poem encloses 
itself, and its various components are to be understood by virtue of their 
relation to each other and not by virtue of anything outside the poem — 
e.g., the few lines about Queen Anne (3.7-8) are to be explicated not by 
Pope's known attitude toward Queen Anne but by her relations to 
Belinda and the Muse and the queens in the card game; thus in this poem 
the fact of a woman ruling England offers a sign of the other inversions 
the poem deals with. This does not mean that one cannot go outside the 
poem on the track of allusions; allusions are very much in the poem — as 
the ubiquity of Catullus should testify. Part of the point of the poem, after 
all, is made by the simultaneous presences of Homer, Virgil, and 
Catullus in the same poem. But the poem itself, by the kind of internal 
relationships it sets up, decides what is relevant, and by appeal to, and 
consonance with, these we can judge the relevance and importance of 
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our notions about it. All this is simply to say that epic, like satire, is not a 
static thing, but exists more in a relation than as an absolute: they define 
themselves not in se but by a network of relationships inter partes. The 
final paradox remains, of course, that in the case of epic at least these 
relationships are internal and reflexive and that by this means the poem 
also defines itself in se. Ultimately, it mirrors itself. In a final sense, the 
real nature of the mock epic inThe Rape of the Lock lies in the enclosure 
of everything by epic. 
This reflexiveness should be by now familiar. It is exactly the same 
structural relationship I described in MacFlecknoe. It reappears in 
Absalom and Achitophel, where the central metaphors of fathers and 
sons define themselves first as the relation of king and subjects, pass 
through the nuclear realignment of the disquisition on liberty that rede­
fines them by virtue of z^dam's relation to his posterity, and finally 
emerge in the light of the all-encompassing divine paternity. More than 
this, this reflexiveness is exactly the same phenomenon that the com­
mentators I discussed in chapter one discerned in the Aeneid.10 The 
triad formed by The Rape (i ii [i-ii] II I) corresponds in more than mere 
outline to the circular pattern of thought as described by Medieval 
thinkers11 or to what Wind calls a "Platonic emanating triad,"12 and it 
just as strongly resembles the pattern of rites of initiation13 and what Jung 
names "Enantiodromia."14 None of this is accidental; I believe it pre­
sents a paradigm case of cultural conservatism, in which a pattern of 
psychological discovery, a way of knowing and enlightenment, was 
early affiliated with a mode of literature deeply concerned with the same 
problems. The centrality and importance of the subject matter ensured 
the survival of the form — ensured, in fact, that the form would be 
constantly reinterpreted and rearticulated in the light of each 
civilization's definitions of knowledge and wisdom — as long as it could 
continue to bear the weight put upon it and as long, of course, as the 
relation of the container to its contents was understood.15 Let me be 
perfectly clear about what I am suggesting here: I want to say that the 
reflexive, triadic, and palindromatic pattern I have described above is, 
in effect, the skeleton key to epic. It is the basic structural form that 
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constituted an implicit part of the notion of the genre of epic, and it 
appears to have been understood as such for at least 1,700 years. It is the 
grammar of the genre, over which a good many syntaxes and rhetorics 
have been laid. 
The Faerie Queene and Paradise Lost display both the persistence 
of the structural framework and the variety of styles it will support. This 
is not the place for any extended analysis of either poem, so I will only 
try here to map out some of the broader structural relations that employ 
the pattern we are interested in. 
In the Faerie Queene, certain large correspondences present them­
selves immediately. Whatever Spenser's encompassing plan for his 
projected twelve books may have been, the six we have fit easily into the 
triadic pattern.16 The intertwined and interlocking events of books 3 and 
4 have been frequently commented upon and need no particular mention 
here. These two central books treat a private virtue and a public one, 
chastity and friendship, and unite them thematically as well as narra­
tively through a generous Renaissance conception of love and con­
stancy. Spenser works these concerns out through the quests of individu­
als for individuals; he symmetrically arranges on either side of them 
quests involving the fate of cities or kingdoms. Both books 2 and 5 
culminate in parallel and simultaneous actions carried out by the titular 
hero of the book and Arthur. In book 2, this involves Arthur's slaying of 
Maleger and raising the siege on Alma's castle while Guyon sails to 
Acrasia's island, destroys the Bower of Bliss, and restores her thralls to 
their proper forms. In book 5, Arthur defeats Geryoneo and frees Beige 
from virtual imprisonment in her castle while Artegal sails to Irena's 
land, defeats Grantorto, and restores justice. Discordant events close 
both books: Grill berates the successful Guyon, and Envy, Detraction, 
and the Blatant Beast set upon the triumphant ArtegaL In both cases, the 
heroes accomplish the purgation of a kingdom and the restoration of what 
had been distorted (human souls and justice) to its proper form. In both 
books, too, Spenser invokes the figure of Hercules. Arthur's battle with 
Maleger parallels very closely Hercules' battle with Anteus, and 
Guyon's conquest of Acrasia and destruction of her power over men 
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seems a clear ideological reversal of Hercules' subservience to Om­
phale, an episode that forms the basis of Artegal's capture by Radigund 
in book 5.17 
The action pattern of book 6 practically repeats that of book 1, but the 
men and women of the poem have somewhat exchanged roles. In book 1, 
Red Crosse Knight is imprisoned by the giant Orgoglio and rescued 
through the efforts of Una, who brings Arthur to his aid. In book 6, 
Pastorella is imprisoned by the brigands and rescued by Calidore. 
Spenser attaches to Pastorella a modified version of Red Crosse Knight's 
personal history: both are foundlings; both are left in a field, and both 
bear names derived from the circumstances of their abandonment and 
adoption (George and Pastorella); both in the course of the poem dis­
cover their true identities. Spenser utilizes some direct correspondences 
as well. The Salvage Man answers to Satyrane, Defetto, Decetto, and 
Despetto to the Sans Brothers. The remedies the holy Hermit applies 
correspond to those Red Crosse Knight received at the House of Holi­
ness. Both Calidore and Red Crosse Knight temporarily forget their 
quests, and both receive visions, on the Mount of Contemplation and on 
Mount Acidale, respectively (both visions take place in the tenth canto, 
by the way). Both reunite a daughter and her parents, both engage a great 
beast, and — most important of all — both nearly achieve the reestab­
lishment of a pastoral, prelapsarian existence — Red Crosse Knight by 
the liberation of Eden and the freeing of Una's parents, Calidore by the 
restitution of Pastorella to her parents, the defeat of the brigands, and the 
capture of the Blatant Beast. Both accomplishments are similarly marred 
by the predicted escapes of Archimago and the Blatant Beast (and, in 
the case of book 1, by the continued freedom of Duessa). There are also 
important parallels between the ideological conceptions and functions of 
Archimago-Duessa and the Blatant Beast, but this discussion should 
already be long enough to show the presence of the kind of symmetrical 
structure we are interested in. Put briefly, the action pattern of book 1 of 
the Faerie Queene parallels the action of 6, that of 2 parallels 5, and 3 
and 4 are completely intertwined and function as the narrative and 
ideological nexus of the whole poem. I think — though this is not the 
place to demonstrate it — that the same sort of palindromatic, triadic 
structure informs each of the individual books of The Faerie Queene, so 
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that the relationship between whole and part in the poem is a shifting 
relationship of metonomy and synechdoche: whole and parts are simul­
taneously container and contained. 
The same relationship holds true for Paradise Lost, where the circu­
larity of the structure reinforces the simultaneity of the events of the 
poem.18 Books 6 and 7 provide the crossover point for all of Paradise 
Lost, moving the action of the poem irrevocably out of the divine sphere 
and into the human. These books mirror each other exactly: the same 
characters — Adam, Eve, and Raphael — figure in the same situation — 
Raphael is instructing Adam and Eve about events in heaven before their 
creation. In book 6, he describes the war in heaven, the Son's entrance 
into the fight, the defeat and expulsion of Satan's legions, the Son's 
triumphal return, and the heavenly jubilation. Book 7 parallels and 
antithesizes that by presenting the work of creation rather than destruc­
tion. Raphael describes God's intention to repopulate the heavens with a 
new race, the Son's entrance into chaos, its replacement by the newly 
created universe, and, once again, the Son's triumphal return and the 
heavenly jubilation. The other books arrange themselves symmetrically 
like types and antitypes around these two. Some examples are in order. 
Book 5 opens with Raphael's arrival in Paradise; 8 closes with his 
departure. Both books contain his crucial warnings to Adam about 
Satan's plans. Book 5 also recounts the beginnings of Satan's rebellion 
against the dominion of God and the kingship of the Son; 8 nicely 
counterpoints that with Adam's account of his own creation and his 
immediate recognition of the necessity of "some great Maker" (8.278; cf. 
particularly 5.852 ff.). Books 4 and 9: in 4, Satan adopts the form of a 
toad, in 9, that of a serpent. In the earlier book, he discovers the 
prohibition placed upon the fruit of the tree; in the latter he utilizes that 
knowledge. Book 4 contains the first temptation of Eve, in her dream; 9 
contains the successful temptation in actuality. Both books close with a 
quarrel: 4, between Satan and Gabriel; 9, between Adam and Eve. More 
examples: 
Book 3 Book 10 
Prediction that man will sin Announcement that man has 
The Son offers to satisfy divine sinned 
justice The Son judges the sinners 
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Sin and Death proceed toward Satan proceeds toward earth 
earth 
A hellish triumphal council, end- A heavenly council, ending trium­
ing in hisses phantly in hosannahs 
Book 11 Book 2 
Heavenly council Council of Demons 
Sentence of death pronounced on Satan meets Sin and Death; sees 
Adam and Eve; Adam sees con- consequences of his own sin in 
sequences of his sin in his son his son 
Abel's death 
Adam's first glimpse of new world Satan's first glimpse of newly 
he has made created world 
Books 1 and 12 complete the process and round the poem: book 1 begins 
with the expulsion of Satan and 12 ends with the expulsion of Adam and 
Eve. Babel, Nimrod, and the blasphemous city dwellers of 12 corres­
pond to Pandemonium and its inhabitants. The catalog of patriarchs and 
prophets in the last book answers the catalog of devils and false gods in 
the first. The demonic speculation about Adam and Eve in book 1 is 
confuted by the announcement of advent of the second Adam in 12. 
Earth is "but the shadow of Heav'n" (5.575), and the poem ends as it 
began with the near-total defeat of Satan. 
Within this overall structure, the two halves of the poem also break 
down into repetitions of this pattern, books 1 through 6 and 7 through 12 
constituting smaller repetitions of the original structure. I will list the 
parallels briefly (and not exhaustively, as the preceding view of the 
entirety of the poem has also been only partial). Book 1 opens, as 6 
climaxes, with the fall of Satan. Somewhat informal satanic councils 
take place in each book, and the demonic artifacts, associated in both 
cases with wind, match each other — Pandemonium in 1 and cannon in 
6. The Son's triumphal entry into the heavenly court at the end of the 
sixth book counterpoints the entry of Satan into council at Pan­
demonium. Both books 2 and 5 contain formal demonic councils, but 
beyond this the correspondences exist more as antitheses than parallels: 
Satan leaves hell to attack Adam and Eve, and this is counterpointed in 
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book S both by Raphael's departure for earth to warn them and by 
Abdiel's leaving the rebel camp to warn God. Raphael's flight through 
creation to earth answers Satan's journey through chaos to earth in the 
same manner that Adam's and Eve's prayers and tasks in book S 
correspond to the diversions of the demons in book 2. At the center of 
this, in 3 and 4, we haw the same sort of mirroring that we saw more 
grandly in 6 and 7, and the same sort of crossover from heaven to earth, 
also less grandly. Satan seen approaching the earth in 3 is counterbal­
anced by Satan captured in Paradise in 4; the revelation of the second 
Adam in 3 anticipates the appearance of the first Adam in 4; Satan's use 
of the form of a lesser angel in 3 prepares for his diminishment into the 
shapes of cormorant and toad in 4 — even his dialogue with Uriel about 
the wonders of God's new creation anticipates his monologue of self-
doubt and wonderment at his first sight of Adam and Eve in 4. 
So also in the unit formed by books 7-12 — but by this point, it 
would probably be best only to list the parallels: 
Book 7 Book 12 
Creation of new world to replace New beginning of the human race 
loss of Satan and his followers from Noah 
Sabbath of Creation The Second Coming 
Opening of Paradise Closing of Paradise 
Book 8 Book 11 
Adam denied knowledge of physi- Adam gains knowledge of life on 
cal heavens earth 
Creation of Adam and Eve; their Announcement of the expulsion of 
dominion in Paradise Adam and Eve from Paradise 
Departure of Raphael from earth Arrival of Michael in Earth 
Book 9 Book 10 
Adam and Eve discuss their labors Adam and Eve discuss penitence 
Satan tempts Eve in form of ser- Satan forced into form of serpent 
pent 
The fall and the sympathetic fall of Sin and Death start toward earth 
earth 
Adam and Eve clothe themselves The Son clothes Adam and Eve 
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In addition to all these uses of the epic pattern, Paradise Lost falls 
into a triad of four-book units. Each has its own protagonist and its own 
pervasive locale: in the first four books, Satan initiates all of the major 
actions, and Hell — which Satan carries with him — provides the 
setting; in the second four, the Son performs the crucial acts and Heaven 
furnishes the stage; in the last four books Man — particularly Adam, but 
also the idea of Man — dominates events and earth serves as landscape. 
Particular episodic correspondences will probably stand out from what 
has already been said, but there are important correspondences of large 
actions as well. In each unit of the triad, the first two books deal in a 
paradoxical manner with the work of destruction. In books 1 and 2, the 
devils build Pandemonium and hold their Grand Conference, which 
results in the plans for the fall of Adam and Eve; under the guise of 
physical (Pandemonium) and political (Satanic empire) creation, the 
demons begin the task of undoing God's creation. Conversely, books S 
and 6 apparently describe destruction — the defeat and expulsion of 
Satan and his legions from Heaven — but what is destroyed is the 
principle of destruction itself, which the Son negates and exiles. Books 9 
and 10 return to the original paradox with the fall of Adam and Eve and 
the creation of the empire of Sin and Death. Correspondingly, the second 
two books of each unit deal with the workings of Providence: 3 and 4 
describe God's foreknowledge and concern for Man and the steps he 
takes to safeguard Adam and Eve; 7 and 8 describe his creative activity 
in restoring the heavenly balance Satan sought to disrupt; 11 and 12 
present this latter activity functioning in exactly the same way in time 
rather than in space. 
Milton's subject matter and theme also create a paradox in the relation 
of the units of the triad. As we have discussed it so far, the pattern 
consists of a processional series of events leading up to a point of 
conversion, a nexus, that capsulizes and alters them and leads in turn to 
a recessional series of events that mirror the first — the Red Crosse 
Knight fights the dragon Error badly, is enlightened at the House of 
Contemplation, and fights the great dragon well. This still remains true 
in Paradise Lost: God's Providence in capturing Satan at Eve's ear is 
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matched by God's Providence working itself out in the historical process 
of redemption, and both relate to God's bringing good out of evil by his 
creation of the world. But it is much more proper and more accurate, in 
the case of Paradise Lost, to see events i and I not as mirroring each 
other but as both mirroring the events encapsulated in (i-ii). The central 
unit of Paradise Lost is God and God's works, which can be adequately 
mirrored only by his Son, the Logos, and not by the human word. He is 
the source and end of all the reality that art is supposed to mirror, and as 
such cannot reflect anything himself: all other things reflect him. So the 
real mirrors in Paradise Lost are the first and last units of the poem, and 
what they mirror is the center. Satan, of course, is a distorting mirror. 
What he does in his attempts to emulate God is a travesty of him: 
darkness visible is not the equivalent of light invisible. In that sense, 
Satan and Hell are high burlesque; they are the possibility of mock epic 
— and perhaps the direction of it — already contained within the epic. 
Adam and Earth are the legitimate mirrors of the poem; created in God's 
image and bearing his impress, they are the high art our "erected wits" 
still let us reach to, though our "infected wills" will not let us attain them. 
This is why, I believe, the poem ends at a point that corresponds to book 
6 of the Aeneid: Adam has been illuminated, his goal has been ex­
plained, and his real epic works — and ours — are about to begin. 
Everything before has been prologue; what follows is "the better for­
titude / of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom" (9.31-32) and the "argu­
ment / Not less but more Heroic than the wrath / Of stern Achilles" (9. 
13-15). What it offered was a viable direction for epic, if only epicists 
had known it.19 None but Fielding seems to. 
This is a long way about to The Rape of the Lock, but it returns us to it 
with sharper insight. The structure oiThe Rape, not the subject of it, is 
what indissolubly links it to epic, and the self-enclosure and symmetry of 
that structure should now be apparent and meaningful. The parallelisms 
of the structure naturally lend themselves to the expression of allegorical 
and analogical ideas, and its repetitions and reflexiveness make it a 
natural vehicle for the depiction of simultaneous events. The notion of 
synchronicity seems tied up very closely with it. The marshaling of 
villains and heroes in Absalom and Achitophel occurs simultaneously. 
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MacFlecknoe transpires in a no-time of tautological prophecy. At the 
center of The Rape, Ariel's abandonment of Belinda, the cutting of the 
lock, and the mission of Umbriel to the Cave of Spleen happen at the 
same moment. The various quests of the Faerie Queene are simultane­
ous. In Paradise Lost, the falls of Satan and of Man take place in 
eternity that contains in the same instant and forever the triumph of the 
Son and the triumph of Christ: the poem ends a few minutes after it 
began, for time only starts with the Fall and the expulsion from the 
garden. The palindromatic pattern makes possible the solution of 
Milton's central problem in Paradise Lost: the expression in sequential 
terms of what occurred instantaneously and simultaneously.20 This 
perhaps explains somewhat the phrase ut pictura poesis: poetry is only 
able to articulate the simultaneous, which painting can present simul­
taneously through spatial organization, by a sequential verbal construct 
that rounds upon itself, provides its own borders and frame, and by 
parallelism and repetition of incident links events that painting would 
group by line and form. Painting is metaphor for the linguistic conver­
sion of extension into sequence, of space into time; conversely, space, in 
poetry, is the nexus that converts eternity into time and time into 
eternity. InParadise Lost, God first creates a paradise in space and then 
re-creates it in time. Human history is the palette with which he sequen­
tially rebuilds what he originally made instantaneously and plastically. 
Indeed, human history is in Paradise Lost conceived of as a verbal 
construct, an exposition of the promise made to Adam and renewed to 
Abraham, redeemed by the Word and fulfilled in the second coming of 
the Word. Human time is divine space, and poetry that breaks through 
the merely phenomenal into the realm of plan and pattern reproduces, in 
human, sequential terms (the terms Raphael had to use to tell Adam of 
the war in Heaven) a picture of the divine, of eternity, of infinite 
correspondence — of an infinity of mirrors reflecting an inexhaustible 
oneness. In exactly that sense, poetry is a speaking picture. And in 
exactly that sense, The Rape of the Lock locates Belinda spatially at the 
end of the poem and by doing so deifies her: by making her peripheral, 
the Muse makes her eternal. The shift in human space reveals the true 
pattern of divine time and frees Belinda and the poem itself from the traps 
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of sequence, succession, and change. It reconstitutes a meaningful 
order, which, it seems, it is the formal and thematic goal of epic to posit. 
Achilles guarantees the fall of Troy. Odysseus restores the proper 
succession of dominion on Ithaca. The many heroes of the Faerie 
Queene strive against the continuing effects of the Fall. Providential 
history will culminate in the reestablishment of Paradise. David restores 
proper rule to Israel. And Belinda finds her humbler but proper place in 
the great pattern. That pattern was left awry by Adam's fall, and its 
restitution is the heroic task of all men and all poets since, as Milton 
realized. That restitution is the form and meaning of epic. 
Ill 
Aubrey Williams has explained the basic relation of The Dunciad to 
classical epic and has particularly elucidated its adaptation of the Aeneid 
to its own poetic uses.21 My own study of The Dunciad is in many 
particulars indebted to Williams's seminal work. Pope's use of the 
notion of the translatio imperii and its analogue the translatio studii to 
shadow the spread of Dulness's empire fulfills the idea of restitution we 
discussed before: in his model, the transference of power involved the 
restitution of the Trojan empire through Rome; in his own poem, 
Dulness moves outward from the English Troynovant to reestablish the 
ancient hegemony of her parents, Chaos and Night. That comprehends 
the essential action of the poem. The precise means by which Dulness 
and her dunces accomplish that action are not so easily pinned down. 
That Dulness employs Cibber as the spearhead of her campaign is 
clear. He is the mortal manifestation of Dulness; she sees "her Image full 
exprest, / . . . chief in Bays's monster-breeding breast" (1.107—8). The 
precise relationship between Dulness and Cibber is quite crucial to an 
understanding of the poem, because it is conceived in exact and consis­
tent terms, terms comparable to those Dryden used to conceptualize 
Flecknoe and Shadwell. Cibber is the Messiah; Dulness is a direct 
parody of Sapientia, who is most commonly identified with Christ as the 
Son, the Logos.22 Thus they are the mortal and immortal forms of the 
same entity. Evidences of the theological basis of the relationship 
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abound in the poem, from the lines quoted above to Gibber's coronation 
as "the Antichrist of wit" (2.16) and beyond. This relationship bears 
relevantly on the action of the poem in that Cibber's status, at the outset, 
resembles Christ's at the beginning of Paradise Regained or Aeneas's 
before his descent to hell: all these heroes stand at turning points of their 
lives, aware that in some way they are called, but unclear and unsure to 
what or for what, and most uncertain about their own identities and roles. 
None knows he is a hero; none knows what his task will be. Like 
Paradise Regained and the first half of the Aeneid, The Dunciad 
centers its interest on the gradual revelation of its hero's identity and 
mission. 
Cibber's first — and almost his only — action in The Dunciad 
consists of his praying to Dulness to illumine him about his course of 
action. 
What can I now? my Fletcher cast aside, 
Take up the Bible, once my better guide? 
Or tread the path by venturous Heroes trod, 
This Box my Thunder, this right hand my God? 
Or chaired at White's amidst the Doctors sit, 
Teach Oaths to Gamesters, and to Nobles Wit? 
(1. 199-204) 
The poem has before this identified Cibber as an incarnation of Dulness 
(1. 107-8, quoted above); this passage ironically adds to that identifica­
tion by forcing us to see Cibber, "chair'd. . . amidst the Doctors/' as the 
young Christ in the temple "sitting in the midst of the doctors" (Luke 
2:46).23 The irony does not lie so much in the simple juxtaposition of 
Christ and Cibber and the inversion of values that represents as it does in 
Cibber's unawareness of what he has said. The biblical episode includes 
Christ's direct acknowledgment of his messianic role: "Know ye not that 
I must be about my father's business?" (Luke 2:49). The whole was 
traditionally regarded as a foreshadowing of Christ's public life. Cibber, 
as a true son of Dulness, remains sublimely unaware of the significance 
of what he is saying. He remains indomitably the private individual, the 
self-contained and reflexive: 
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What then remains? Ourself. Still, still remain 
Cibberian forehead, and Cibberian brain. 
This brazen Brightness, to the Squire so dear; 
This polished Hardness, that reflects the Peer: 
This arch Absurd, that wit and fool delights; 
This Mess, tossed up of Hockley Hole and White's; 
Where Dukes and Butchers join to wreathe my crown, 
At once the Bear and Fiddle of the town. 
(1.217-24) 
This privateness and reflexiveness are the very qualities that make him 
the perfect public exponent of Dulness. There follows this prayer a series 
of recognitions or expositions of Cibber's identity and role. First Dulness 
responds to his prayer by transporting him to "her sacred Dome" (1.265) 
where "she plann'd th' Imperial seat of Fools" (1.272). Cibber responds 
to this by recognizing a correspondence between himself and the place: 
Well pleased he entered, and confessed his home. 
So Spirits ending their terrestrial race, 
Ascend, and recognize their Native Place. 
(1.266-68) 
The book ends with further adumbration of his role. Dulness anoints and 
crowns him in a ceremony that simultaneously parodies royal corona­
tions (and should remind us of the corresponding scene in MacFlecknoe 
and the linking there between the protagonists and their locus) and the 
baptism of Christ. 
The Goddess then, o'er his annointed head, 
With mystic words, the sacred Opium shed. 
And lo! her bird, ( a monster of a fowl, 
Something betwixt a Heideggre and owl,) 
Perch'd on his crown. 'All hail! and hail again, 
My son! the promis'd land expects thy reign.' 
(1.288-92) 
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The baptism of Christ signaled the beginning of his public career; 
Dulness develops the broadest implications of this aspect of the event in 
her half-question, half-exhortation — 
'0 ! when shall rise a Monarch all our own, 
And I, a Nursing-mother, rock the throne, 
'Twixt Prince and People close the Curtain draw, 
Shade him from Light, and cover him from Law; 
Fatten the Courtier, starve the learned band, 
And suckle Armies, and dry-nurse the land: 
Till Senates nod to Lullabies divine, 
And all be sleep, as at an Ode of thine.' 
(1.311-18) 
Book 2 offers at least a partial realization of Dulness's hope as "the soft 
gifts of Sleep conclude the day" (2.419) of heroic exercises. The book as 
a whole functions as a kind of confirmation and beginning of Cibber's 
public mission. He opens the book enthroned in ludicrous parallel to 
Satan's "bad eminence": 
High on a gorgeous seat, that far out-shone 
Henley's gilt tub, or Fleckno's Irish throne, 
Or that where on her Curls the Public pours, 
All-bounteous, fragrant Grains and Golden show'rs, 
Great Cibber sate . . . 
(2.1-5) 
An extended simile makes quite explicit what is implicit above: 
Not with more glee, by hands Pontific crown'd, 
With scarlet hats wide-waving circled round, 
Rome in her Capitol saw Querno sit, 
Thron'd on sev'n hills, the Antichrist of wit. 
(2.13-16) 
The games that follow this stand in the same relation to Dulness's real 
purposes that the games in the Aeneid do to the tasks of epic heroes: they 
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were rehearsals, exercises in heroic virtue in small — here, almost 
symbolic adumbrations of the real work of the dunces. The vacuity, the 
obscenity, the scatology are only signs of what is to come, just as the 
slumber that closes the book is only a foreshadowing, a miniature, of the 
great darkness that will close the fourth book. The events of book 2 
contain the seeds of this later growth in the form of their presentation. 
The outward spread of sleep, seemingly confined here to the dunces 
themselves and only to those under the explicit sway of Dulness, grows 
in implicit importance when juxtaposed with the passage it parodies: 
Who sate the nearest, by the words o'ercome, 
Slept first; the distant nodded to the hum. 
Then down are rolled the books; stretched o'er 'em lies 
Each gentle clerk, and muttering seals his eyes. 
As what a Dutchman plumps into the lakes, 
One circle first, and then a second makes; 
What Dulness dropped among her sons imprest 
Like motion from one circle to the rest; 
So from the midmost the nutation spreads 
Round and more round, o'er all the sea of Heads. 
(2.401-10) 
God loves from Whole to Parts: But human soul 
Must rise from Individual to the Whole. 
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake, 
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake; 
The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds, 
Another still, and still another spreads; 
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace; 
His country next; and next all human race; 
Wide and more wide, th? o'erflowings of the mind 
Take every creature in, of every kind; 
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest, 
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breast. 
(Essay on Man, 4.361-72) 
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Dulness converts the expansive flow of love into an expanding tide of 
inertia, and the circular images in both passages unite in making both 
acts cosmic or cosmogonic. The Dunciad anticipates and supports this 
in advance by casting Cibber as the sun of his world and by linking that 
image to a part of Raphael's description of creation in Paradise Lost. 
Here is Pope's image, followed by the passage from Milton: 
All eyes direct their rays 
On him, and crowds turn Coxcombs as they gaze. 
His Peers shine round him with reflected grace, 
New edge their dulness, and new bronze their face. 
So from the Sun's broad beam, in shallow urns 
Heav'ns twinkling Sparks draw light, and point their horns. 
(2.7-12) 
Hither as to thir Fountain other Stars 
Repairing, in thir gold'n Urns draw Light, 
And hence the Morning Planet gilds her horns 
{Paradise Lost, 7.364-66) 
Cibber's role is a public one, and his coronation here only forms a small 
part of the function he is to perform. That coronation stands as the first 
foreshadowing of his real task and eminence, just as the games contain 
implicitly the real nature of the heroic tasks the dunces are called to. 
Book 3 reproduces the conditions of the sixth book of the Aeneid and 
so offers the final and fullest explanation of the hero's goal. Cibber, 
sound asleep and urefin'd from Reason" (3.6), "on Fancy's easy wing" 
(3.13) tours the underworld and hears his Anchises, Elkanah Settle, 
explain the coming wonders of his reign. Like Michael and Adam, they 
ascend a hill from which they view in space what will transpire in time. 
They see an ever increasing barbarism spreading out from Cibber ("All 
nonsense thus, of old or modern date, / Shall in thee centre, from thee 
circulate" (3.59-60)) to engulf nations, arts, and culture. Goths and 
Huns enact in kingdoms what modern dunces do in genres, and just as 
they poured from the frozen north into civilized Europe, so the dunces, 
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with Cibber at their head, erupt from the world of the stage into the stage 
of the world. 
His never-blushing head he turn'd aside, 
(Not half so pleas'd when Goodman prophesy'd) 
And look'd, and saw a sable Sorc'rer rise, 
Swift to whose hand a winged volume flies: 
All sudden, Gorgons hiss, and Dragons glare, 
And ten-horn'd fiends and Giants rush to war. 
Hell rises, Heav'n descends, and dance on Earth: 
Gods, imps, and monsters, music, rage, and mirth, 
A fire, a jig, a battle, and a ball, 
Till one wide conflagration swallows all. 
Thence a new world to Nature's laws unknown, 
Breaks out refulgent, with a heav'n of its own: 
Another Cynthia her new journey runs, 
And other planets circle other suns. 
The forests dance, the rivers upward rise, 
Whales sport in woods, and dolphins in the skies; 
And last, to give the whole creation grace, 
Lo! one vast Egg produces human race. 
(3.231-48) 
These lines describe the creation of an anti-nature, a parody of the 
apocalyptical new heavens and new earth, conceived of in the terms 
Horace uses in the AYS Poetica to describe the artistic misbegotten. But 
the process does not stop with art; its spills over into life, into what we 
call reality. The relationship between the two here is the same as it was in 
MacFlecknoe: bad art distorts fact, remakes reality in its own image. 
Pope first depicted the process early in book 1 when, in describing 
Dulness's cave, he also traced the growth of miscreation step by step 
from hints to sounds, to words, to images, to genres and out beyond these 
to the world itself. 
Here she beholds the Chaos dark and deep, 
Where nameless Somethings in their causes sleep, 
Till genial Jacob, or a warm Third day, 
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Call forth each mass, a Poem, or a Play: 
How hints, like spawn, scarce quick in embryo lie, 
How newborn nonsense first is taught to cry, 
Maggots half-form'd in rhyme exactly meet, 
And learn to crawl upon poetic feet. 
Here one poor word an hundred clenches makes, 
And ductile dulness new meanders takes; 
There motley Images her fancy strike, 
Figures ill pair'd, and Similies unlike. 
She sees a Mob of Metaphors advance, 
Pleas'd with the madness of the mazy dance; 
How Tragedy and Comedy embrace; 
How Farce and Epic get a jumbled race 
How Time himself stands still at her command, 
Realms shift their place, and Ocean turns to land. 
Here gay Description Egypt glads with show'rs, 
Or gives to Zembla fruits, to Barca flow'rs; 
Glittering with ice here hoary hills are seen, 
There painted vallies of eternal green, 
In cold December fragrant chaplets blow, 
And heavy harvests nod beneath the snow. 
(1.55-78) 
This is the ultimate aim of Dulness —the submission of the universe, the 
enunciation of the uncreating word. For this task, Cibber is esential: he is 
the wonder child, the messiah of Dulness who will introduce the "new 
Saturnian age of Lead" (1.28) — or as Settle phrases it, in a gross 
inversion of Virgil's messianic eclogue, 
This, this is he, foretold by ancient rhymes: 
Th'Augustus born to bring Saturnian times. 
Signs following signs lead on the mighty year! 
See! the dull stars roll round and re-appear. 
See, see, our own true Phoebus wears the bays! 
(3.319-23) 
This explains fully what it means to be the anti-Christ of wit: Cibber must 
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undo Christ's work both as spiritual redeemer and agent of creation. He 
must reduce the human mind and the universe to inertia by the destruc­
tion of form and the subtraction of meaning — no more, no less. 
Book 3 leaves us at the same point as book 6 of the Aeneid: the hero at 
last knows the full dimensions of his task, and it now remains for him to 
fulfill it. Both books 1 and 3 have focused on Gibber's growing awareness 
of what he must do. Book 2 shadowed some of his works. Book 4 
describes the body that cast that shadow and completes the realization of 
Dulness's kingdom. It is the totally false world created by the false vision 
that passes through the Ivory Gate of the first three books. 
Book 4 presents its vision of chaos within the framework of a perfect 
symmetry. Pope's opening plea to Dulness to "Suspend a while your 
Force inertly strong" (4.7) parallels his final futile plea to the Muse to 
"Relate, who first, who last resign'd to rest" (4.621), after which Dulness 
"Then take[s] at once the Poet and the Song" (4.8) as "Universal 
Darkness buries All" (4.656). Inside that outermost frame, matching 
enumerations of various arts, all extinguished or about to be extin­
guished, confine and define the action of the poem (4.17-44 and 4. 
626-56). The center of the poem opens with the appearance of the 
"Harlot form" (4.45) of Opera; she pleads with Dulness to banish 
Handel, to separate sound from sense, to reduce all music, all harmony, 
to "One Trill' (4.57) so that "To the same notes thy sons shall hum, or 
snore, / And all thy yawning daughters cry, encore77 (4.59-60). The 
central action of the poem ends when Dulness accomplishes exactly that 
by her yawn (4.605 ff.). Between these two points, The Dunciad maps 
the point-by-point spread of Dulness from the private life to the public, 
from theory to practice, from personal aberration to cultural derange­
ment. 
The action begins with Opera's plea because of the metaphoric value 
of the notions of music and harmony. The universe is God's poem, God's 
song, and in desiring to silence the Muses and "let Division reign" 
(4.53), Opera is seeking to banish the aesthetic and intellectual dimen­
sions of the created universe. She wants to reduce the world to mere 
physical phenomena — sound without sense, noises of no meaning. The 
blast of "Fame's posterior Trumpet" (4.71) appropriately follows her 
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speech and summons the dunces to their goddess. Dulness has in them 
already accomplished part of Opera's prayer: the dunces respond 
mechanically to physical laws; their motions are governed by physical 
phenomena. 
None need a guide, by sure retraction led, 
And strong impulsive gravity of Head: 
None want a place, for all their Centre found, 
Hung to the Goddess, and coher'd around. 
Not closer, orb in orb, conglob'd are seen 
The buzzing Bees about their dusky Queen. 
The gath'ring number, as it moves along, 
Involves a vast involuntary throng, 
Who gently drawn, and struggling less and less, 
Roll in her Vortex, and her pow'r confess. 
(4.75-84) 
Pope puns insistently on words like "Attraction," "gravity," "Centre," 
and "Vortex" to demonstrate the process by which Dulness succeeds. 
The puns move ambiguously between a semi-metaphorical and intellec­
tual meaning and one that is "scientific" and physical. The dunces 
themselves are tracing exactly the same movement, behaving less and 
less like rational beings and more and more like simple bodies in motion. 
They enact the substitution of mechanics for metaphysics, of Descartes's 
and Newton's world for Aquinas's and Hooker's.24 The language of 
Pope's note to the lines makes this process and its implications very 
clear: 
It ought to be observed that here are three classes in this 
assembly. The first of men absolutely and avowedly dull, 
who naturally adhere to the Goddess, and are imaged in the 
simile of the Bees about their Queen. The second involuntar­
ily drawn to her, tho' not caring to own her influence, from 
ver. 81 to 90. The third of such, as, tho' not members of her 
state, yet advance her service by flattering Dulness, cultivat­
ing mistaken talents, patronizing vile scriblers, discouraging 
living merit, or setting up for wits, and Men of taste in arts 
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they understand not; from ver. 91 to 101. In this new world of 
Dulness each of these three classes hath its appointed station, 
as best suits its nature, and concurs to the harmony of the 
System. The first drawn only by the strong and simple im­
pulse of Attraction, are represented as falling directly down 
into her; as conglobed into her substance, and resting in her 
centre. 
—All their centre found, 
Hung to the Goddess, and cohered around. 
The second, tho' within the sphere of her attraction, yet 
having at the same time a different motion, they are carried, 
by the composition of these two, in planetary revolutions 
round her centre, some nearer to it, some further off: 
Who gently drawn, and struggling less and less, 
Roll in her Vortex, and her pow'r confess. 
The third are properly excentrical, and no constant members 
of her state or system: sometimes at an immense distance 
from her influence, and sometimes again almost on the sur­
face of her broad effulgence. Their use in their Perihelion, or 
nearest approach to Dulness, is the same in the moral World, 
as that of Comets in the natural, namely to refresh and 
recreate the Dryness and decays of the system; in the manner 
marked out from ver. 91 to 98. 
The interplay of the poem and its note make explicit here the cosmogonic 
implications of the allusion at the beginning of book 2. Dulness is 
genuinely engaged in world-building, in the substitution of her own 
cosmos for God's. What startles me about this (and I suspect it startled 
eighteenth century readers as well) is that she undertakes this task as a 
perfectly orthodox Cartesian. The kinds of planetary motion described, 
and particularly the presence of the concept of the vortex, are quite 
sufficient to identify the source of the system described as Descartes's.25 
The question to be answered, of course, is, Why Descartes? To what 
end? The answer seems to lie in the de facto Cartesian separation of mind 
from matter and in Descartes's resolutely materialistic explanation of the 
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origin of the universe — the same process that Pope here attributes to 
Dulness. Descartes provides the theoretical base for Dulness's practice 
by positing the radical disjunction of mind and matter, thought and 
thing.26 For this reason, the dunces' bodies obey the laws of Cartesian 
physics while their minds — as we shall see — share the essential 
solipsism of Cartesian philosophy. 
The address of the specter-schoolmaster illuminates the process by 
which comprehension is narrowed and imagination stifled through a 
further disjunction. His method of education separates words from the 
substantial meanings they ought to convey; it separates, that is, rhetoric 
from dialectic and logic. 
Then thus. "Since Man from beast by Words is known, 
Words are Man's province, Words we teach alone. 
When Reason doubtful, like the Samian letter, 
Points him two ways, the narrower is the better. 
Plac'd at the door of Learning, youth to guide, 
We never suffer it to stand too wide. 
To ask, to guess, to know, as they commence, 
As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense, 
We ply the Memory, we load the brain, 
Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain; 
Confine the thought, to exercise the breath; 
And keep them in the pale of Words till death. 
Whate'er the talents, or howe'er designed, 
We hang one jingling padlock on the mind: 
A Poet the first day, he dips his quill; 
And what the last? A very Poet still. 
Pity! the charm works only in our wall, 
Lost, lost too soon in yonder House or Hall. 
There truant WYNDHAM ev'ry Muse gave o'er, 
There TALBOT sunk, and was a Wit no more! 
How sweet an Ovid, MURRAY was our boast! 
How many Martials were in PULT'NEY lost! 
Else sure some Bard, to our eternal praise, 
In twice ten thousand rhyming nights and days, 
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Had reach'd the Work, the All that mortal can; 
And South beheld that Master-piece of Man." 
(4.149-74) 
The attributes Pope gives to the speaker of these lines help define his 
role. He is a specter (4.149), Moloch-like ("Dropping with Infant's 
Blood, and Mother's tears" [4.142]), and he bears Mercury's caduceus 
(4.140 and Pope's note) — the first of several figures in the poem who 
shall do so (see 4.347 and 4.637). He is a specter because, literally, he 
represents the ghost of learning, the disembodiment of education; he is 
Moloch-like because to his whims children are sacrificed; he bears the 
caduceus because, like Mercury, with it he guides the souls of the dead, 
because, like Mercury, he is the mediator, the messenger, between gods 
and men, and finally because, like Mercury, he is a god both of elo­
quence and of lies, of? in effect, false wit.27 His position as schoolmaster 
enables him to warp the mind right at the outset of education and provide 
a bias toward words in themselves that will prevent his students from 
ever reaching behind them to ideas — so his fitness as mediator between 
Dulness and men. More than this, his function, although primarily to 
corrupt the private life and destroy the processes of individual thinking, 
also spills over to corrupt the public life, as his effect upon "The pale 
Boy-Senator" (4.147) shows. Dulness recognizes this aspect of his work 
in her reply to him by exclaiming happily about the blessings of "some 
pedant Reign" (4.175) and the doctrine "which my Priests, and mine 
alone, maintain . . . The RIGH T DIVINE of Kings to govern wrong" 
(4.185-88). At this point in the poem, Pope does not stress this matter, 
but one of the poem's tacit assumptions remains that corruption of 
education and the private life will inescapably culminate in corruption of 
the public life, of government, and of human society in general. 
Bentley-Aristarchus carries the undermining of education yet further. 
Speaking for the critics and simultaneously for the colleges, he describes 
the reduction of learning from the level of the word to the level of the 
letter: 
Roman and Greek Grammarians! know your Better: 
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Author of something yet more great than Letter; 
While tow'ring o'er your Alphabet, like Saul, 
Stands our Digamma, and o'ertops them all. 
Ti s true, on Words is still our whole debate, 
Disputes of Me or Te, or aut or at, 
To sound or sink in cano, O or A, 
Or give up Cicero to C or K. 
(4.215-22) 
What the master critic accomplishes is the total diversion of the human 
mind from entities to fragments, from language as a conveyor of meaning 
to language as — literally — thing in itself. This results in the produc­
tion — in a physical sense — of words for their own sakes, words on a 
page, books conceived as material body rather than repository of ideas. 
For thee we dim the eyes, and stuff the head 
With all such reading as was never read: 
For thee explain a thing till all men doubt it, 
And write about it, Goddess, and about it: 
So spins the silkworm small its slender store, 
And labours till it clouds itself all o'er. 
(4.249-54) 
Aristarchus appropriately delivers as the final proof of the efficacy of his 
system the thing itself: 
With the same Cement, ever sure to bind. 
We bring to one dead level ev'ry mind. 
Then take him to develop, if you can, 
And hew the Block off, and get out the Man. 
But wherefore waste I words? I see advance 
Whore, Pupil, and lac'd Governor from France. 
(4.267-72) 
The pupil has just completed the last step in the educational process, the 
grand tour. He represents the finished product of Dulness's educational 
innovations, a paragon of hervertu, whom she accepts as ahero (4.335). 
He has nothing to say. 
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His tutor does all the talking, and describes a grand tour that schools 
the pupil in sensuality and frivolity and erases any last traces of thought 
from his head. He 
Dropt the dull lumber of the Latin store, 
SpoiPd his own language, and acquir'd no more; 
All Classic learning lost on Classic ground; 
And last tmtid.Air, the Echo of a Sound! 
See now, half-cur'd, and perfectly well-bred, 
With nothing but a Solo in his head. 
(4.319-24) 
He embodies the fulfillment of Opera's prayer and the total evacuation of 
intelligibility; he is a form without a content, a body without a mind, and 
a hero of Dulness's kingdom. Within the complex mock epic of The 
Dunciad, the tutor's description of his pupil's tour presents another, 
miniature mock epic: the pupil, "the young Aeneas" (4.290), 
The Stews and Palace equally explor'd, 
Intrigu'd with glory, and with spirit whor'd; 
Try'd all hors d'oeuvres, all liqueurs defin'd, 
Judicious drank, and greatly daring din'd 
(4.315-18) 
and returned at last to the court of Dulness to insure the restitution and 
continuance of her reign (4.330-34). Pope invokes the Aeneid here 
precisely because of the values that allegorists and commentators like 
Landino had seen in it: because it depicted a process of education that 
culminated in an individual's attainment of philosophical beatitude, 
because it rejected sensuality and worldly dominion for the calm of 
contemplation and intellectual self-mastery. This Aeneas reverses that. 
He represents the total corruption of the private life, the impossibility of 
thought. His journey offered him a series of tests that he progressively 
failed and brought him back to his starting point, totally vacuous, to 
enlist himself as another minion of Dulness. This episode marks the 
completion of the first half of Dulness's undertaking. Words have been 
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totally separated from meaning; the private life has been completely 
devalued. What now remains is the corresponding destruction of the 
public life and the undoing of things themselves. 
The dunces have now completed their miseducation, and like Cibber 
at the end of book 1 are on the point of beginning their public lives. The 
poem signals this shift of focus by the presentation of another character 
bearing Mercury's wand ("Annius, crafty Seer, with ebon wand" [4.346]) 
and explicitly linked with that deity ("taught by Hermes, and divinely 
bold" [4.381]). This episode apparently centers on a quarrel between 
Annius and Mummius about the possession of things — specifically 
coins — but they speak of the things as deities, matter raised to the level 
of divinity. Pope has his characters appropriately convey this by means 
of an extended image of a parodic incarnation: 
Then taught by Hermes, and divinely bold, 
Down his own throat he risqu'd the Grecian gold; 
Received each Demi-God, with pious care, 
Deep in his Entrails — I rever'd them there, 
I bought them, shrouded in that living shrine, 
And, at their second birth, they issue mine. 
(4.381-86) 
Particular phrases, like "Demi-God," "pious care," "rever'd," charge 
the passage with its special significance; "living shrine" establishes the 
final field of reference, since it is a formal title and salutation of Christ's 
earthly mother and is used as such in the Roman Catholic litany of the 
Virgin.28 Annius's reply to this ratifies these notions: 
"Witness great Ammon! by whose horns I swore," 
(Reply'd soft Annius) "this our paunch before 
Still bears them, faithful; and that thus I eat, 
Is to refund the Medals with the meat. 
To prove me, Goddess! clear of all design, 
Bid me with Pollio sup, as well as dine: 
There all the Learn'd shall at the labour stand, 
And Douglas lend his soft, obstetric hand." 
(4.387-94) 
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They return to Pollio because he provides the conjunction of the classi­
cal and Christian traditions they are perverting: the most notable Pollio 
of classical literature is the Pollio of Virgil's fourth eclogue, the mes­
sianic eclogue, in whose consulship will be born the wonder child who 
will reintroduce the Saturnian age. Douglas's "soft, obstetric hand" 
completes the travesty: "(God's) obstetric hand brought forth the winding 
serpent" (Job 26:13, Douai and Vulgate). Biblical commentators take 
the serpent for many things, among them Satan himself.29 
The appearance of this episode at this point in The Dunciad signifies 
many things. By its very nature, it indicates a shift of Dulness's activities 
from the private realm she has by this time totally pervaded to the public 
world of human activity and social intercourse. The coins themselves 
hint of the money obsession of that world; the emphasis on collection and 
acquisition demonstrates its absorption in things for themselves as 
separate from any meaning the things might possess. The theological and 
classical framework against which these are played indicates the extent 
to which all this opposes the spirit of Christian culture and the extent to 
which it is simultaneously blasphemous and inhuman. Beyond this, the 
allusions show in very precise detail the process Dulness is now initiat­
ing. The incarnation provides the nexus of spiritual and material: the 
word is made flesh. In the most literal sense, that is what the episode 
tokens in The Dunciad. Dulness has already thoroughly corrupted 
language and she is now turning her attention to the degradation of 
material objects. This involves the contrary but simultaneous motions of 
exaltation and debasement. The coins become the demigods whose 
images they bear and usurp a spiritual dimension to which they have no 
claim. At the same time, their ascension is contradicted by their incarna­
tion, and they become excrement. Rather than bearers of life, they are 
the by-products of life — waste, inert matter reduced to its lowest 
common denominator. Exaltation of matter provides Dulness's method; 
the reduction of it to lifeless extension and mass explains her goal. She 
seeks to parallel publicly and in matter what she has accomplished 
privately and in mind. All this, of course, works out in greater detail 
exactly the same web of ideas we have already encountered in 
MacFlecknoe. 
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Dulness forms her attack on two fronts, one the kind of specialization 
and fragmentariness of vision exemplified by Annius and Mummius and 
later by the botanist and butterfly-collector, and the other the kind of 
generalization that substitutes fragments for system, as does the "gloomy 
Clerk" (4.459). Both of these end in a corrupted conception of Nature as 
atomistic. Both substitute parts for wholeness — a point that Dulness 
herself stresses: 
"0  ! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes 
And Reason giv'n them but to study Flies I 
See Nature in some partial narrow shape, 
And let the Author of the Whole escape: 
Learn but to trifle; or, who most observe, 
To wonder at their Maker, not to serve!" 
(4.452-58) 
The "gloomy Clerk" offers the theoretical basis for this in Lucretius's 
indifferent deity or, alternatively, in the pervasive but amorphous object 
of Shaftesbury's soft-headed enthusiasm. 
Oh hide the God still more! and make us see 
Such as Lucretius drew, a God like Thee: 
Wrapt up in Self, a God without a Thought, 
Regardless of our merit or default. 
Or that bright Image to our fancy draw, 
Which Theocles in raptur'd vision saw, 
While thro' Poetic scenes the Genius roves, 
Or wanders wild in Academic Groves; 
That NATURE our Society adores. 
Where Tindal dictates, and Silenus snores. 
(4.483-92) 
Both are projections of the human ego, extrapolations of finite concep­
tions that make God in man's image rather than man in God's. 
All-seeing in thy mists, we want no guide. 
Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride! 
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We nobly take the high Priori Road, 
And reason downward, till we doubt of God: 
Make Nature still encroach upon his plan, 
And shove him off as far as e'er we can: 
Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place; 
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space. 
Or, at one bound o'erleaping all his laws, 
Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause, 
Find Virtue local, all Relation scorn, 
See all in Self, and but for self be born: 
Of naught so certain as our Reason still, 
Of naught so doubtful as of Soul and Will. 
(4.469-82) 
These passages extend the process of materialization further into crea­
tion, constantly reducing the role of spirit and mind. The "Mechanic 
Cause" thrust into God's place links up intelligibly with the Cartesian 
creation that opened book 4 and marks the process by which matter 
usurps the function of mind. Pope parallels this in the passages in 
question by a simultaneous allusive retracing of the path of history, 
moving steadily backward toward the point of creation. From the incar­
nation presented in the Annius and Mummius episode, the poem jumps 
back to Eve's account of her creation and the first object that interested 
her, herself: 
As I bent down to look, just opposite, 
A Shape within the wat'ry gleam appear'd 
Bending to look on me, I started back, 
It started back, but pleas'd I soon return'd, 
Pleas'd it return'd as soon with answering looks 
Of sympathy and love . . . 
(Paradise Lost, 4.461-65) 
Pope recreates this situation in his butterfly-collector's account of the 
pursuit of his quarry: 
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I saw, and started from its vernal bow'r 
The rising game, and chac'd from flow'r to flow'r. 
It fled, I follow'd; now in hope, now pain; 
It stopt, I stopt; it mov'd, I mov'd again. 
(4.425-28)30 
A line in the Clerk's speech — "Or at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws" 
(4.477) —invokes Milton's description of Satan's entrance into Eden — 
"At one slight bound high overleaped all bound" (4.181). The poem 
reaches the creation point with Silenus, who "shook from out his Pipe 
the seeds of fire" (4.494). Pope's own notes to the poem insist on 
Silenus's identification as the Epicurean teacher of Virgil's sixth eclogue, 
where he gives an Epicurean account of the creation of the world from the 
seeds of fire, earth, air, and water. He has a twofold function in The 
Dunciad: to unite in one figure and one hypothesis — atomism — all of 
the various theories — Cartesian, Hobbesian, Lucretian — offering 
"Mechanic Causes" instead of spiritual principles, and to extend the 
power of those causes to the work of creation itself, thus banishing mind 
and spirit retroactively from the origin of the universe. He brings 
Dulness one step closer to the total removal of God, one step closer to the 
state of chaos that existed before creation, before the informing word of 
divine wisdom imposed form on matter. To this point in the poem, 
Dulness has succeeded in separating thought and thing, in enmeshing 
thought further in the trap of language conceived of as thing, and in 
reducing language from expression of thought to random conglomeration 
of letters and sounds; she has made matter the principal component of the 
universe and further reduced that matter to a random conglomeration of 
atoms, hostile to the impress of mind and obedient only to mechanical 
laws. Silenus describes the same process of reduction at work in the 
human sphere, contracting human beings from their intellectual poten­
tiality to a servitude to the basest forms of matter. 
Then thus. "From Priest-craft happily set free, 
Lo! ev'ry finish'd Son returns to thee: 
First slave to Words, then vassal to a Name, 
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Then dupe to Party; child and man the same; 
Bounded by Nature, narrow'd still by Art, 
A trifling head, and a contracted heart. 
Thus bred, thus taught, how many have I seen, 
Smiling on all, and smil'd on by a Queen. 
Mark'd out for Honours, honour'd for their Birth, 
To thee the most rebellious things on earth: 
Now to thy gentle shadow all are shrunk, 
All melted down, in Pension, or in Punk! 
So K* so B** sneak'd into the grave, 
A Monarch's half, and half a Harlot's slave. 
Poor W** nipt in Folly's broadest bloom, 
Who praises now? his Chaplain on his Tomb. 
Then take them all, oh take them to thy breast! 
Thy Magus, Goddess! shall perform the rest." 
(4.499^516) 
The Magus competes the task by means of his potion, which banishes 
consciousness totally and leaves only a human form existing in and for 
matter. 
With that, a WIZARD OLD his Cup extends; 
Which whoso tastes, forgets his former friends, 
Sire, Ancestors, Himself. One casts his eyes 
Up to a Star, and like Endymion dies: 
A Feather, shooting from another's head, 
Extracts his brain; and Principle is fled; 
Lost is his God, his Country, ev'rything; 
And nothing left but Homage to a King! 
The vulgar herd turn off to roll with Hogs, 
To run with Horses, or to hunt with Dogs; 
But, sad example! never to escape 
Their Infamy, still keep the human shape. 
(4.S17-28) 
The cup, of course, is Circe's cup, and the human shapes rolling with 
hogs an ironic reversal of Circe's ability to transform the body while the 
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mind remained untouched. In this same section, Pope quickly invokes 
two other episodes from Odysseus's journey — the Cimmerians and the 
Sirens (4.532, 541). The whole section, from the introduction of Silenus 
forward, corresponds to the episode of the tutor and pupil returned from 
the Great Tour earlier in the poem. Silenus, too, is a tutor who intro­
duces a band of youths to the goddess and addresses her on their behalf. 
Pope makes the situations parallel and reintroduces the imagery of the 
epic journey because this later scene presents the final corruption of the 
public life as an exact analogue to the earlier scene's presentation of the 
corruption of the private. He invokes the figure of Odysseus rather than 
Aeneas because (in addition to the fact that he has already used Aeneas as 
exemplar of the private virtues) Odysseus is the one epic figure explicitly 
and unwaveringly loyal to country, family, and self, and the one epic 
figure whose final actions clearly result in the reassumption of his rightful 
identity and the reunification of his family and kingdom, all presided 
over and blessed by Wisdom herself in the form of Athene. The dunces 
here precisely reverse this set of values: the Magus's cup brings forget ­
fulness of friends, sire, ancestors, self, brain, principle, god, country, 
everything — "And nothing left but Homage to a King" (4.524). These 
lines eradicate every possibility of public virtue, of sensible govern­
ment, of honorable society. 
The Magus passage also marks the beginning of what Pope calls "the 
celebration of the greater Mysteries of the Goddess" (note to 4.517), 
which involve initiation and consequent transformation. The transfor­
mations involve increasingly great reductions in activity, both of mind 
and body, reaching toward an ultimate point of total inertia, from 
The vulgar herd turn off to roll with Hogs, 
To run with Horses, or to hunt with Dogs 
(4.525-26) 
down to 
Others the Syren Sisters warble round, 
And empty heads console with empty sound. 
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No more, alas! the voice of Fame they hear, 
The balm of Dulness trickling in their ear. 
(4.541^44) 
After this, "a Priest succinct in amice white" (4.549) celebrates the 
ultimate mystery, the transformation and reduction of matter itself. 
On some, a Priest succinct in amice white 
Attends; all flesh is nothing in his sight! 
Beeves, at his touch, at once to jelly turn, 
And the huge Boar is shrunk into an Urn: 
The board with specious miracles he loads, 
Turns Hares to Larks, and Pigeons into Toads. 
Another (for in all what one can shine?) 
Explains the Seve and Verdeur of the Vine. 
What cannot copious sacrifice atone? 
Thy Treuffles, Perigord! thy Hams, Bayonne! 
With French Libation, and Italian Strain, 
Wash Bladen white, and expiate Hays's stain. 
Knight lifts the head, for what are crowds undone 
To three essential Partriges in one? 
(4.549-62) 
The form of the mystery draws upon the mass, principally the consecra­
tion and transubstantiation of the Host as celebrated in the Roman rite. 
"Three essential partriges in one" parodies the relationship of the per­
sons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each separate and 
distinct, yet all forming one being. This element is present here because 
in transubstantiation the Host is converted into the Body and Blood of 
Christ, and since Christ is both man and god, second person of the 
Trinity, the whole Trinity is present in the form of the Host. The 
appearance of the Host is unchanged, but its actuality is radically 
altered. The celebrant here in effect reverses the process and reaches 
upward through matter to alter the nature and substance of divinity. The 
mystery is not that he "Turns Hares to Larks, and Piegons into Toads" 
but that he reduces God to matter; the central mystery is the transubstan­
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tiation of spirit into "three essential Partriges in one." Dulness 
materializes spirit, while at the same time subtracting from matter all 
properties save extension and mass. Everything else, everything muta­
ble, she eliminates — a thorough Cartesian to the last. After this, there is 
nothing else for her to do except welcome her initiates and send them off 
to theirfinal task, to extend this mystery to all creation, to find or to make 
the leader who "shall three Estates command, / And MAKE ONE 
MIGHTY DUNCIAD OF TH E LAND " (4.603-4). 
Dulness has reached the moment of uncreation, signaled once again in 
the poem by Hermes' wand, this time cosmically extinguishing the stars 
(IV. 637-38). She yawns the uncreating word that will restore the empire 
of Chaos, and the yawn is the uncreating word. It antithesizes the divine 
fiat by which the world was created; it is unarticulated vocal breath, 
sound without substance or form, that subtracts form from the universe. 
It restores Chaos because it is chaos; yawn and gulf (chaos) share in 
Greek a common root, and the yawning gulf of Chaos that Pope here 
describes darkly translates them both. This is the way the world ends, 
not with a bang but a pun. 
IV 
The poem ends with Chaos because chaos is material and what Pope 
has described is a world increasingly immersed in matter.31 By and 
large, he has employed Cartesian conceptions to convey his vision of the 
disjunction of mind from matter and the gradual triumph of mindless 
matter. For this reason, the poem concludes with fully realized inertia: 
for Descartes, the only true property of matter is extension. Even motion 
is alien to it, and is consequently eliminated at the end of The Dunciad, 
The few brief mentions of Lucretius and Epicurus serve primarily to 
locate Cartesian physics within the general framework of an atheistic 
atomism, with its consequent implications of fragmentary and chaotic 
materialism, a cosmos without form or plan. But the Cartesian system 
offered Pope the sustaining myth or metaphor he needed to depict in 
orthodox epic form the complete inversion of orthodox epic subject 
matter. If Wisdom is the patron deity of epic heroes, Dulness is certainly 
her appropriate perversion, and materialism, broadly and philosophi­
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cally considered, her sustaining creed. In that sense, The Dunciad is 
not mock epic but epic — and its final, apocalyptic lines, the requiem for 
a culture, are epic in any sense. Pope was not unique either in seeing 
materialism as the Damoclean sword of his civilization or in perceiving 
the connection between the tenets of contemporary physics and the 
wisdom of traditional epic. Swift anticipated him in both and dealt with 
both even more elaborately, and it is to Swift that we must now turn our 
attention. 
1. Pope links his Windsor Forest with Paradise Lost through his comparison of the 
forest with "The Groves of Eden," which still "look green in Song" (7-8) and most 
explicitly through his concluding plea to Granville to write the great English national epic 
(423-34). Windsor Forest is, of course, itself a georgic, and is linked to Virgil's 
Georgics by numerous allusions and imitations. 
2. For the importance of Catullus to The Rape of the Lock, see Earl R. Wasserman's 
fine "The Limits of Allusion in The Rape of the Lock," JEGP 65 (1966): 425-44. 
3. The Republic ofPlato, trans. F. M. Cornford (New York, 1963), 10.600, p. 331. 
4. See, for example, Sidney's Defence of Poesie, or Tasso's remarks quoted in 
chapter 1. 
5. Essay on Human Understanding, 2.23.2. 
6. Ralph Cohen, in "The Augustan Mode in English Poetry," Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 1 (1967): 3-32, argues that these lines present "an inverted prospect" (p. 12). It 
seems to me that the "prospect" is not inverted at all, culminating as it does in a fully 
realized microcosm. Rather, the serious flaw would appear to be the prospect itself, 
"implying a world beatable in Newtonian space and time, leading (though not necessar­
ily) to an infinity beyond man's comprehension" (p. 31): these are the very aspects of the 
prospect that Pope apparently regards with horror and that made it a natural vehicle for 
Belinda's perversion of art into material, time-bound artificiality. Thus I would have to 
argue that in Pope's view — and implicitly in Dryden's and Swift's — the prospect is not 
one of the major modes of Augustan poetry, but one of the threats to it. 
7. Reprinted in the Twickenham Edition, 2:205. 
8. The irony of this is not simply the "Earthly lover lurking at her Heart" (3.144), but 
also that Belinda becomes, by winning the card game, "the Man." 
9. That the metamorphosis has a linguistically sound base is, I think, part of Pope's 
point. Greek komes, hair = English comet. 
10. Classical scholars have discerned similar structural patterns (which they refer to 
as "ring composition") in Homer, and Cedric H. Whitman, in his chapter "Geometric 
Structure of The Iliad" (Homer and the Heroic Tradition [Cambridge, Mass., 1958] 
pp. 249-84), describes a pattern very similar to the one I am positing here. 
11. Compare the passage from The Sphere ofSacrobosco quoted in chapter 1, note 
22. 
12. Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (New Haven, Conn., 1958), 
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pp. 39 ff. An example: "To expound the system in all of its ramifications, Pico required 
several hundred Conclusiones. . .  . All we must remember is that the bounty bestowed 
by the gods upon lower beings was conceived by the Neoplationists as a kind of 
overflowing (emanatio), which produced a vivifying rapture or conversion (called by 
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TALE OF A TUB is among the most extraordinary 
works in any literature, and it is something of a stand­
ing wonder to me that any of our cliches about 
Augustanism have survived the simple fact of its exis­
tence. The period bracketed by A Tale of a Tub and 
Tristram Shandy cannot constitute a literary Age 
of Reason. For all that, the Tale is a thoroughly Augustan work, having 
important links with both The Rape of the Lock and The Dunciad and 
with the same body of materials that lies behind them. Its concerns 
resemble those of Pope's poems: in its radical disjunction of form and 
content it links intelligibly with The Rape of the Lock; in its employ­
ment of a pervasive materialism as a central metaphor it connects with 
The Dunciad. The same process of reification that informed Dunciad 4 
proceeds also in the Tale: 
However, for this Meddly of Humor, he made a Shift to find a 
very plausible Name, honoring it with the Title of Zeal; 
which is, perhaps, the most significant Word that hath been 
ever yet produced in any Language; As, I think, I have fully 
proved in my excellent Analytical Discourse upon that Sub­
ject; wherein I have deduced a Histori-theo-physi-logical 
Account of Zeal, shewing how it first proceeded from a 
Notion into a Word, and from thence in a hot Summer, 
ripned into a tangible Substance. (6.86) 
The growth of notions into words in the Tale briefly summarizes the 
spread of Dulness from Cibber's leaden works to the great work of the 
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achieved leaden age: ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. That is the 
relation oiA Tale of a Tub to the epic ancestors we have been studying. 
Swift's manipulation of materialism here both resembles and differs 
from. Pope's use of it. As in The Dunciad, it provides a control and a 
touchstone for the central concerns of the book. Such plot as there is 
depends entirely upon the "thingness" of the will and the coats — the will 
as a collection of words, syllables, and letters to be sorted and arranged 
to produce the desired meanings, the coats as a surface to be filled up to 
produce the desired appearance. Peter's search through the will totidem 
literis reduces it and its contents effectively to manipulable objects; 
Jack's use of it as an umbrella merely ratifies this. At the extremes, the 
opposites meet: Peter's total disregard for the literal meaning of the will 
evacuates it of meaning and makes of it only a piece of paper; Jack's 
exaggerated respect for its literal meaning makes it no more or no less 
than that. The real will, like the Scriptures it represents, is a tertium 
quid that responds neither to literalizing nor to allegorizing but provides 
the nexus of both, just as the coats, for the reader, are transparently coats 
and Christian faith at one and the same time. 
Metaphor — human language — causes all the difficulty. In one sense 
bread is the staff of life that Peter claims it is; in another sense, it is not 
"excellent good Mutton" (4). So, too, Jack's "fair Copy of his Father's 
Will": it both is and is not "Meat, Drink and Cloth, . . . the 
Philosopher's Stone, and the Universal Medicine" (11). Neither 
Peter nor Jack nor the narrator of A Tale of a Tub seems able to grasp this 
aspect of language, and as a result, language seems always to be slipping 
away from them, to become either a series of hieroglyphs to be arranged 
and interpreted according to the whim of the critic or to become a 
parchment to be carried, worn, consumed, and so on. Jack's attitude 
toward the will matches the narrator's toward the "universal System in a 
small portable Volume" (5), for which he gives a recipe; contradictorily, 
the narrator's pursuit of the allegory of the ass (3) corresponds to Peter's 
hunt in the will for those elusive shoulder knots (2). This failure of all 
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three to recognize the true nature of language derives from the narrator's 
more fundamental failure to see the duality of human nature as a linking 
of corporeal and spiritual, and leads in turn to the two antithetical 
metaphysical systems of the Tale, Sartorism and Aeolism. 
Sartorism offers a philosophy of outsides. It glorifies the external, the 
surface to be filled and adorned. Sartorism provides the compelling 
necessity for altering the three brothers' coats, for overlaying them with 
shoulder knots and filigree and silver points, just as it offers the adequate 
explanation of the overdecorated and fabulous nature of Grubaean art. 
In consequence of these momentous Truths, the Grubaean 
Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts and their 
Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and Fables, which 
having been perhaps more careful and curious in adorning, 
than was altogether necessary, it has fared with these Vehicles 
after the usual Fate of Coaches over-fmely painted and gilt; 
that the transitory Gazers have so dazzled their Eyes, and 
filFd their Imaginations with the outward Lustre, as neither to 
regard nor consider, the Person or the Parts of the Owner 
within. A Misfortune we undergo with somewhat less Reluc­
tancy, because it has been common to us with Pythagoras, 
Aesop, Socrates, and other of our Predecessors. (1.40) 
Moreover, Sartorism provides a refuge from reason with its "Tools for 
cutting, and opening, and mangling, and piercing," "which enters into 
the Depth of Things, and then comes gravely back with Informations and 
Discoveries, that in the inside they are good for nothing." Analytical 
thinking ends in uncovering the "many unsuspected Faults" of the beau 
and the sadly altered carcass of the woman flayed (9), whereas Sartorism 
offers to the believer a universe dressed for show, from the "fine Coat 
faced with Green," which is land, to the "fine Doublet of white Satin 
. . . worn by the Birch" (2). 
Swift has fashioned Sartorism as a kind of parody of Hobbism: the 
paragraph of rhetorical questions that describes land as a green coat and 
sea as a "Wastcoat of Water-Tabby" (2) alludes to, and satirizes, the 
rhetorically and logically similar opening of Leviathan.1 
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Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the 
world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this 
also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing 
life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata 
(engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth 
a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a 
spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, 
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such 
as was intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitat­
ing that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. 
For by art is created that great LEVIATHA N called a 
COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is 
but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength 
than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was 
intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as 
giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, 
and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial 
joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the 
seat of sovereignty every joint and member is moved to 
perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the same in the body 
natural; the wealth zn&riches of all the particular members, 
are the strength; salus populi, the people's safety, its 
business, counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to 
know are suggested unto it, are the memory, equity, and 
laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedi­
tion, sickness, and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and 
covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first 
made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let 
us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.2 
Hobbes's argument is reductive in two ways: his mechanical metaphors 
(which are only half metaphors on their way to being taken literally, like 
the metaphors of A Tale of a Tub) reduce human life and human beings to 
purely material, physically explicable phenomena; and God's activity, 
for all its prominence in the first and last sentences, is very strictly 
paralleled with, if not equated to, man's own devices. Swift incorporates 
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both points into his parody and makes them the basis of Sartorism. God 
is clearly a human artificer, and he creates artificial animals — clothes 
that are souls — which then possess life (if life is defined as "but a motion 
of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within'7)- Swift 
carries the process of materialization to its logical conclusion by a strict 
literalization of all metaphor: 
The Worshippers of this Deity had also a System of their 
Belief, which seemed to turn upon the following Fundamen­
tal. They held the Universe to be a large Suit ofCloaths, 
whichinvests every Thing: That the Earth is invested by the 
Air; The Air is invested by the Stars; and the Stars are 
invested by the Primum Mobile. Look on this Globe of 
Earth, you will find it to be a very compleat and fashionable 
Dress. What is that which some call Land, but a fine Coat 
faced with Green? or the Sea, but a Wastcoat of Water-
Tabby? Proceed to the particular Works of the Creation, you 
will find how curious Journey-man Nature hath been, to 
trim up the vegetable Beaux: Observe how sparkish a 
Perewig adorns the Head of a Beech, and what a fine Doub­
let of white Satin is worn by the Birch. To conclude from 
all, what is Man himself but a Micro-Coat, or rather a 
compleat Suit of Cloaths with all its Trimmings? As to his 
Body, there can be no dispute; but examine even the Ac­
quirements of his Mind, you will find them all contribute in 
their Order, towards furnishing out an exact Dress: To in­
stance no more; Is not Religion a Cloak, Honest a Pair of 
Shoes, worn out in the Dirt, Self-love a Surtout, Vanity a 
Shirt, and Conscience a Pair of Breeches, which, tho' a 
Cover for Lewdness as well as Nastiness, is easily slipt down 
for the Service of both. (2.46) 
What lies behind all this, of course, are the ancient metaphor of the body 
as the clothing of the soul and its somewhat younger corollary of style as 
the dress of thought.3 Swift's narrator and Swift's satire materialize and 
mechanize both of these, so that "Embroidery, was Sheer Wit" (2) and 
art, in effect, "the Assistance of Artificial Mediums, false Lights, 
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refracted Angles, Varnish, and Tinsel" (9) to cover the otherwise insipid 
objects of the world and to make men happy. This results in the 
narrator's thinking of everything in his world not only as an object, but as 
an object that exists primarily as a surface to be covered: the body 
requires clothing, books need long introductions, fables necessitate 
elaborate allegories.4 Anything possessing a point, be it reason or satire, 
may not be allowed to pierce the surface — thus his disclaimer of having 
"neither a Talent nor an Inclination for Satyr" (The Preface) and his 
preference for general satire over particular: "Tis but a Ball bandied to 
and fro, and every Man carries a Racket about Him to strike it from 
himself among the rest of the Company" (The Preface). His own summa­
tion of the consequences of his position says it best: 
In the Proportion that Credulity is a more peaceful Posses­
sion of the Mind, than Curiosity, so far preferable is that 
Wisdom, which converses about the Surface, to that pre­
tended Philosophy which enters into the Depth of Things, 
and then comes gravely back with Informations and Dis­
coveries, that in the inside they are good for nothing. The two 
Senses, to which all Objects first address themselves, are the 
Sight and the Touch; These never examine farther than the 
Colour, the Shape, the Size, and whatever other Qualities 
dwell, or are drawn by Art upon the Outward of Bodies; and 
then comes Reason officiously, with Tools for cutting, and 
opening, and mangling, and piercing, offering to demon­
strate, that they are not of the same consistence quite thro'. 
Now, I take all this to be the last Degree of perverting Nature; 
one of whose Eternal Laws it is, to put her best Furniture 
forward. And therefore, in order to save the Charges of all 
such expensive Anatomy for the Time to come; I do here 
think fit to inform the Reader, that in such Conclusions as 
these, Reason is certainly in the Right; and that in most 
Corporeal Beings, which have fallen under my Cognizance, 
the Outside hath been infinitely preferable to the In: Whereof 
I have been farther convinced from some late Experiments. 
Last Week I saw a Woman flay'd, and you will hardly 
believe, how much it altered her Person for the worse. Yes­
terday I ordered the Carcass of a Beau to be stript in my 
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Presence; when we were all amazed to find so many unsus­
pected Faults under one Suit of Cloaths; Then I laid open his 
Brain, his Heart, %n6.\\i§ Spleen] But, I plainly perceived at 
every Operation, that the farther we proceeded, we found the 
Defects encrease upon us in Number and Bulk: from all 
which, I justly formed this Conclusion to my self; That 
whatever Philosopher or Projector can find out an Art to 
sodder and patch up the Flaws and Imperfections of Nature, 
will deserve much better of Mankind, and teach us a more 
useful Science, than that so much in present Esteem, of 
widening and exposing them (like him who held Anatomy to 
be the ultimate End oiPhysick.) And he, whose Fortunes and 
Dispositions have placed him in a convenient Station to enjoy 
the Fruits of this noble Art; He that can with Epicurus 
content his Ideas with the Films and Images that fly off upon 
his Senses from the Superficies of Things; Such a Man truly 
wise, creams off Nature, leaving the Sower and the Dregs, for 
Philosophy and Reason to lap up. This is the sublime and 
refined Point of Felicity, called, the Possession of being 
well deceived; The Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool 
among Knaves. (9.109-10) 
Directly contradictory to all this is the narrator's apparent fondness for 
Jack and for Aeolism, for the doctrine of (somewhat loosely) the inner 
light and the philosophy of insides. Aeolism depends in its very rudi­
ments upon the contents of its vessels, male and female, for its doctrine 
and practice. 
At other times were to be seen several Hundreds link'd 
together in a circular Chain, with every Man a Pair of Bellows 
applied to his Neighbour's Breech, by which they blew up 
each other to the Shape and Size of a Tun; and for that 
Reason, with great Propriety of Speech, did usually call their 
Bodies, their Vessels. When, by these and the like Perfor­
mances, they were grown sufficiently replete, they would 
immediately depart, and disembogue for the Pub lick Good, a 
plentiful Share of their Acquirements into their Disciples 
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Chaps. . .  . At which Junctures, all their Belches were re­
ceived for Sacred, the Sourer the better, and swallowed with 
infinite Consolation by their meager Devotes. And to render 
these yet more compleat, because the Breath of Man's Life is 
in his Nostrils, therefore, the choicest, most edifying, and 
most enlivening Belches, were very wisely conveyed thro7 
that Vehicle, to give them a Tincture as they passed. (8.96-
97) 
This parodic inspiration closely resembles the narrator's own notions of 
the development and flowering of that noblest of all human states, 
madness, which, as he describes it, arises as well from an inward vapor. 
For great Turns are not always given by strong Hands, but by 
lucky Adaptation, and at proper Seasons; and it is of no 
import, where the Fire was kindled, if the Vapor has once got 
up into the Brain. For the upper Region of Man, is furnished 
like the middle Region of the Air; The Materials are formed 
from Causes of the widest Difference, yet produce at last the 
same Substance and Effect. Mists arise from the Earth, 
Steams from Dunghils, Exhalations from the Sea, and Smoak 
from Fire; yet all Clouds are the same in Composition, as well 
as Consequences; and the Fumes issuing from a Jakes, will 
furnish as comely and useful a Vapor, as Incense from an 
Altar. Thus far, I suppose, will easily be granted me; and then 
it will follow, that as the Face of Nature never produces Rain, 
but when it is overcast and disturbed, so Human Understand­
ing, seated in the Brain, must be troubled and overspread by 
Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, to water the 
Invention, and render it fruitful. Now, altho' these Vapours 
(as it hath been already said) are of as various Original, as 
those of the Skies, yet the Crop they produce, differs both in 
Kind and Degree, merely according to the Soil. (9.102-3) 
And the effects of these vapors are "those two great Blessings, 
Conquests and Systems" (9.107) — among the latter, of course, Sar­
torism and Aeolism themselves. 
Swift 143 
The beliefs of Aeolism are not as distant from Sartorism as they at first 
sight appear: both are materialist philosophies, equally dependent upon 
a resolutely corporeal understanding of what is meant by soul. Aeolism 
literalizes metaphoric language — witness "spirit" and "inspiration" — 
as insistently as does Sartorism. And if we recall Sartorism's point of 
origin in Hobbes, the resemblance grows even stronger. The narrator 
explains inspiration, intuition, vision, and madness in a purely mechan­
ical way, making of human beings comic steam engines churning out, 
and churned by, vapors. Hobbes claimed that "life is but a motion of 
limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within," and went 
on to ask "what is the heart but a spring, and the nerves but so many 
strings, and the joints but so many wheels giving motion to the whole 
body such as was intended by the artificer?" The narrator of the Tale 
inquires similarly about a particular instance of madness: 
Now is the Reader exceeding curious to learn, from whence 
this Vapour took its Rise, which had so long set the Nations 
at a Gaze? What secret Wheel, what hidden Spring could put 
into Motion so wonderful an Engine? It was afterwards dis­
covered, that the Movement of this whole Machine had been 
directed by an absent Female, whose Eyes had raised a 
Protuberancy, and before Emission, she was removed into an 
Enemy's Country. . . . Having to no purpose used all 
peaceable Endeavours, the collected part of the Semen, 
raised and enflamed, became adust, converted to Choler, 
turned head upon the spinal Duct, and ascended to the Brain. 
(9.103-4) 
Aeolism provides the complement of Sartorism in offering an explana­
tion of the "principle part within" that provides motion to the automata. 
Both systems work to ensure the happiness of the self-deceived, whether 
the focal point of the deception be the lucubrations of one's own brain or 
"the Films and Images . . . from the Superficies of Things" (9.110). 
As the narrator assures us, "A strong Delusion always operates] from 
without, as vigorously as from within" (9.108). 
144 Epic to Novel 
Between them, Aeolism and Sartorism generate the metaphors that 
control the structure and meaning of the Tale of a Tub. These can be 
found in the images and notions of insides and outsides, containers and 
contained, and the shifting allegiance of the narrator to one or the other. 
The tub itself and its antitypes, the oratorical machines, are containers to 
be valued for their contents. Grubaean writings, we are told, contain 
great arcana, and superficial readers must "be persuaded to inspect 
beyond the Surface and Rind of Things," for 
Wisdom is a Fox, who after long hunting, will at last cost you 
the Pains to dig out: 'Tis a Cheese, which by how much the 
richer, has the thicker, the homelier, and the courser Coat; 
and whereof to a judicious Palate, the Maggots are the best. 
'Tis a Sack-Posset, wherein the deeper you go, you will find 
it the sweeter. Wisdom is a Hen, whose Cackling we must 
value and consider, because it is attended with an Egg; But 
then, lastly, 'tis a Nut, which unless you chuse with Judg­
ment, may cost you a Tooth, and pay you with nothing but a 
Worm. (1.40) 
The coats themselves are outsides, exterior souls, and the tailor-god who 
creates them perches emblematically upon what the narrator with un­
characteristic brevity simply calls a superficies, a surface. The critical 
mirror that the narrator describes (3.63) "cast[s] Reflections from its 
own Superficies, without any Assistance of Mercury from behind." 
Peter's feast retains the outward appearance of brown bread, but "in 
[this] Bread is contained, inclusive, the Quintessence of Beef, Mut­
ton, Veal, Venison, Partridge, Plum-pudding, and Custard" 
(4.72). The narrator, "with a World of Pains and Art, dissected the 
Carcass of Humane Nature, and read many useful Lectures upon the 
several Parts, both Containing and Contained" (5.77), as a result of 
which "throughout this Divine Treatise," he "skilfully kneaded up both 
together with a Layer of Utile and a Layer of Dulce" (5.77). The 
Aeolists, of course, see themselves as vessels and containers of their 
divine winds and view these contents as of crucial importance; neverthe­
less, even among them outsides are held in some honor, and the size of 
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ears were "not only lookt upon as an Ornament of the Outward Man, but 
as a Type of Grace in thelnward" (11.129). And outwardly, of course, 
Jack looked very much like Peter, and was often mistaken for him. The 
narrator reports the opinion of "the famous Troglodyte Philosopher": 
Tw certain (said he) some Grains of Folly are of course 
annexed, as Part of the Composition of Human Nature, 
only the Choice is left us, whether we please to wear them 
Inlaid or E«mbossed; And we need not go very far to seek 
how that is usually determined, when we remember, it is 
with Human Faculties as with Liquors, the lightest will 
be ever at the Top. (10.116) 
And beyond all this, the fable of Peter, Martin, and Jack and the 
digressions of the narrator stand in an unsteady inside-outside relation to 
each other, one or the other of them being, in theory, the empty container 
thrown out to the whale to prevent that Leviathan — in a strikingly mixed 
metaphor — "from laying violent Hands" (Preface, p. 24) on Church and 
State. The narrator clearly indicates the equivalence of these apparent 
opposites when he moves blithely from an encomium of madness and the 
inward generation of delusion (9}to a statement of preference for outward 
delusion, praising the man who "can with Epicurus content his Ideas 
with the Films and Images that fly off upon his Senses from the Super­
ficies of Things" (9.110). He demonstrates the same thing structurally 
by the total conflation of fable and digression at the end of the Tale, so it 
is indeed merely a matter of choice whether we read our follies "Inlaid or 
Embossed." 
The interaction of outsides and insides furnishes the essential key to 
reading the Tale intelligibly. The narrator understands both physically: 
outsides are bodies, and insides are more bodies, fragments of bodies, or 
mechanical causes of motion in bodies. The narrator really thinks he is 
getting inside human beings when he sees a woman flayed or a beau 
stripped; he believes he is mastering the insides of books when he learns 
their titles or scans their indexes. For that reason, his own book accumu­
lates a large collection of outsides — title page, epigraphs, lists of other 
books, "An Apology," "Postscript," the bookseller's dedication, "The 
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Bookseller to the Reader/' "The Epistle Dedicatory to His Royal 
Highness Prince Posterity," "The Preface " and finally Section I, "The 
Introduction." Inside all of that is the tale itself, which the narrator 
constantly goes outside of to give us his theories about criticism, mad­
ness, digressions, and so on. All of these he also views physically, as 
material additions to the magnitude of his work: 
. . . having the Modern Inclination to expatiate upon the 
Beauty of my own Productions, and display the bright Parts 
of my Discourse; I thought best to do it in the Body of the 
Work, where, as it now lies, it makes a very considerable 
Addition to the Bulk of the Volume, a Circumstance by no 
means to be neglected by a skilful Writer. (5.82) 
Despite surface appearances, the narrator of A Tale of a Tub acts in a 
reasonably consistent manner toward his book. It essentially offers him 
another surface to be adorned or another tub to be filled up: whether we 
regard the Tale as an inside or an outside depends entirely upon whether 
we decide he is adorning a surface or filling a container. He is at least 
perceptive enough to see that those acts are identical. If Sartorism makes 
the body an inside and the soul an outside, Peter's actions nevertheless 
use the coats as surfaces to be adorned — and do so to such a degree that 
what started as an outside becomes an inside to be uncovered by Martin 
and Jack in their own diverse fashions. The same paradox is true of 
human bodies: insides in the tenets of Sartorism, they become for the 
narrator surfaces to be decorated and at all costs not to be entered. At the 
extremes, the opposites meet, as Jack and Peter so often do, and the 
narrator at least sees that "Inlaid or Embossed" is our only choice about 
anything. 
As readers, we confront that choice at every paragraph of the Tale. 
The story of Peter, Martin, and Jack is clearly an allegory, a parable, 
that demands interpretation — demands that we enter into it and examine 
its contents. How shall we do that? By Peter's method of textual 
analysis? That method leads the narrator to conclude that critics are 
asses — which may be true, but is only another metaphoric statement 
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that itself requires further explanation, and, taken in any sense, is hardly 
comforting to us. By Jack's method, then, of total literalism? We are 
then indeed dealing with a tale of a tub: there's nothing in it. And what of 
the supposed digressions? Most of them are not genuinely digressive at 
all. Are they the real point of the Tale and the fable only a delusive 
outside? If that is the case what holds it all together? What structures it 
and regulates its progress? How are we to get inside the digressions — 
inside an inside — and uncover their meaning? Or is their meaning, too, 
all there on the surface? 
The answers to all these questions lie in a more precise definition of 
the kinds of insides and the kinds of outsides we and the narrator are 
dealing with. Probably the most pertinent place to begin clarifying these 
matters is with the narrator's use of the traditional metaphor of the mirror 
of art — a metaphor we have already seen adapted in a similar (I think) 
manner by Pope in The Rape of the Lock. Here, the narrator speaks of 
the critical mirror particularly. He stresses the superficial nature of the 
reflection involved: only surfaces are reproduced; the imitation is con­
fined to the material, to the body alone. 
A certain Author, whose Works have many Ages since been 
entirely lost, does in his fifth Book and eighth Chapter, say of 
Criticks, that their Writings are the Mirrors of Learning. 
This I understand in a literal Sense, and suppose our Author 
must mean, that whoever designs to be a perfect Writer, must 
inspect into the Books of Criticks, and correct his Invention 
there as in a Mirror. Now, whoever considers, that the 
Mirrors of the Ancients were made of Brass, and sine 
Mercurio, may presently apply the two Principal Qualifica­
tions of a True Modern Critick, and consequently, must 
needs conclude that these have always been, and must be for 
ever the same. For, Brass is an Emblem of Duration, and 
when it is skilfully burnished, will cast Reflections from its 
own Superficies, without any Assistance of Mercury from 
behind. All the other Talents of a Critick will not require a 
particular Mention, being included, or easily deducible to 
these. (3.63) 
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Let us pass over the narrator's interesting literalism and the possible 
significations of Mercury and Brass to concentrate on the extremely 
corporeal version of artistic reflection that Swift here describes. The 
mirror itself is presented as a solid surface that resists penetration: it 
lacks physical or metaphorical depths. The image is quite physically 
thrown back from this superficies. The reflexiveness of this process 
approximates what took place before Belinda's mirror: the kind of 
criticism Swift here describes literally creates in its own image or simply 
repeats its own image, just as Shadwell repeated Flecknoe. But I have 
talked about this particular process enough in other chapters. Swift's 
lines are illuminating for another reason: his conception and his language 
are Lucretian. He is in fact employing here Lucretius's description of the 
behavior of atoms in the formation of reflected images.5 These are the 
same "Films and Images that fly off . .  . from the Superficies of 
Things" that the narrator assured us contented Epicurus and "a Man 
truly wise" (9.110; see Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 4.26 ff.). 
The narrator behaves as a perfect Lucretian throughout the Tale. His 
epigraph from the De Rerum Natura sets him a task equivalent to 
Lucretius's: 
?Tis sweet to crop fresh Flow'rs, and get a Crown 
For new and rare Inventions of my own: 
So noble, great, and gen'rous the Design, 
That none of all the mighty Tuneful Nine 
Shall grace a Head with Laurels like to mine. 
For first, I teach great Things in lofty Strains, 
And loose Men from Religion's grievous Chains. 
(1.935-41)6 
Later he refers to himself as Secretary of the Universe and again quotes 
lines from the De Rerum Natura that level his undertaking with 
Lucretius's: 
Quemvis preferre laborem 
Suadet, & inducit noctes vigilare serenas. 
(1.141-42) 
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. .  . I wake all Night, 
Laboring fit Numbers, and fit Words to find, 
To make Things plain, and to instruct your Mind, 
And teach her to direct her curious Eye 
Into coy Nature's greatest Privacy. 
(1.172-76; see Tale, 5.77) 
And once again — this time with explicit reference to Jack — he quotes 
from the same Lucretian passage that provided his epigraph: 
Mellaeo contingens cuncta Lepore. 
(6.89) 
Creech somewhat loosely translates as follows (I will give the clauses 
preceding to make clear the connection between this and what I have 
already quoted): 
For first, I teach great Things in lofty Strains, 
And loose Men from Religion's grievous Chains: 
Next, tho' my Subject's dark, my Verse is clfear, 
And sweet, with Fansy flowing ev'ry where. 
(1.940-43) 
Implicitly, this casts the narrator as the poet-propagandist-disciple Lu­
cretius to Jack's guide-philosopher-exemplar Epicurus; his task, like 
Lucretius's, is to expound the system of his master. At all events, these 
explicit parallels and the ubiquity of reference to, and quotation from, 
De Rerum Natura delineate the narrator's role. 
The Lucretian materials are certainly not accidental: they form an 
integral part of the mind and character of the narrator of the Tale, and at 
the very least add a piquant irony to "the freshest Modern ['s]" frequent 
deplorings of the ignorance of the ancients. As we have seen, he concep­
tualizes vision and the process of mirroring according to the tenets of 
Lucretian atomic theory. He presents as well an impeccable Lucretian 
case for the material nature and effects of language, paraphrasing and 
quoting Lucretius to the effect that air and words are heavy bodies 
leaving consequently material impressions on implicitly material minds. 
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The deepest Account, and the most fairly digested of any I 
have yet met with, is this, That Air being a heavy Body, and 
therefore (according to the System of Epicurus) continually 
descending, must needs be more so, when loaden and press'd 
down by Words; which are also Bodies of much Weight and 
Gravity, as it is manifest from those deep Impressions they 
make and leave upon us; and therefore must be delivered 
from a due Altitude, or else they will neither carry a good 
Aim, nor fall down with a sufficient Force. 
Corpoream quoque enim vocem constare fatendum est, 
Et sonitum, quoniam possunt impellere Sensus. Lucr. 
Lib. 4 (1.36) 
Creech translates the Latin lines very concisely: " 'Tis certain then, that 
Voice that thus can wound / Is all Material: Body every Sound" 
(4.545-46). The prose before and after the Latin verse condenses and 
paraphrases material from the same section of De Rerum Natura, 
roughly 4.524 ff. and 4.563 ff. respectively. The Aeolists have not 
failed to grasp at least one implication of these ideas; they argue suc­
cinctly that "Words are but Wind; and Learning is nothing but 
words; Ergo, Learning is nothing but Wind" (8.97). For the Aeolists, 
of course, that is a compliment. 
But wind plays a much more fundamental role in Aeolist cosmology 
than that quotation indicates. With the kind of literal-mindedness that 
characterizes the narrator of the Tale, they literalize the forma infor­
mans of man, whether it be called spiritus, animus, afflatus, oxanima, 
into its etymological and imagistic base, wind alone (8.95). This wind 
we already know to be purely material, and according to Aeolist doctrine 
it defines the nature of man. 
. . . Since Wind had the Master-Share, as well as Operation 
in every Compound, by Consequence, those Beings must be 
of chief Excellence, wherein that Primordium appears most 
prominently to abound; and therefore, Man is in highest 
Perfection of all created Things, as having by the great 
Swift 151 
Bounty of Philosophers, been endued with three distinct 
Anirna's or Winds, to which the Sage Aeolists, with much 
Liberality, have added a fourth of equal Necessity, as well as 
Ornament with the other three; by this quartum Principium, 
taking in the four Corners of the World; which gave Occasion 
to that RenowedCabbalist, Burnbastus, of placing the Body 
of Man, in due position to the four Cardinal Points. 
In Consequence of this, their next Principle was, that Man 
brings with him into the World a peculiar Portion or Grain of 
Wind, which may be called a Quinta essentia, extracted 
from the other four. (7.95-96) 
Swift has so managed affairs here that these Aeolist doctrines point by 
point parallel and parody Lucretius's explanation of the mortality and 
materiality of the spirit and the way in which it causes motion in the 
body — a point with obvious relevance to our earlier discussion of the 
relation of Aeolismto Hobbes's "principal part within." This passage in 
fact parallels in form and function the parody of Hobbes that preceded 
the exposition of the tenets of Sartorism. Here is Creech's translation of 
part of Lucretius's argument: 
Ti s Certain then, the Seeds, that frame the Mind, 
Are thin, and small, and subtile, and refin'd: 
For when the Mind is gone, the former Weight 
Each Limb retains, the Bulk remains as great. 
And yet 'tis Mixt: for when Life's Pow'rs decay, 
A gentle Breeze with Vapour flies away: 
This Vapour likewise shews that Air is there. 
All Heat has Air; for Heat, by Nature rare, 
Must still be intermixt with Parts of Air. 
Well then: we know the Mind and Soul comprise 
Three Things; yet from all these no Sense can rise, 
No vig'rous Thought from such a Frame as this. 
Then we must add a fourth Thing to this Frame; 
And yet that Fourth, tho' Something, has No Name: 
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Its Parts are smooth, small, subtile, apt to move, 
When press'd, or troubPd by the weakest Shove: 
From this comes Sense. (3.220-36) 
Next, how these four are mix'd, I would rehearse, 
How fitly join'd; but now my flowing Verse 
The Poorness of the Latin Tongue does check: 
Yet briefly, and as that permits, I'll speak. 
They all confus'dly move; no difPrent Space 
To each allotted, and no proper Place, 
Where this divides, from that, and lies alone; 
But all their Powers, conjoin'd, arise as one. 
So gen'rally, in ev'ry Piece of Meat, 
Our Sense discovers Odour, Savour, Heat; 
The Flesh the same: So Heat, and Air, and Wind 
Make up one Nature mix'd, and closely join'd 
With that Quick Force,- which makes them move; and whence 
Thro7 all the Bodies Parts springs vig'rous Sense. 
This Nature's deeply hid; this does possess 
The inmost Space, and most remote Recess. 
As in our Limbs, the Soul's removed from View, 
Because its Seeds are thin, and small, and few; 
So this fourth Nameless Force within the Soul 
Lies hid, its chiefest Part, and rules the Whole. 
So likewise must the Heat, and Air, and Wind 
Be in convenient Place, and Order join'd: 
This must be uppermost, that lower fall, 
To make it seem One Nature, fram'd of All: 
Lest Heat and Air, plac'd sep'rately, distract 
The Pow'r of Sense, and make it cease to act. (3.250-75) 
The three animae and the quartum principium tally in both texts; the 
Aeolists' uQuinta essentia, extracted from the other four" seems trans­
parently a parodic extension of Lucretius's mysterious blending of his 
principles into an inexplicable unity. It is somewhat difficult to deter­
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mine, at this point, whether Swift is using the rationalistic system of 
Lucretius to debunk the obscurantism of the sects, or the obscurantism of 
the sects to explode the rationalism of Lucretius, or where either stand in 
relation to the DNA and RNA of modern corpuscular theory. And Swift 
substantially complicates the parodic element by using Lucretius's de­
scription of an epileptic fit as the vehicle for his own description of an 
Aeolistrite(8.98; compare Lucretius, 3.487 ff. and Creech's translation, 
3.469-85). 
The Aeolists — and the narrator, apparently — accept the principle of 
the correspondence of the microcosm and the macrocosm. The narrator 
describes Aeolist sages delivering their knowledge by adopting 
a certain Position of Countenance, which gave undoubted 
Intelligence to what Degree or Proportion, the Spirit agitated 
the inward Mass. For, after certain Gripings, the Wind and 
Vapours issuing forth; having first by their Turbulence and 
Convulsions within, caused an Earthquake in Man's little 
World; distorted the Mouth, bloated the Cheeks, and gave the 
Eyes a terrible kind of Relievo. At which Junctures, all their 
Belches were received for Sacred, the Sourer the better, and 
swallowed with infinite Consolation by their meager De­
votes. (8.97) 
This "Earthquake in Man's little World" synopsizes Lucretius's descrip­
tion of the process of eathquake in the great world, with no loss of causal 
relationships and little change of scenery (De Return Natura, 6.5 5 7 ff.; 
Creech, 6.540 ff.). And the narrator pursues a similar argument from 
analogy in tracing the origins and workings of madness: 
For the upper Region of Man, is furnished like the middle 
Region of the Air; The materials are formed from Causes of 
the widest Difference, yet produce at last the same Substance 
and Effect. Mists arise from the Earth, Steams from Dung­
hils, Exhalations from the Sea, and Smoak from Fire; yet all 
Clouds are the same in Composition, as well as Conse­
quences: and the Fumes issuing from a Jakes, will furnish as 
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comely and useful a Vapor, as Incense from an Altar. Thus 
far, I suppose, will easily be granted me; and then it will 
follow, that as the Face of Nature never produces Rain, but 
when it is overcast and disturbed, so Human Understanding, 
seated in the Brain, must be troubled and overspread by 
Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, to water the 
Invention, and render it fruitful. Now, altho' these Vapours 
(as it hath been already said) are of as various Original, as 
those of the Skies, yet the Crop they produce differs both in 
Kind and Degree, meerly according to the Soil. (9.102-3) 
This argument, too, seems to be a condensation of Lucretius, though the 
point is not important: see De Rerum Natura, 6.451 ff. In the para­
graphs immediately following this, the narrator employs the same pro­
cess to explain how love becomes madness through the conversion of 
semen to choler and its ascension to the brain. His language throughout 
draws explicitly and implicitly on Lucretius's passage on the causes of 
physical desire (Tale, 9.103-4; De Rerum Natura, 4.103 ff.). In any 
event, the reversible proposition, as in man so in the universe, seems as 
firmly established for him and the Aeolists as it earlier was for him and 
the Sartorists. 
In Swift's parodic system, the Lucretian materials obviously provide a 
philosophic base for Aeolism parallel to Sartorism's roots in Hobbes's 
works. But Lucretius is more important than that to the narrator, who 
sees himself as an avatar of the classical poet-scientist-philosopher, like 
him engaged in clarifying rerum naturam. The Epicurean atomism 
Lucretius expounds subsumes Hobbes's thinking (which was contem­
porarily considered a revival of classical atheistic atomism — of 
Epicurus and Lucretius, in short):7 Hobbes's materialism and 
Descartes's vortices (9.105) appear as no more than elaborations of 
Lucretius's attempt to explain the workings of the universe materially 
and mechanically. These latter qualities the narrator himself singles out 
for mention in his brief summation of Epicurus's major tenets: 
Epicurus modestly hoped, that one Time or other, a 
certain Fortuitous Concourse of all Mens Opinions, after 
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perpetual Justlings, the Sharp with the Smooth, the Light and 
the Heavy, the Round and the Square, would by certain 
Clinamina, unite in the Notions of Atoms and Void, as these 
did in the Originals of all Things. (9.105) 
We have already seen the roles of atoms in forming films, images, 
vapors, the weightiness of speech. The Clinamina are, loosely, the 
angles of incidence, attraction, or attachment of atoms to each other; in 
classical atomic theory, these and the sizes or qualities of the atoms 
themselves determine the nature of the body produced. This is also true 
of the world of the narrator of the Tale: 
Now, the former Postulatum being held, that it is of no 
Import from what Originals this Vapour proceeds, but either 
in what Angles it strikes and spreads over the Understanding, 
or upon what Species of Brain it ascends; It will be a very 
delicate Point, to cut the Feather, and divide the several 
Reasons to a Nice and Curious Reader, how this numerical 
Difference in the Brain, can produce Effects of so vast a 
Difference from the same Vapour, as to be the sole Point of 
Individuation between Alexander the Great, Jack of 
Leyden, and Monsieur Des Cartes. (9.107) 
And since the microcosm mirrors (in what manner we have already seen) 
the macrocosm, the behavior of atoms becomes the behavior of men: 
But, here the severe Reader may justly tax me as a Writer 
of short Memory, a Deficiency to which a true Modern 
cannot but of Necessity be a little subject. Because, Memory 
being an employment of the Mind upon things past, is a 
Faculty, for which the Learned, in our Illustrious Age, have 
no manner of Occasion, who deal entirely with Invention, 
and strike all Things out of themselves, or at least, by Colli­
sion, from each other. . . . (6.84) 
And by the same token, the Sartorists argue that what "are vulgarly 
called Suits of Clothes, ox Dresses, do according to certain Composi­
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tions receive different Appellations. . .  . If certain Ermins and Furs be 
placed in a certain Position, we stile them a Judge, and so, an apt 
Conjunction of Lawn and black Sattin, we intitle a. Bishop" (2.47). And 
Peter's ability to juxtapose an S, an H, an O, and so on, will at length 
bring forth the desired shoulder knot. Words become bodies, bodies 
become words, and both are reducible to randomly colliding atoms. 
This, in its barest form, is the world inhabited by the narrator of 
A Tale of a Tub. 
Swift's latter-day Lucretius has the virtue, for my purposes at least, of 
making explicit what seems implicit in everyone else. Atomic theory — 
known to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the "corpuscular 
theory" — provides the rationale for the insistent process of reification 
that I have so often remarked on. Hobbes and Descartes do no more than 
Epicurus and Lucretius in confining human knowledge to the surface of 
things; Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities — 
between what is really "in" the object and what human perception puts 
there — merely reinforces the limitation. Atomism explains those bodies 
and surfaces. I do not mean this in any loose or haphazard way; I mean 
precisely that the kind of ideas about language, about body, about 
society, and about the cosmos that I have been discussing were shaped 
by the premises and implications of what contemporaries knew as the 
corpuscular theory and what we glibly pass off as the dawn of Western 
science. Almost from the Restoration onward, some form of atomic 
theory dominated scientific investigation, banishing older ideas of the 
nature of bodies and along with them established notions of the relation­
ships of bodies and souls and spirits of all sorts.8 What we have seen in 
literature reflects the substitution of the implications of atomism for 
Aristotelian genera and species or for the Platonic web of relations 
between physical existence, the ideal, and the One. Atomism makes 
transcendence impossible; it lops off a whole, previously inhabited 
dimension of human life. It calls into being a chaotic, purely material 
world — and this is the shared accusation that Dryden, Pope, and Swift 
have leveled at all of their villains. What alarms them is the possibility 
that bad art can call into being just such a world, that Flecknoe, 
Shadwell, the Grub Street hack, Belinda, Dulness and her minions, all 
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can in fact create a cosmos where art is a corpus. Paradoxically, they can 
only accomplish this because of the shared faith of Dryden, Pope, and 
Swift in the ability of language to reflect and to affect reality. That is, 
Dryden's, Pope's, and Swift's fears are based on an acceptance of the 
microcosm-macrocosm analogy as ontologically true: consequently, 
the conceptualizations of the human mind and the artistic cosmoses that 
result from them directly affect the greater world. Atomism eliminates all 
analogies but one, that of random bodies randomly constellating at all 
levels of existence. Atomism negates all other modes of relationship and 
replaces them with a new and terrifying absolute: body totally without 
access to grace, corporeality that excludes all other forms of existence, 
all other modes of being. This accounts in large part for the peculiar 
satiric uses of bodies in Augustan literature, from Shadwell's "Tun of 
Man" to the Yahoos; this same cosmological revolution radically altered 
the relationship of language and body for Augustan and all subsequent 
art. 
Looked at on a purely literal level, there is no great gulf between 
Swift's narrator's account of the origin of madness and Bernardus 
Silvestris's explanation of the formation of the various humors in the 
human body (see above, pp. 42-43). From any other point of view, the 
difference is enormous. Although he does not hesitate to use physical 
language and mechanical conceptions, Bernardus describes a process 
that is firmly embedded in a world of analogies and in an analogically 
intelligible world. What happens chemically in the human body also 
occurs, mutatis mutandis, morally and intellectually in the human 
mind or spirit or may be checked, reversed, negated, or redirected by the 
mind or spirit. Astrological phenomena and terrestrial phenomena may 
parallel human actions, but they do not control them. Body may expli­
cate spirit for limited intelligences, but it does not dominate spirit. In the 
world of A Tale of a Tub, body is spirit, as the Aeolists so amply prove, 
and the point of such analogies as remain is their physical necessity. 
Steam and vapors ascend to the sky and form clouds; vapors ascend to 
the human brain and form madness. Both universe and human mind 
obey physical laws. What for Bernardus gave a spiritual dimension to the 
physical and made things invisible explicable through things visible, for 
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Swift's narrator eliminates the spiritual entirely and reduces everything 
to the more or less predictable (if you know the kind of brain and the 
angle of incidence of the vapors) action of physical agents. The central 
fact, metaphor, and analogy of the cosmos of the Tale of a Tub is the 
random motion of an atom. 
Since individuals also behave like atoms, it follows that any kind of 
society is impossible save the loose union of those whose madnesses 
harmonize. Everything else remains fragmentary and haphazard. Ex­
emplary figures are impossible: since conquests and systems are the 
greatest products of the greatest madnesses, no individual has anything 
to learn from the career of an Aeneas or a Red Crosse Knight, either 
literally or metaphorically considered. In that sense, epic too is impos­
sible. Peter's and Jack's interpretations reduce Scripture to chaos; the 
narrator's emulation and denigration of Homer wreak the same havoc on 
epic. The really heroic calling, he assures us, is the practice of criticism, 
to travel thro' this vast World of Writings: to pursue and hunt 
those Monstrous Faults bred within them: to drag out the 
lurking Errors like Cacus from his Den; to multiply them like 
Hydra's Heads; and rake them together like Augeas's Dung. 
Or else to drive away a sort of Dangerous Fowl, who have a 
perverse Inclination to plunder the best Branches of the Tree 
of Knowledge, like those Stymphalian Birds that eat up the 
Fruit. (3.58) 
Scripture is destroyed when the will becomes an expression of Peter's 
will; epic is undone when it becomes the mode of the narrator's — or any 
individual's — madness. In the world of A Tale of a Tub, there are only 
individuals, and mad ones at that. 
The absence of genuine society indicates the disappearance of struc­
tures of all sorts. Governments and systems of thought are the projec­
tions of individual eccentricity, from Odysseus's reconquest of Ithaca to, 
I suppose, the Code Napoleon and Cambodia and Laos. Literary 
structures are equally beyond the pale, as A Tale of a Tub so graphically 
shows — materials that belong in the preface find their way into the body 
of the work, tale and digression confusedly intertwine, writing itself only 
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furnishes an opportunity for the narrator to empty his commonplace 
book. Of the characteristic epic structure we examined earlier, there 
remains this much: at the center of the book, the narrator shifts our 
attention from Peter to Jack, (6), from the exponent of the outside to the 
exponent of the inside, and launches forth in praise of digressions and the 
discovery of "a Nut-shell in an Iliad" (7).9 In the first half of the book, 
while Peter was busily adorning the outside of his coat, the narrator was 
just as busily leading us into the penetralia of books, mysteries, signs, 
and allegories; in the second half, as soon as Jack begins exploring the 
inner man, the narrator declares his allegiance to excurses, outsides, and 
'Those Entertainments and Pleasures . . . such as Dupe and play the 
Wag with the Senses" (9.108). After this, insides and outsides change 
places, as they have so often, and fable becomes excursus, digression the 
matter of the work: "aNut-shell in an Iliad" is only an outside within an 
outside. Containers contain containers, digressions "inclose Digressions 
in one another, like a Nest of Boxes" (5.77; the narrator at this point 
disapproves of the arrangement). Every step of uncovering merely 
reveals another surface — which is at least one good reason why outsides 
are preferable to insides. 
There is another. The cosmos of the Tale of a Tub is Lucretian to the 
core — and the irony of that is that for Lucretius there is no core. Every 
seemingly solid body contains the void. Everything, everyone, is a 
superficies covering nothing. The atoms paper over the hollowness, but 
the hollowness remains — for, as Lucretius argues, if there were no void, 
there could be no penetration, no displacement, no motion of any sort 
(De Rerum Natura, 1.329 ff.). So in a Lucretian world, everything is a 
tale of a tub — everything that exists is a container that contains nothing. 
All is a series of surfaces, box within box. Sartorist soul and Aeolist spirit 
are both films flying off the superficies of things, surfaces held forth to 
divert attention from the void within — so, too, Grub Street fables, so, 
too, the heroic genealogy of critics. In the same ironic way in which 
Pope structures chaos, Swift fuses form — or formlessness — and 
meaning in the Tale of a Tub. The fragmentation of the narrative, the 
constant asides and digressions, the myriad of images and opinions 
thrown off, the alternations of discourse and narrative, theoretical pro­
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nouncement and practical result, the frenzies of Peter and Jack and the 
alarums and excursions of the narrator's momentary preoccupations — 
these are not the vehicles of meaning in the Tale: these are meaning. The 
Tale itself, like the tub whose precise significance escaped the Grand 
Committee ("The Preface," p. 24), embodies meaning in a way that 
neither Peter, Jack, nor the narrator are capable of grasping; it embodies 
it by giving it form, by using form — body — as a physical language and 
language as a formal body and thereby, in a final irony, creating the 
"artificial man" Hobbes spoke of. The success of that artifice is a 
uniquely Swiftian triumph: to have shaped a repudiation of Hobbesian 
and Lucretian materialism exclusively out of the materials of the "cor­
puscular" philosophy, to have invalidated a whole way of life by giving it 
existence — this runs close to the borders of logic and the limits of 
language. It is an act of courage, too, to call into being the very world 
whose possibility one fears, and perhaps the saddest irony of the Tale is 
its prophetic accuracy. We inhabit the world of A Tale of a Tub. It, too, 
like all other solid bodies, contains the void. 
II 
The Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit 
offers Swift the opportunity for one last fillip: it functions in relation to A 
Tale of a Tub as does the last squirt of seltzer water in a Marx Brothers 
movie. It virtually ignores the presence of the Battle of the Books in its 
explicit linkings with the Tale: imagery, metaphor, subject, treatment, 
all derive logically from the Tale, and either continue and complete what 
the Tale has started or make explicit what to this point has been only 
implied. In any event, the end product of any or all of these is an 
outrageous intellectual slapstick. 
For example, the opening two sentences: 
It is now a good while since I have had in my Head some­
thing, not only very material, but absolutely necessary to my 
Health, that the World should be informed in. For, to tell you 
a Secret, I am able to contain it no longer, (p. 171) 
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My reaction to the narrator's inability to "contain" anything so "very 
material" is a mixed one indeed. Consider also his choice of the episto­
lary form: "Letters to a Friend" are now in vogue, ergo, "having dis­
patched what I had to say of Forms, or of Business, let me intreat, you 
will suffer me to proceed upon my Subject; and to pardon me, if I make 
no farther use of the Epistolary Stile, till I come to conclude" (p. 172). 
The discursive correspondent blatantly shares the narrator of the Tale's 
disregard for the consonance of subject, genre, and style. He possesses 
as well the same fondness for beginning with an allegory, and the one he 
chooses seems particularly charged: certainly the observant reader can­
not take the fable of Mahomet and his ass as simply an allegory of the 
"Fanatick Auditory" and the "Gifted, or enlightened Teacher" (p. 173) 
without doubling the complications and amusement by recollection of 
the Ass-Critic and Ass-Jack from the Tale, or Aesop's escape in Ass's 
form in the Battle. The explanation of the mechanical operation of the 
spirit conforms very neatly with everything we have been told about 
Aeolist inspiration, from the ascension of vapors to the unfortunate 
extension of the outer vessel and the system-builder's sad seduction by 
his lower parts into a ditch. And the basis of both systems is identical: "I 
am apt to imagine, that the Seed or Principle, which has ever put Men 
upon Visions in Things Invisible, is of a Corporeal Nature . . .  " (p. 
188). 
There does not seem to me anything terribly complex about the 
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, at least not as compared to A Tale 
of a Tub.10 Its importance seems to me to reside in its final mirroring, 
across the Battle of the Books, of the concerns and attitudes of the Tale. 
The Tale concludes diminuendo, as the narrator tries to write about 
nothing; the Mechanical Operation repeats once again, even more 
diminished, a by-now familiar refrain. Even more explicit than the Tale, 
even more fragmented, it still reminds us as the volume dwindles to a 
close that this is one book, that there are connections among the three 
works, that, in short, A Tale of a Tub, the Battle of the Books, and the 
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit are to be read as an interconnected 
and unified work. 
To prove that last statement, I will have to show real connections 
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among the three works and especially between the Battle and the Tale, 
In an obvious way, of course, the Battle of the Books and the 
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit simply separate the twin concerns 
of the Tale — abuses in learning and religion — and treat each of them 
individually. But there are more meaningful links than that. 
The Battle of the Books continues the major metaphors that Swift 
generated in A Tale of a Tub. First the simple process of reification, the 
reduction of intellectual and spiritual concepts to physical bodies, 
reaches its logical conclusion in the literal battle of the books, and the 
bookseller's friendly reminder that "when Virgil is mentioned, we are 
not to understand the Person of a famous Poet, . . . but only certain 
Sheets of Paper, bound up in Leather" (p. 139) merely reinforces that 
point, as does the goddess Criticism's later adoption of octavo format. 
Second, both narrators agree about the inefficacy of satire. I quote here 
the narrator of the Battle: "Satyr is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do 
generally discover every body's Face but their Own; which is the chief 
Reason for that kind of Reception it meets in the world, and that so very 
few are offended with it" ("The Preface of the Author," p. 140). Third, 
the narrators agree also in their preference of outsides to insides: 
THERE is a Brain that will endure but one Scumming: 
Let the Owner gather it with Discretion, and manage his 
little Stock with Husbandry; but of all things, let him 
beware of bringing it under the Lash of his Betters; 
because, That will make it all bubble up into Imperti­
nence, and he will find no new Supply: Wit, without 
knowledge, being a Sort of Cream, which gathers in a 
Night to the Top, and by a skilful Hand, may be soon whipt 
into Froth; but once sctcmm'd away, what appears under­
neath will be fit for nothing, but to be thrown to the 
Hogs.11 ("Preface," p. 140) 
And as for containers — the books themselves are containers, holding 
the "Spirit" or uBrutum hominis" (p. 144) of their authors; the library is 
a container; the Full and True Account of the Battle is itself a container 
very much like the Tale of a Tub, filled with episodes and digressions 
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and, even more like the Tale, ultimately composed of several layers of 
surfaces. 
The surfaces I refer to are the several layers of allegory that make up 
the Battle of the Books. In a manner exactly like the beginnings of the 
Tale and the Discourse, the Battle of the Books opens with an allegory 
that sets the theme of the narration and/or exposition to follow. In this 
case, the narrator presents his little fable of the republic of dogs, and 
proceeds to apply it to affairs in St. James Library, to the advantage of 
neither group in the dispute. From this point on, the Battle's mode of 
procedure differs from the Tale's: the narration progresses in a reason­
ably straightforward manner, with few of the digressions and interrup­
tions of the Tale. TKose sections — where the narrator speaks in propria 
persona, offering systems, theories, and interpretations — are now 
lar *ely confined to the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit. That is, the 
process of confusing fable and digression that we saw at the end of the 
Tale of a Tub has now been carried out to its logical conclusion, and 
fable and digression have now completely changed places: the fable now 
treats of abuses of learning (Battle of the Books), and the digressive 
essay {Mechanical Operation of the Spirit) now concerns itself with 
abuses of religion. Both subjects have been reduced to a primarily 
physical mode of existence, and once again separated into unrelated 
entities: in effect, the narrator of the Tale has fully succeeded in his 
project of secularizing and materializing religion and learning. 
That digression will, I hope, be pardoned; I am a victim of my 
environment. 
The Battle of the Books proceeds episodically to no conclusion: 
Bentley's and Wotton's ignominious trussing, like "a Brace of 
Woodcocks11 (p. 164), is followed only by a sprinkling of asterisks and a 
feeble uDesunt caetera." The road thither has led through an explana­
tion of the origins of the quarrel, the steps preliminary to actual hos­
tilities, the encounter of the spider and the bee and its exposition and 
application by Aesop, the catalogues of the armies, the council in 
heaven, the visit to, and visit of, the goddess Criticism (a kind of descent 
to the underworld), the battle itself (a series of individual skirmishes in 
the Homeric manner), a council of generals with the intrusion of a 
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Thersites (Bentley), a night expedition and the "deaths" of Bentley and 
Wotton in a wonderful parody of Virgil's Nisus and Euryalus episode. 
All of these, except the episode of the spider and the bee, very obviously 
fit the mock-epic pattern, and it is striking to realize just how much 
characteristically epic material (at least characteristically Iliadic) Swift 
has gotten into so short a work. But the exception is what I want to 
examine. 
The fable of the spider and the bee is simple to the point of being 
transparent, and Aesop's application of it strikes every reader as some­
what spiderishly venomous but perfectly apt. The complications arise 
from its context. Once again, outsides triumph over insides, and the 
wide-ranging bee handily humiliates the self-sufficient spider. But after 
what we have seen of outsides and insides in A Tale of a Tub, I for one 
find it very difficult to take that straightforwardly. And Aesop's allegori­
zation only makes things more confusing; he is, after all, an allegorical 
figure himself, who provides us, in the middle of an allegory, with 
another allegory. Then, too, there is the question of genre and decorum, 
since we are dealing with books in general and epic in particular: what is 
a beast fable doing in the middle of an epic? Or more generally, what is 
the relation of the whole spider and bee episode to the rest of the Battle of 
the Books? 
The several layers of allegorical surfaces that precede all this provide 
the answer to that question. The story of the republic of dogs leads the 
narrator to explain the quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns as 
centering on possession of the highest peak of Parnassus. In this quarrel, 
"Ink is the great missive Weapon" (p. 143), and the trophies both sides 
set up in celebration of a victory are books, which are subsequently 
stored in libraries. In St. James Library, because of accident or misman­
agement or mischief, Ancient and Modern books were jumbled together, 
and that led to their resuming the quarrel. Allegory (republic of dogs) 
leads to exposition (quarrel about Parnassus) leads to allegory (ink as 
weapon, books as trophies) leads to exposition (books are stored in 
libraries, thus, battle of books). Clearly then, the episode of the spider 
and bee fits the pattern of allegory and explanation set up by the narrator, 
and the question then becomes one of why the pattern breaks down after 
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this episode. But there are other elements to the pattern as well. The 
republic of dogs has its roots in fact, not parable — only the application 
of language drawn from the sphere of government makes it in any way 
metaphoric, and certainly not genuinely allegorical. What the narrator 
offers as an application of it, however, is most definitely allegorical — 
the quarrel about possession of the highest peak of Parnassus — but this 
is presented to us as fact. Then again, ink as weapon and books as 
trophies: this is barely metaphor at all; it is hyperbole at best. But the 
narrator presents it as allegory, and the quarrel in the library among 
physical books is presented as fact. So, too, the actions of the spider and 
the bee, which would seem like the doings of the republic of dogs to be 
rooted in fact, are made allegory by Aesop, whose application or expla­
nation becomes the fact that supplants them. Allegory is more real than 
reality. Like religion and learning, inside and outside have once more 
changed places: interpretation is now prior to fact, literature is prior to 
reality. Books replace men, and "real" occurrences are only materials 
for allegory at best. We have stepped through the looking glass. 
And that is the point of it all, of the inconclusiveness of the Battle of 
the Books and the downbeat ending of the Tale and the final emblematic 
fall that concludes the Mechanical Operation. It is when we realize 
fully the implications of the spider and the bee, that in an allegory we are 
reading another allegory that is being allegorized for us by an allegorical 
character, that Swift's simple point emerges in devastating clarity. He is 
talking about the substitution of literature for life, about the deformation 
of life by literature — literature in the sense of all letters: theology, 
philosophy, physics, poetry. What he is talking about is the peculiarly 
modern temperament that substitutes theorizing about life for living it, or 
that makes life over to fit the theory. His whole point lies in the tenuous 
connection between art and reality, between word and thing, and the 
myriad ways in which that connection can be broken. To make every­
thing words is just as bad as to make everything body, and the simple 
statement of Swift's whole volume is that we do. 
The Battle of the Books, in which all that exists becomes literature, 
stands between A Tale of a Tub and the Mechanical Operation of the 
Spirit, in both of which all that exists becomes body. At the center of the 
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Battle stands the episode of the spider and the bee, which would appear 
to be the most digressive element in it, but which in every important 
sense forms the heart of it, revealing just how flesh is made word.12 Swift 
inserts it in a mock epic for the same reason that Pope litters clues about 
The Rape of the Lock, to demonstrate that same disjunction of epic 
manner and epic matter. The Battle of the Books has no real connection 
with epic save through a parody of its surface; the insides of epic are 
contained, ironically, in^4 Tale of a Tub. There, as inThe Dunciad, art 
and philosophy, religion and government are presented in the process of 
being fragmented, materialized, and destroyed. The narrator of the Tale 
and the sort of mind he embodies are making what later writers would 
call unity of culture impossible, and with it they are banishing epic, since 
traditional epic had always been the vehicle for precisely that awareness 
of the interrelatedness of human life. Aeneas, in Landino's view, had 
step by step to learn private morality, the virtues and defects of public or 
civil life, and finally the lessons of philosophy about the summum 
bonum. The narrator of the Tale eliminates that tedious process and, 
like the spider of the Battle, spins everything out of himself, either by 
inspiration or by sounding the harmonizing chord of his madness. In 
either case, it marks the destruction of traditional epic by substituting 
private vision for the wisdom of a culture, by making the individual the 
paradigm for the whole. It is, simply, the substitution of solipsism for 
society. Swift's playing with allegoresis throughout the volume demon­
strates that point again and again: what is the real difference, after all, 
between what Aesop does to the spider and bee and what the narrator of 
the Tale does to asses, or what the narrator of the Mechanical Opera­
tion does to Mahomet and his ass? The universal tendency of all the 
characters in all these works is to impose private visions from without 
and to claim that they constitute the real insides of the matter. Swift, like 
Pope, is describing the breakdown of a whole civilization, the moment at 
which all the energies and aspirations of a culture turn against themselves 
and bring forth parodies of their ideal. What Scaliger charges to Bentley 
in the Battle can stand equally well as an indictment of Swift's narrators 
and Pope's dunces: "Miscreant Prater, said he, Eloquent only in thine 
own Eyes, Thou railest without Wit, or Truth, or Discretion. The 
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Malignity of thy Temper perverteth Nature, Thy Learning makes thee 
more Barbarous, thy Study of Humanity, more Inhuman; Thy 
Converse amongst Poets more groveling, miry, and dull. All Arts of 
civilizing others, render thee rude and intractable; Courts have taught 
thee ill Manners, andpolite Conversation has finished thee a Pedant"1 
(p. 161). Bentley, like Peter and Jack and the narrators, is a man 
deformed by letters, a life warped by literature. He is also the wave of the 
future, sure proof that art does affect life and alter reality. The narrator of 
the Mechanical Operation states the proposition succinctly, and his is, 
after all, the last word on the subject: " . .  . There is many an Opera­
tion, which in its Original, was purely an Artifice, but through a long 
Succession of Ages, hath grown to be natural" (p. 175). 
Ill 
From the point of view of literature, the volume containing^ Tale of a 
Tub, the Battle of the Books, and the Mechanical Operation of the 
Spirit accomplishes, in prose parody, the overt separation of epic matter 
from the epic manner. Gulliver's Travels goes on to exploit epic matter 
in a prose comic or mock epic without the epic manner. Lemuel Gulliver 
explores the metaphoric and ontological cosmos the Tale volume has 
called into being. Gulliver succeeds the narrator of the Tale as map-
maker of this brave new world. Like his predecessor, he straddles 
painfully the diverging worlds of body and mind. Confounded by the 
total duality of spirit and matter, he can only offer us the latitude and 
longitude of his life and ours. Simultaneously failed philosopher and 
inadvertent guide, he is the Cartesian cartographer of our schizoid, 
unepic universe. 
Gulliver's Travels presupposes the world of A Tale of a Tub. It is, on 
the face of it, a perfectly reasonable world. Absent from it are God, 
religion, human affection, and any firm standards of judgment. Total 
egocentricity and chance replace them. Gulliver exists as a fragmentary 
individual, isolated from family and his fellow men both by the illogic of 
random events and the shallowness of his own feelings. The simple 
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sequence of events, the variables of his life, become the determinants of 
it. His own judgments, conditioned and altered by perspective and 
vanity, are the only norms. At the same time, they are what is most 
crucial in the book, what Swift resolutely directs our attention toward. 
Gulliver is a new kind of protagonist in literature, chosen and developed 
for his paradoxically peculiar averageness — middle son of a middle-
class family from the middlemost county in England, attended univer­
sity but took no degree, and the university "canting Emmanuel" at that. 
Gulliver is no extraordinary figure chosen because his life offers a pattern 
for emulation; his role is rather to represent all of us. He is the hero as 
synechdoche rather than exemplar. This new Everyman represents us all 
because he is different from us all, just as we are different from each 
other; his idiosyncratic vanity and eccentricity link him to us and furnish 
the bond of our common humanity. These factors in themselves put 
Gulliver's Travels on the road to the novel. 
Swift's uses of bodies and clothing indicate in themselves the con­
tinuities between Gulliver and A Tale of a Tub. Bodies are both the 
expression of reality and the determinants of Gulliver's judgments about 
it — though his judgments usually invert the value so blatantly displayed 
before him. The tininess of the Lilliputians betrays their pettiness, their 
smallness of mind and spirit; Gulliver fails to see it but comes to share it, 
glorying in the title of Nardac and vigorously defending the honor of the 
Lilliputian lady with whom he is improbably accused of having an affair. 
Starting from the proposition that "human Creatures are observed to be 
more Savage and cruel in Proportion to their Bulk" (2.1.87), he fails to 
see that the size of the Brobdingnagians reflects their magnanimity, and 
he carefully suppresses all evidence of his own physical pettiness by 
resolutely avoiding mirrors — though it still breaks out in his ostenta­
tious triumphs over rats and flies, in his near disasters with rats and 
monkeys, and — in a more important moral dimension — in his vicious 
offer to the king of the secret of gunpowder. The bodily deformity of the 
Laputans clearly tokens their deformity of mind. Theirs is a Cartesian 
world indeed: the husbands keep their heads, deformed by the total 
domination of mind and the nature of their studies, quite literally in the 
clouds, while their comely ladies solace their neglected bodies on the 
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mainland below. The Academy of Lagado derives almost directly from 
the "Digression on Madness," and the Struldbrugs descend lineally from 
the unfortunate flayed woman. As for the Houyhnhnms: Gulliver finds it 
easier to think of himself as quadruped manque than as well-dressed 
Yahoo, and it is the sexual advances of a female Yahoo that definitely 
determine the point. As corollaries to all this, Gulliver's clothing in the 
various adventures sustains the central action and metaphorics: his 
patchwork garment demonstrates his immersion in the smallness of 
vision of the Lilliputians; his mouse-skin breeches sustain the Brobding­
nagian King's indictment of Gulliver-sized people as "little odious 
Vermin" (2.6.132). His scientifically made and ill-fitting clothes in 
Laputa show the depth of the disjunction between mind and body. In 
Houyhnhnmland, he once again clothes himself in animal skins, includ­
ing Yahoos'. In a lovely final irony, Swift has Gulliver — the would-be 
Houyhnhnm who seeks to deny any bond with the Yahoos — make his 
departure from the Houyhnhnms in a boat made of Yahoo hides, with 
Yahoo-skin sails, and calked with Yahoo tallow. The body, as Swift 
would have known from Augustine if from nowhere else, is the ship that 
transports the soul through the vicissitudes of this life. Deny it as he will, 
Gulliver must accomplish all his travels in and with a Yahoo body. And 
ignore it though he does, outsides still embody insides for those with 
eyes to see. 
Swift develops the character of Gulliver with fine consistency from 
his first adventures to his final misanthropy. Each book, of course, is 
written as if it were done immediately after the journey described, so that 
in fact we are dealing with four distinct stages of Gulliver's character as 
lie responds to, and is altered by, the immediately preceding events. 
Gulliver among the Lilliputians reveals some of the traits that lead him 
finally to the tranquillity of an English stable. Although he can be very 
exact and acute about things external to him, including other people, he 
is obtuse and vague in his knowledge of himself. For example, in the 
same chapter (1.6) in which he describes Lilliputian law and custom with 
brevity and precision, and his own clothing and living arrangements 
somewhat more verbosely, he also protests with deadpan seriousness his 
innocence of any liaison with a Lilliputian "great Lady." In Brobding­
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nag, too, although he can tell us in great detail about warts and cancers 
and how many hogsheads a maid of honor pisses? he manages to delude 
himself about his own size, with explicitly comic results after his rescue. 
For all the importance of bodies in determining character and even in 
defining the knowable, Gulliver suppresses this evidence with amazing 
ease when it is unsettling to his self-esteem. This, of course, is what he 
ultimately does vis-a-vis Yahoos and Houyhnhnms. In the first two 
books, where he encounters the human body telescoped and micro-
scoped but essentially undistorted, Gulliver is able to assimilate himself 
to his surroundings completely and think of himself in the same perspec­
tive as the natives. In Laputa and Lagado and among the Struldbrugs, 
where distortion of body mirrors distortion of mind, he has more diffi­
culty but still manages to internalize the "set," the Weltanschauung, of 
his environment: he is unhappy on Laputa because his hosts, busy with 
airy speculation, pay little attention to him; but in Lagado, he cheerily 
confesses that "I had myself been a Sort of Projector in my younger 
days" (3.4.178) and immerses himself in the Academy. The Struldbrugs 
shock him, because he had been forgetting that the body decays: both the 
Academy of Lagado and the Flying Island had, in their different ways, 
been devoted to overcoming or ignoring physical limits, and the 
Struldbrugs — like Tithonus or the Sybil — are eternal embodiments of 
exactly that, freed from one great limitation in order to perpetuate all the 
others. That and the evidence of Glubbdubdrib, where he once more 
sees the process of decay, from Aristotle to Descartes and from "English 
Yeomen of the old Stamp" (3.8.201) to contemporary politicians, force 
him to "melancholy Reflections" on the degeneration of the human race. 
At this point, he begins to conceive of normal humanity in something of 
the same light that he saw himself— physically, at least — in Brobding­
nag. Houyhnhnmland confronts him with the final distortion of body. 
Animal rationale has bifurcated into an irrational animal with a human 
body and a rational animal with a horse's. Instead of recognizing that he 
is neither Houyhnhnm nor Yahoo but some third thing between them — 
animal rationis capax, in Swift's phrase — Gulliver embraces both 
erroneous extremes simultaneously. He has never been able to see 
himself clearly in relation to others but always had, to the best of his 
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ability, to become others. Here, shocked by the physical proof that he 
shares at least part of Yahoo nature, he ignores the physical proof that he 
has no part of Houyhnhnm nature, that the Houyhnhnms are totally 
alien. Swift has made them horses for the same reason that the Laputans' 
bodies are distorted: the kind of mind they embody is, simply, not 
human. The pure rationality of the horses lies as far beyond Gulliver as 
the pure bestiality of the Yahoos lies beneath him, and it is pointless to 
argue whether it is an ideal for men or not: human beings, in Swift's view, 
are simply not capable of it, and that is why he has personified it in totally 
nonhuman form. Unfortunately, Gulliver does not realize that. 
Gulliver's self-knowledge breaks down completely when he accepts the 
logic of "because I am a Yahoo I must be a Houyhnhnm"; from that 
point, it is a short step to the mad ex-surgeon in the stable talking to 
horses. 
I think we must see Gulliver's Travels as a comic Odyssey. Not 
because of particular incidents or analogues, though there are plenty of 
those — Yahoos and Circe's swine, Glubbdubdrib and the Odyssean 
descent to hell, and so on — but because of the central importance to the 
satire of Gulliver's failure to know himself. Odysseus, the man of many 
turns, always knows who he is, even through he often has to lie about it, 
as to the Cyclops — but even there the episode closes with his declara­
tion of his identity. His final assumption of his full identity — as 
Odysseus, son of Laertes, father of Telemachus, husband of Penelope, 
king of Ithaca — climaxes the poem, and the progression is swift and 
sure from the seeming beggar's bending of the great bow to Penelope's 
being convinced by his knowledge of the secret of the bed to his reunion 
with Telemachus and Laertes. To put it crudely, Odysseus never thinks 
for a moment that he is a Cyclops; Gulliver does. Gulliver is an obtuse 
version of the Odysseus of the other tradition, the Ulysses whom Virgil 
depicted as the arch-liar and whom Dante put in hell for misusing his 
intellect, for giving false counsel and persuading his followers to leave 
home again. He has no Athene to guide him and no Penelope to sustain 
him — only an amorphous wife who seems to go on producing children 
with or without his presence. But he may be the artificer of Odysseus's 
greatest trick: the Trojan horse. 
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Therefore since my Acquaintance were pleased to think my 
poor Endeavours might not be unacceptable to my Country; I 
imposed on myself as a Maxim, never to be swerved from, 
that I would strictly adhere to Truth; neither indeed can I be 
ever under the least Temptation to vary from it, while I retain 
in my Mind the Lectures and Examples of my noble Master, 
and the other illustrious Houyhnhnms, of whom I had so 
long the Honour to be an humble Hearer. 
JSfec si miserum Fortuna Sinonem 
Finxit, vanum etiam, mendacemque improba finget. 
(4.12.292-93) 
Fortune can make Sinon wretched, but it cannot make him a liar; thus 
speaks Ulysses' catspaw, the man who is about to persuade the hapless 
and trusting Trojans to welcome the wooden horse into their city, to their 
ultimate destruction. Thus quotes the man who has just told a whopping 
great falsehood about a race of rational horses. The Houyhnhnms are 
Gulliver's wooden horse, and you accept them to your own destruction. 
They are the delusive outside that hides the hollow and dangerous core; 
they are the external form of Gulliver's own madness. 
The literary joke about Guilliver's veracity is complicated somewhat 
by the frontispiece that appears in some editions of the Travels 
(Faulkner's, 173S) depicting Captain Lemuel Gulliver and with the 
inscription uSplendide Mendax. Hor." On the one hand, this literally 
(particularly when coupled with the Sinon allusion) casts Guilliver as 
another lying traveler with the usual collection of tall tales; it compounds 
the point of the travel book format, in effect. On the other hand, the 
phrase comprises Horace's praise of Hypermnestra, the one of the fifty 
Danaids who lied to her father and did not murder her husband. From the 
interplay between these two possibilities and from the seeming con­
tradiction between the Horatian allusion and the Virgilian, I think we can 
discern the dimensions of the kind of tension Swift is seeking: not 
clear-cut distinctions between lie and truth, but a notion also of a kind of 
lie that reveals the truth, of a fiction that gets closer to the truth than fact 
does. Gulliver's Travels is that kind of beneficial lie; the Houyhnhnms 
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are not, and Gulliver's quotation of Sinon's lines is one last Odyssean 
warning about what is in store for us if we do not look into the horses 
carefully. Gulliver is a liar, a mendacious traveler peddling tall tales — 
but he has been places we have not and seen true things that only fiction 
can express. 
Gulliver's Travels is an inverted Bildungsroman: it is about the 
limitations of knowledge, empiric and speculative, and particularly 
about the kinds of limits that body and the mere fact of having one 
impose on mind. Laputan males attempting to play along with the music 
of the spheres while their wives play with footmen translates into the 
grammar and rhetoric of Gulliver's Travels the fable of the 
"philosopher" of the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, "who, while 
his Thoughts and Eyes were fixed upon the Constellations, found him­
self seduced by his lower Parts into a Ditch" (p. 190). Scatology looms 
so large in the book for precisely this reason: it embodies the least com­
mon denominator of our corporeal, animal nature. Despite the Lagadan 
projectors' attempts to "denature" it, the fecal bond holds firm through­
out the book; in its metaphors, the Yahoos' shitting on Gulliver's head 
constitutes a claim of kinship with him, just as in Brobdingnag his 
landing knee-deep in a cake of cow-dung reminds us of his — and our — 
real physical limitations. A man's reach should not exceed his grasp, 
unless he is willing to get "filthily bemired" (2.5.124). 
Since most things, in the Lockean and Berkleyan view, exist as they 
are perceived, the conditions of our knowing form the determinants and 
limits of our knowledge. For this reason, the first two books ofGulliver's 
Travels center primarily on epistemological satire rather than social or 
political. The Gulliver who generously refuses to destroy Blefuscu is the 
same Gulliver who offers to teach the king of Brobdingnag how to 
destroy his subjects: what have changed are the conditions of Gulliver's 
position — particularly the direction in which his vanity is engaged. So 
Swift's playing with sizes in books 1 and 2 is not simply a juggling with 
perspective but a demonstration that how we know determines what we 
know and that the process of our knowing is ultimately dependent not on 
a calm, free mind formulating clear and distinct ideas but on a very 
limited, frail, intimidatable body and a mind open to distortions induced 
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by fear and pride. It is significant of this that after his return from Lilliput 
Gulliver does not fear being stepped on, but after returning from Brob­
dingnag, "I was afraid of trampling on every Traveller I met" (2.S. 148). 
In the same way, Gulliver proudly indulges in a childlike bit of penis 
display to the Lilliputian soldiers who march between his legs and stare 
up at his tattered breeches, but in Brobdingnag, where it can have no 
effect at all, he carefully conceals his genitals when he hides behind a 
sorrel leaf to urinate. In these terms, the gulf between his mind and the 
Houyhnhnms' is most succinctly distilled in their inability to understand 
him when he speaks of "those Parts that Nature taught us to conceal" 
(4.3.236). 
Book 3 turns to examining the limits imposed on speculative and 
practical knowledge by the interaction of mind and body — speculative 
most graphically in the Laputans, practical in the Academicians. But the 
flying island itself is the image that dominates the book. As a heavy body 
floating in air, it represents the same thing as the Laputans' pretensions to 
hear the music of the spheres — an attempt to transcend physical 
limitations, to control nature. But the irony, of course, rests on the fact 
that the whole power of the island comes from nature, from the inert body 
of the lodestone, and that its limits are precisely fixed by the effective 
range of the stone. The famous rebellion episode, which has been so 
much cited as an instance of political satire, is no more than a demonstra­
tion of the impossibility of transcending bodies and physical limitations. 
Physical laws govern the motion of the island, and physical means 
control it; and if those four towers mean anything at all specific, it is 
surely something like the four elements rather than the four Drapier^s 
Letters. The Struldbrugs confirm all this: at the close of the book, they 
explicitly embody all of the limitations that corporeal existence imposes 
on the human mind. They are witnesses to the ravages of physical decay 
and petty passion: weak, ignorant, helpless, envious of living and dead 
alike. 
At the end of book 3, nearing his return to England, Gulliver declines 
the ceremony of "trampling upon the Crucifix" in a chapter (3.11) that 
contains the only explicit reference to Christianity in all of the Travels. 
The crucifix is, of course, the overt sign of the redemption, the symbol of 
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the fact that man is weak and in need of divine intercession and aid. It is a 
statement of human limitation, and trampling on it would be a rejection 
of that notion, a refusal of intercession or aid7 and, inthetermsofLaputa 
and Lagado, an implicit statement of human self-sufficiency and non-
limitation. At the end of book 3, Gulliver refuses to make that statement; 
in book 4, he does. 
The name Houyhnhnm means "Perfection of Nature" (4.3.235); they 
are what man would be if he were genuinely definable as animal 
rationale. They are also what man would be if he were perfectly natural. 
He is, however, none of these things, as "trampling upon the Crucifix" 
and Gulliver's treatment at the hands of his mutineers are designed to 
remind us. The Houyhnhnms do not even approximate what man could 
have been if Adam had not fallen: they are too perfectly rational to feel 
any emotion other than a rather tepid friendship (contrast Adam's and 
Eve's feelings in Paradise Lost), and one of Swift's master ironies is that 
it is precisely Gulliver's ego-involvement that leads him to choose them 
as ideal. Moved toward misanthropy by his experiences at Glubbdubdrib 
and with the Struldbrugs, confirmed by the treachery of his own crew, 
the shock of the Yahoos and his identification of them with the rest of 
humanity force him to recoil to the antithetical, nonhuman extreme of 
passionless logic — a position he comes to hold with intense passion and 
prideful contempt for even the exemplary humanity of Pedro de Mendez. 
Gulliver employs a consistent double-think by accepting both wrong 
extremes and identifying himself with Yahoo and Houyhnhnm simul­
taneously. His final failure is the root failure from which he began, his 
inability to know himself independent of external references. (It is worth 
noting that here as in Brobdingnag Gulliver avoids sight of himself 
whenever possible [4.10.278].) The man who stands in the stable talking 
to horses is certifiably insane: the dream of reason ends in exactly that 
kind of nightmare. 
IV 
Gulliver, within the limits of its comic-parodic form, points the way 
toward the possible prose epic of our now prosaic world. It inversely 
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illuminates the possibility of reaching wisdom without divine guides. 
For Swift and the writers who follow him — for us — Athene and 
Raphael are no longer available. What future heroes must discover and 
map, with their merely human equipment, is not the divine plan for them 
but the existence and dimensions of the human spirit and the possibility 
of freeing it from the bind of matter or at least giving it direction over 
matter. They must learn to live with and beyond their bodies — this lies 
behind the importance of chastity in Joseph Andrews and behind the 
importance of constancy, both as physical direction (as opposed to 
random movement) and as physical and emotional chastity, in Tom 
Jones. In a world of flux, of bodies in motion, they will have to seek 
sanity and stability, to assert once again the possibility of order and of the 
primacy of a mind that has learned to live in and with the weaknesses of 
its body as well as with its own limitations — as Captain Booth finally 
does at the end of Amelia. 
With all that, it is probably not correct to see Gulliver's Travels as the 
direct antecedent of Fielding's novels. Fielding reverts to the thematic 
pattern of serious verse epic; Swift's work is firmly grounded in the 
mock-epic pattern. The former always locates its hero, whatever his 
personal importance, in a much larger cosmic, historical, or social 
framework that dwarfs him and reduces his merely human claims to 
greatness or to pity to their relative proportions. Aeneas is important not 
for himself but as the founder of Rome, and before those as-yet-unborn 
generations his purely personal feelings, for Dido or for Troy, must 
bow.13 The allegory accentuates this even more, evaporating Aeneas as 
an individual and replacing him with an Everyman who suffers and 
achieves as surrogate for all of us. So, too, Fielding's heroes in their 
commonality — Tom Jones — represent us; so, too, do they locate 
themselves within the framework of family and society, within a web of 
relations that diminish their personal importance while enhancing their 
social and historical stature. But the thematics of mock epic, which 
constitute Swift's peculiar milieu, are something far different from this. 
In mock epic, as in spiritual autobiography, the hero is central not just to 
the story but to the cosmos. Things happen/or him; everything posses­
ses meaning in relation to him. Robinson Crusoe, with its special 
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providences and intensity of focus on the process of the hero's calling and 
conversion, probably offers the paradigmatic eighteenth-century exam­
ple of orthodox spiritual biography.14 In mock epic, the hero possesses 
the same centrality and importance as he does in spiritual autobiography; 
and as in the latter, he must also learn to recognize his calling, his 
election, and his cosmic significance — "Thy own Importance know,7' 
Ariel tells Belinda. But in mock epic the hero goes even beyond this: his 
task becomes the imposition of his self upon the cosmos. He becomes 
the creator-god who remakes the world in his own image. This is the 
essential narrative-thematic burden of all mock epic, from 
MacFlecknoe through The Rape of the Lock and The Dunciad to A 
Tale of a Tub and Gulliver's Travels. Gulliver's final vision of the world 
as exclusively divisible into Yahoos and Houyhnhnms is simply the 
projection of his own schizophrenia, his version of the Tale's choice 
between being a fool or a knave. The novels that spring from Gulliver's 
Travels are the great eccentric novels like Tristram Shandy and 
Finnegans Wake, which see in the creation and imposition of a self an 
act that is at once cosmic and comic. They are the novels of doubleness 
of vision, the bifocals for the split personality of our age. Their heroes 
continue Gulliver's work, mapping the unknown islands of our lives — 
nice places to visit, for the most part, but you wouldn't want to live there. 
Neither did Fielding. 
1. For this particular point and others about Hobbes's place in A Tale of a Tub, see 
Phillip Rarth's Swift and Anglican Rationalism (Chicago, 1961). Edward Rosenheim, 
in his provocative Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chicago, 1963), discusses the passage 
from a different point of view (pp. 124-26). I have drawn several suggestions and much 
stimulation from both these books. 
2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakshott (Oxford, n.d.), p. 5. 
3. For the importance of these images to literature, see, of course, Rosamund Tuve's 
Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947). 
4. Wit, too, is frozen by the narrator into object by his strict and literal observance of 
the unities of "Time, Place, and Person," which results in a jest "that will not pass out of 
Covent-Garden; and such a one, that is no where intelligible but at Hide-Park Corner" 
as well as in his calculating "the Taste of Wit" exactly "for this present Month of August, 
1697" ("The Preface," p. 26). 
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5. Cf. De Rerum Natura, 4.97 ff. and 4.150 ff. For a differing consideration of the 
role of Lucretian materials in the Tale, see Ronald Paulson, Theme and Structure in 
Swift's Tale of a Tub (New Haven, Conn., 1960). 
6. The text of Lucretius that I use throughout is Creech's edition and translation: 
Titus Lucretius Carus, of the Nature of Things, trans. Thomas Creech, 6th ed. 
(London, 1722). The Lucretian lines in question are 1.930 ff. 
7. Again, for an account of the importance of atomism at this time, see Kargon's 
Atomism in England. 
8. For a fuller discussion of the banishment of spirit from Western thinking, see 
Kargon, Atomism in England, Dijksterhuis's Mechanization of the World Picture, 
and Bethell's Cultural Revolution. 
9. As a matter of fact, there is great subliminal correspondence of part to part 
according to the pattern I discussed earlier, but I have no wish to beat a dead horse. Swift 
no doubt knew what he was doing. 
10. This is not to imply that there are not many important areas of the Discourse that 
need clarification: e.g., the "Crowd of little Animals" on page 181. 
11. It is important to note, however, that though the preference for outsides remains, 
outsides here bear different values — as, for instance, the clean surface of the Helicon 
that flows over "a thick sediment of Slime and Mud" (p. 162). 
12. In terms of the palindromatic structure discussed earlier, the Battle of the Books 
as a whole and the spider and bee episode in particular function as the central mirroring 
unit. 
13. In the same way, Odysseus is always seen in relation to Telemachus and to 
Laertes (in the Greek text, his patronymic, Laertiades, is ubiquitous); Homer locates him 
in a web of relationships — father, son, husband, warlord, guest, king, and so on. In an 
even more explicit manner, Adam and Eve are more important as parents of the human 
race than in themselves, and many of the heroes of the Faerie Queene share the same 
kind of historical or prototypical significance. 
14. For spiritual autobiography in relation to the novel, see George A. Starr's Defoe 
and Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton, N.J., 1965). 
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IPIC'S VARYING FORTUNES fall into a relatively 
I coherent pattern, both formally and materially. 
I Verse epic in the high style is, if we are to take The 
\Rape of the Lock seriously, impossible because of 
(disjunction between the fragility of contemporary 
I mores and pursuits and the ponderousness of the 
vehicle that would have to convey them. A Tale of a Tub postulates a 
further disjunction between the theoretically exemplary epic hero and 
the fragmented, multiplex society he can no longer adequately represent. 
Swift's choice of form also demonstrates how great an indecorum would 
be involved in the use of full-dress verse epic format for the aspirations of 
Augustan England. In a real sense, the Longinian revival and the 
attachment of the aesthetics of the sublime to epic criticism should be 
understood as an attempt to substitute a rhetorical grandeur for what no 
longer existed in fact. All that this sort of criticism accomplished, 
however, was to distance epic still further from the real interests of the 
age, to make it more unreal and irrelevant, just as the gradual elevation 
of the hero from normal humanity to near divinity, from representative to 
paragon, accomplished the material cognate of that formal disaster. To 
be arbitrary and absolute, from the moment of Landino's singling out 
Aeneas as the man "destined for glory" — as opposed to Bernardus's 
"dweller in the body," i.e., everyman — poets and critics steadily 
intensify the virtues and status of the epic hero until the appearance of 
such bloodless lay figures as Blackmore's Arthur or Fenelon's 
Telemaque. Only Milton really stands aside from this development, 
showing in Adam and Eve the possibility of epic scope and heroism in 
flawed humanity, but that represents a direction epic did not take.1 
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Restoration and eighteenth-century readers chose rather to try to assimi­
late Paradise Lost to then prevailing notions of epic regularity, and 
Milton himself moved into a much more conventional pattern with 
Paradise Regained. 
All the works we have examined so far have one firm material link with 
traditional epic: they have all offered or satirized competing or com­
plementary definitions of wisdom. Wisdom, whether conceived as 
knowledge of philosophy or theology, politics or ethics, has been the 
core of epic from the Hellenistic allegoresis of Homer forward. Renais­
sance criticism and practice intensified this element by heavily em­
phasizing the didactic purpose of epic and fitting it out as a tool to teach 
man about, and to help him obtain, felicity: the summum bonum.2 
Usually this end was sought through the medium of allegory, as in Tasso 
and Spenser, but subsequent poets tended to be more and more explicit 
about the goals of their poetry. Thus Milton deals overtly with the loss 
and regaining of felicity, and Fenelon, pursuing a civil virtue rather than 
a theological one, puts his Telemaque through a series of explicitly 
political lessons. The matter of the allegory tends to replace the matter of 
the narrative. Epic is in the process of biting its own tale, of moving 
through narrative and allegory back to psychomachy — a process that is 
perhaps best illustrated in The Dunciad or A Tale of a Tub. The process 
is complicated further by the shifting definition of wisdom itself, which 
was undergoing changes diametrically opposite those of the epic hero. 
While he was metamorphosing from every man to super-hero, wisdom 
was moving from divinity to near-worldliness, from an attribute of God 
and knowledge of things divine shared by men only through a kind of 
divine in-flowing or participation in Christ who was Wisdom, to 
philosophical knowledge naturally obtainable, to morality, to 
prudence.3 The epic virtue moves out of the sphere of contemplation and 
more and more into the realm of action — like the respective bodies of 
knowledge in The Dunciad and A Tale of a Tub — while the epic hero 
performs the contrary motion and becomes more and more actionless — 
like David in Absalom and Achitophel, or Shadwell in MacFlecknoe, 
or Cibber in The Dunciad. The tension tears epic apart, dividing it 
between a series of episodes more and more sensational because they 
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must provide the interest and a hero who because of his superiority to all 
circumstances can provide no drama whatever. At least a part of the 
mock epics we have talked about has been legitimately mockery of the 
epic: Cibber's inactivity means many things, and that is one of them. The 
Tale of a Tub, too, partakes of that mockery: its alternation of fable and 
essay and usurpation of fable by essay recapitulates the process by which 
content destroyed form. These two works embody, for me at least, the 
nadir of formal epic, epic's own descent to hell. Fielding plays the sybil 
to lead it back to light. In his works, from Joseph Andrews through to 
Amelia, epic meaning is once again welded to epic action, and the 
internals and externals of epic are made to coincide. 
Fielding's three novels deal with increasingly larger and more gener­
ous notions of wisdom and with correspondingly greater sweeps of 
society. Their themes progress from an examination of prudence and 
constancy in Joseph Andrews, where the effects are confined to the 
relatively small space symbolized by Wilson's home, to the elaboration 
of a much fuller conception of wisdom in Tom Jones and the greater 
scope represented by the Allworthy and Western estates, to the meticu­
lous investigation of philosphic liberty in Amelia and the embryonic 
regeneration of a whole society. As this thematic growth goes on, 
Fielding at the same time proceeds to utilize more and more traditional 
epic material; this culminates in Amelia, which, simply, is epic. If 
Renaissance is to be defined or characterized, as Irwin Panofsky sug­
gests, by the rejoining of classical form with classical meaning, then 
Fielding's novels constitute the Renaissance of epic: by Amelia, a 
classical notion of wisdom has been relinked with a classical notion of 
epic scope, both articulated over a traditional structure and worked out 
through the deeds of flawed human beings. Fielding, by discarding the 
petrified forms of epic and rediscovering the human nature of the epic 
hero, managed to restore epic to the culturally central position that, 
under the guise of the novel, it has not lost since. 
It is probably important at this point to acknowledge that, strictly 
speaking, it is incorrect to speak of "the novel." Novel is nota genre but 
many genres: Fielding's kind derives from the epic and responds best to 
criticism guided by that knowledge whereas Defoe's kind, for instance, 
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derives from spiritual biography and responds best to examination from 
that point of view, as Hunter's and Starr's books have shown. 
Richardson's novels, too, have a different pedigree, and there are un­
doubtedly many others, but real generic distinctions can and should be 
made among them. To refer to them all in a lump as "the novel" is not 
merely confusing, it is dead wrong. 
It should be clear from all this that I regard seriously Fielding's claim 
that Joseph Andrews is a comic epic in prose, however unfashionable it 
may be to do so. Fielding does not obfuscate, however much he may 
indulge his irony, and his careful establishment of pedigree, his examina­
tion of Joseph Andrews^ form, action and fable, characters and man­
ners, and diction in the manner Bossu made standard for criticism of epic 
("Author's Preface"), his careful distinguishing of 'Joseph Andrews 
from the productions of romance writers on the one hand, and burlesque 
writers on the other" ("Author's Preface") — all these seem clearly 
designed to guide and shape the reader's expectations from the beginning 
of the book. I cannot see what value an extended irony at this point would 
have for an author as concerned about form and the reader's response to it 
as Fielding consistently shows himself to be. He seriously means that 
Joseph Andrews is "a comic romance," which is in turn the same thing 
as "a comic epic-poem in prose," and he really means that its non-comic 
counterpart and predecessor is "the Telemachus of the Archbishop of 
Cambray" (p. 2) — and behind that, of course, the Odyssey. 
At just about the halfway point of the novel, Fielding uses Parson 
Adams to remind us of that opening analysis by having that benevolent 
Christian express and explain his preference of the Iliad to the Odyssey, 
contrary to the opinions of Aristotle and Horace (3.2). Adams employs 
the same divisions Fielding earlier used: subject, action, manners, 
sentiments, and diction. To these he subjoins several other considera­
tions — that of "the Harmatton, that agreement of his action to his 
subject"; Homer's excellence in delineating "the pathetic"; and his 
management o(uOpsis1 or the scenery." Fielding is of course exploiting 
some obvious ironies here in the kindly parson's taste for the fierceness 
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and cruelty of the Iliad while he himself is unknowingly engaged in an 
Odyssey, but that should not distract us from the larger ironic counter­
point between the things Adams praises in Homer's poem and the 
excellences of Fielding's novel. Certainly Parson Adams's encomium of 
the richness of Homer's characters and his ability to delineate the 
passions is designed not merely to remind us simultaneously of Adams's 
erudite vanity and basic good heart, but also to call forth our assent that 
these are indeed accomplishments and to direct our attention to just how 
much Fielding has done in the same vein. And the notion of the 
Harmatton seems crucial to Fielding's own book: its subject is con­
stancy, and its action, like the Odyssey's, a much-interrupted journey 
home.4 Adams and Joseph are, in the literal sense, men of as many turns 
as Odysseus. And for scenery, Fielding offers neither the plains of Troy 
nor the summits of Ida, Olympus, or Sarnos, but the inns and homes of 
England, where, as Parson Adams remarked some pages earlier, "he 
almost began to suspect that he was sojourning in a country inhabited 
only by Jews and Turks" (2.16). 
Fielding frequently strives for this sort of juxtaposition, and he 
achieves it in a number of ways besides through formal analysis or 
criticism. A number of quotations from the Aeneid are scattered 
throughout Joseph Andrews that serve the immediate function of (usu­
ally) allowing Parson Adams vent for his feelings and the ultimate one of 
briefly juxtaposing moments from Joseph Andrews with moments from 
classical epic. Fielding's occasional burlesques and his more frequent 
allusions to the high style serve the same ends. Stylistic self-
consciousness furnishes one of the most important means by which 
Fielding can with greater and greater sharpness distinguish what his 
novel is doing from what it will not even attempt. In distinguishing 
Joseph Andrews from works in the high style, Fielding can make some 
very precise discriminations about the adequacies and relevance of those 
styles. 
The twelfth chapter of the second book furnishes a fine example of 
this. Ostensibly, what happens in the course of this chapter is very 
simple. Adams and Fanny are driven by rain to an ale-house where 
Fanny hears a man singing in another room and promptly faints; Adams 
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bellows to call help; the singer, responding, turns out to be Joseph 
Andrews, and a joyous reunion follows. But that synopsis entirely 
misses the point of the chapter, which is — and is conveyed by — style. 
Fielding begins with a paragraph, preparatory to his description of 
Fanny, that concerns itself with the deliciousness of the artifact about to 
be introduced and invokes several precedents, classical and otherwise, 
for the danger of infatuation: 
Fanny sat likewise down by the fire; but was much more 
impatient at the storm. She presently engaged the eyes of the 
host, his wife, the maid of the house, and the young fellow 
who was their guide; they all conceived they had never seen 
anything half so handsome, and indeed, reader, if thou art of 
an amorous hue, I advise thee to skip over the next paragraph; 
which, to render our history perfect, we are obliged to set 
down, humbly hoping that we may escape the fate of Pygma­
lion; for if it should happen to us, or to thee, to be struck with 
this picture, we should be perhaps in as helpless a condition 
as Narcissus, and might say to ourselves, Quod petis est 
nusquam. Or? if the finest features in it should set Lady 
's image before our eyes, we should be still in as 
bad situation, and might say to our desires, Coelum ipsum 
petimus stultitia. (2.12) 
The description that follows debunks this mock solemnity and showy 
erudition by its sheer naturalness: Fanny's beauty is unaffected, owes 
nothing to art, and in fact is not reducible to it: " . .  . Add to these a 
countenance in which, though she was extremely bashful, a sensibility 
appeared almost incredible; and a sweetness, whenever she smiled, 
beyond either imitation or description. To conclude all she had a natural 
gentility, superior to the acquisition of art, and which surprised all who 
beheld her." Fielding immediately juxtaposes this with Joseph's song, "a 
voice from an inner room," which is "artistic" in the extreme, filled with 
Lethes and Narcissus, Graces and Zephyrus, images living in the breast 
and burning souls. It concludes with an ornate and elegant fornication 
and an equally elegant joke: 
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Advances like these made me bold; 
I whisper'd her, "Love, — we're alone"; 
The rest let immortals unfold: 
No language can tell but their own. 
Ah, Chloe, expiring, I cried, 
How long I thy cruelty bore I 
Ah! Strephon, she blushing replied, 
You ne'er was so pressing before. 
(2.12) 
The artificiality of language and sentiment masks the extreme natural­
ness of the wooer's and lady's behavior — indeed, masks the irony that it 
is chaste Joseph Andrews who sings this seduction song. Fanny has more 
reason than the shock of recognition for fainting. Her reaction, of course, 
immediately deflates the artificiality of the song's reunion of lovers, and 
their simple exchange — "Are you Joseph Andrews?" "Art thou my 
Fanny?" — effectively demolishes the ornate style for the purposes of 
this novel, just as the real chastity of Joseph and Fanny undercuts the 
literary copulation of Chloe and her swain. The death blow — in many 
ways — is dealt by Parson Adams, who prances for joy at this renuion, 
and does not notice that his Aeschylus, like Strephon, is expiring in 
flames. Adams's Aeschylus is an easy symbol of his harmless vanity and 
pride in his erudition; equally easily, it embodies the most elaborate 
form of an ornate and ritualized art, and the first subsidiary genre derived 
from epic. Fielding is making points about decorum and about natural­
ness, and both the stylized lyric and the stylized drama (and I would say, 
by extension, the stylized epic) are inappropriate as vehicles for what he 
has to depict, just as the artifice of the Pygmalion simile is inappropriate 
to the naturalness of Fanny or the sophisticated license of the song is 
inappropriate to the unaffected modesty of Joseph and Fanny. The high 
style and the genres and conduct associated with it are no longer an 
adequate vehicle for the kind of truth Fielding is trying to express. The 
whole point of the juxtaposition of all these elements in this chapter is to 
dramatize the necessity, out of reasons of simple decorum, to generate a 
new form commensurate with these contents.5 In the same manner, I 
would also argue that one of the functions of the "Tale of Leonora, or the 
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Unfortunate Jilt" is to demonstrate the narrative inadequacies of the 
Richardsonian epistolary form. This is exactly the opposite of the 
function of the ornate style in The Rape of the Lock; here the mock epic 
is mocking the epic, or at least that portion of it that had been frozen into 
attitudes and language inappropriate to contemporary reality. One need 
only compare the reunion of Orestes and Electra in the Aeschylus that 
Parson Adams discards with the reunion he witnesses to realize the gulf 
that Fielding's style has crossed.6 
I do not mean that Fielding created de novo, of course, but that he 
forced a new bloom from the old rootstock, and most of its characteris­
tics can be traced with relative clarity to various components of its 
ancestry.7 Fielding's burlesques of the epic are, with the exception of 
Adams's and Joseph's battle with the hunting squire's dogs, not substan­
tive but stylistic, and the sorts of romances he distinguishes his book 
from are not Don Quixote or Gierusalemme Liberata or the Faerie 
Queene, but "such . . . voluminous works commonly called Ro­
mances, namely, Clelia, Cleopatra, Astraea, Cassandra, the Grand 
Cyrus, and innumerable others, which contain, as I apprehend, very 
little instruction or entertainment" ("Author's Preface"). I want to sug­
gest that in establishing a structure for this book, his first try at "this 
species of writing, . . . hitherto unattempted in our language" 
("Author's Preface"), Fielding consciously or unconsciously, with or 
without knowledge, recreated the form of the prime example of the 
"grave romance" in English, Spenser's Faerie Queene. Let me make 
clear at the outset that I am not trying to argue that Fielding in any 
detailed sense used a particular book of The Faerie Queene as a model; 
rather, I want to suggest that in Spenser he could find a versatile 
structural pattern used to embody a subject matter very similar to what 
he himself had in hand (The Faerie Queene is not the only place he 
could find it, of course, but it is one of the most proximate). He could 
also find in The Faerie Queene, seriously treated, the chivalric materi­
als Don Quixote burlesques, which would be in itself an advantage to his 
"Imitation of the Manner of Cervantes" without burlesque. That is, The 
Faerie Queene is the major English work that stands in the same relation 
to Joseph Andrews as the continental chivalric romances do to Don 
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Quixote. For these reasons I will attempt to use Spenser's poem to 
clarify Fielding's novel (which may be darkness heaped on darkness); for 
the sake of simplicity and because of the consonance of subject matter, I 
will confine my discussion to the Britomart episodes of The Faerie 
Queene. Again, I will not be arguing that Fielding "followed" Spenser; I 
am only trying to show the place that the comic materials of Joseph 
Andrews already held in the epic tradition and to locate them against the 
background of serious meaning another writer in that tradition utilized. 
The underlying assumption I am making is that epic as genre possesses a 
kind of autonomy that in and of itself bends its practitioners into paths 
already blazed within its confines. Something like this notion seems to 
me to lurk not very far behind the eighteenth century's respect for genre 
and decorum; the very violations of decorum to which so much of my 
discussion thus far has been attentive seem in themselves to point to an 
organic relation among form, content, and style of which it would be 
folly to assume a writer as sensitive to such matters as Fielding was 
unaware. For all of these a priori reasons, I find it useful to consider 
Joseph Andrews in the light oiThe Faerie Queene; my ex post facto 
reason is that it works. 
Although it is undeniably true that Joseph Andrews in the course of his 
wanderings acquires the kind of prudence that will enable him to survive 
in the world and that Parson Adams so delightfully lacks, it is neverthe­
less not true that this is the point of the novel. If it were, I doubt anyone 
would read it or that a man as imprudent as Henry Fielding would have 
written it. It has always struck me that in making Joseph Andrews into a 
tract on prudence we act as if it were written by Blifil. The simple virtue 
or compound of virtues that Joseph Andrews genuinely displays, how­
ever, and that impels the major actions of the story, from Joseph's first 
refusal of Lady Booby's bed to his final escape from her hand and house, 
can be subsumed briefly under the name of constancy — the constancy 
of Joseph to Fanny that informs his chastity and enables him to scorn the 
lure of wealth and position, her constancy to him, Parson Adams's 
constancy to his parishioners and his own benevolence, even, in both the 
physical and metaphorical senses, the constancy of their homeward 
journeys. This more generous and humane virtue is the real core of 
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Fielding's novel; for it, Joseph and Fanny are rewarded — "A minute 
carried him into her arms, where we shall leave this happy couple to 
enjoy the private rewards of their constancy" (4.16) — and to it, 
prudence, circumspection, and all narrower virtues are clearly subser­
vient. 
Britomart's quest for Artegal spans books 3 and 4 of The Faerie 
Queene, the books of chastity and friendship respectively; and the idea 
of constancy provides the unifying element for the diverse episodes of 
these books in the same manner that constancy in Fielding's novel holds 
to a single point the diverse pulls of chastity, love, and friendship among 
Joseph, Fanny, and Adams. The sexual roles are, of course, reversed, 
and Joseph plays Britomart's part as exemplar of chastity, impelled by 
love and constantly seeking union with his beloved. However, he is like 
Artegal in that he is a changeling. Fanny seems more like Amoret — 
lovely, timorous, chaste, faithful to her lover, a foundling also, and 
incessantly subject to attack, abduction, and near rape, from which she 
is rescued by Britomart. Fielding conflates all of the diverse love 
pursuits of Faerie Queene 3 and 4 into a single tale of chaste love aided 
by friendship. But the importance of the Faerie Queene to Joseph 
Andrews is not through specific characters, though there are many 
correspondences — the blood-and-thunder gentleman who descants to 
Adams about bravery and flees at the first alarm is a lineal descendant of 
Braggadochio, for instance — but through the broad structural pattern I 
discussed in connection with The Rape of the Lock and through certain 
narrative particulars Spenser uses in association with it. 
Joseph Andrews employs the same basic epic grammar as the other 
works we have thus far discussed. Books 1 and 4 answer each other with 
perfect symmetry in every major factor. The discovery of Joseph's real 
birth and family in 4 parallels the account of his supposed birth and 
family at the very beginning of the book. Lady Booby's and Slipslop's 
comic attempts to seduce him correspond to Didapper's inept attempt at 
Fanny and Adams's innocent sojourns in Slipslop's and Fanny's beds (in 
Joseph's discovery of him in the latter, Fielding also gives us a reprise of 
Mrs. Towwouse's discovery of her husband in the arms of Betty the 
chambermaid). Joseph dismissed, robbed, stripped, and abandoned is 
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recapitulated and reversed by Joseph freed from trial, dressed, and 
welcomed as brother into the Booby family. Books 2 and 3 are more 
intricately intertwined and paralleled, in a manner reminiscent of 
Spenser's overall management of his books 3 and 4. Here Fielding 
multiplies incidents astonishingly, and the correspondences abound, 
ranging from the repetitive loss and recovery of Adams's horse and his 
preference of the "pedestrian" mode to the "equestrian," through sym­
metrical fights at inns, to counterpointed rescues of Fanny from rape. 
The cowardly hunting squire of book 2 anticipates the vicious hunting 
squire of book 3. The troubles Adams's Aeschylus and his vanity about 
his learning lead him into at his trial in book 2 foreshadow the similar 
troubles raised by his readiness to read a sermon and play Socrates in the 
hunting squire's prank. The first meeting of Joseph, Fanny, and Adams 
is matched by their reunion near the end of book 3. The argument Adams 
has with the innkeeper, at the end of 2, about practical and speculative 
knowledge is perfectly paralleled by a similar argument, near the begin­
ning of 3, with Joseph about public and private education. Over this 
basic grammar, of course, Fielding has fashioned a structural rhetoric of 
his own, which works itself out through an intricate series of repetitions 
and modifications of thematic situations involving religion (Barnabas, 
Trulliber, Adams himself), law (the quarreling lawyers, Adams and 
Fanny's trial, Wilson's story, Lawyer Scout, Joseph and Fanny's trial), 
active good works, love and sex, interpolated stories, and so on. 
Wilson's story is obviously central to this rhetoric since it provides links 
forward and backward to almost every major theme in the story, includ­
ing the crucial one of Joseph's and Fanny's real identities. 
The Wilson episode functions too as a comic version of the typical 
Spenserian "house of recognition," which usually schools the hero about 
himself and matters pertaining to the theme of the particular book. Such 
are the House of Holiness in book one of the Faerie Queene, the Castle 
of Alma in book 2, the Temple of Isis in book 5, and less typically but 
more relevant here, Belphoebe's dwelling ("a dainty, place . . . As it an 
earthly Paradize had beene . . .  " [3.5.40]) and the Garden of Adonis 
(3.6), both the symbolic loci of chaste and fertile love, like Wilson's 
house and gardens, which Adams, ignoring the intrusion of reality in the 
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young squire's cruel shooting of the spaniel (as death, too, mars the 
perfection of the Garden of Adonis), declares "was the manner in which 
the people lived in the golden age" (3.4). 
Characteristically Spenserian, too, is Fielding's use of houses of 
recognition — or perhaps more properly, houses of temptation — at the 
beginning and end of his book. In book 3 of the Faerie Queene, these are 
the Castle Joyous, where Malecasta attempts to seduce Britomart, taking 
her for a main, and the House of Busirane, where Britomart frees the 
faithful Amoret from her captivity to lust; in Joseph Andrews, they are 
the town and country homes of Lady Booby. Malecasta tempts to simple 
lust, from which pitfall Britomart is effectively saved by the naturalness 
of her inclinations and their being already fixed on Artegal. Neverthe­
less, she is somewhat taken in by Malecasta's "strong extremitie" 
(3-1.53) and as a result sustains a slight wound from Gardante (3.1.65), 
that is, lust of the eyes. Lady Booby's own "strong extremitie" subjects 
Joseph Andrews to the same trial, which he comically passes through the 
strength of his virtue ("Your virtue! . .  . I shall never survive it." [1.8]) 
and, as we discover later, of his love for Fanny. Nevertheless, he too is 
touched: "But I am glad she turned me out of the chamber as she did: for I 
had once almost forgotten every word Parson Adams had ever said to 
me" (1.10). The temptation posed in the House of Busirane is far more 
complex, and Britomart, to emerge safely from it and save Amoret, must 
draw on everything she has learned in the course of the book about love, 
chastity, and constancy. She must, in effect, see through the whole 
Masque of Cupid and distinguish lust in all its disguises. Then she must 
reject not merely lust as an end, but lust as a means to power, position, 
wealth, and so on. At Booby-Hall, Joseph undergoes this complex of 
temptations as, with shifting clarity, it becomes apparent that he is no 
longer a footman and as marriage to Lady Booby becomes a more and 
more real possibility. He is no longer tempted to simple lust (in that 
respect he is exactly like Britomart in the House of Busirane, fighting not 
for his own chastity but for another's) but rather to inconstancy, self-
aggrandizement (self-improvement, Pamela would say), and loveless 
marriage: he can, if he wishes, use Lady Booby's lust as a means to his 
own ends. Lady Booby is of course no longer the simple lay figure for 
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sexual desire and hypocrisy that she was in book 1; she, too, is now 
presented as a far more complex creature, alternately driven and dis­
tracted by her desires, even to the point that, like Busirane, she would 
sooner destroy her beloved than lose him. 
To pass this test, Joseph must balance his own love and fidelity 
against the demands of a fickle and inconstant world and the kind of 
prudence, which, to this point, has been the sine qua non of survival in 
the ;orld. That is, at the crucial point in the novel and his fortunes, he 
has to turn his back on the world and opt for impracticality and improvi­
dence — for Parson Adams, in short, rather than Lady Booby. The 
choice is not easy, particularly when Joseph finds Adams and Fanny in 
bed together: after all that has happened in the novel, it requires a very 
impractical act of faith to believe that Adams does not know "whether 
she is a man or a woman" (4.14). If the momentary disclosure that 
Joseph and Fanny are brother and sister exposes the limitations of 
prudence as a governor of human conduct (there being no possible 
prudential step that could prevent their ignorant incest, and the unpre­
dictable appearance and chance information of the pedlar being the basis 
of the episode), then Joseph's final choices with regard to Lady Booby 
and Parson Adams show the absolute necessity of transcending it. Lady 
Booby is prudential, and at the end of the novel Lady Booby is alone. It 
is a nice touch, I think, that Fielding casts this last test for his heroes in 
the form of Britomart's first. In that episode, her manly appearance in 
full armor led Malecasta to think her a man and subsequently to steal into 
her bed; discovering the intrusion, Britomart grabbed her sword and 
Malecasta shrieked in fright, rousing the household, thus revealing 
Britomart's sex and finally forcing Britomart and the Red Crosse Knight 
tofight their way out of the Castle. The compound of mistaken identities 
and genders that speeds Joseph Andrews to its conclusion is loosely 
drawn on this same pattern: Parson Adams, responding to a cry for help, 
mistakes the sexes of assailer and assailed, releases Didapper (who had 
already mistaken his target) and pummels Slipslop, whose sex he only 
discovers when Lady Booby arrives with light. Embarrassed but exoner­
ated, he beats an erroneous retreat to Fanny's bed, where he is discov­
ered by Joseph soon after, unable to explain his presence and protesting 
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— with some justice, after his run-in with Slipslop and Didapper — that 
uAs I am a Christian, I know not whether she is a man or woman" (4.14). 
In that denial lies the real comic resolution of Joseph Andrews; coupled 
with Joseph's and Fanny's acceptance of it, that narrative moment graphs 
both the limitations of prudence and the limits of chastity, as well as the 
absolute necessity for constancy, love, and friendship to transcend 
them. What is at stake here is a virtue in which prudence, chastity, love, 
friendship, and constancy are all rooted — self-knowledge, the simple 
fact of one's own identity. In the terms ofJoseph Andrews, to know who 
you are is to know what you are; for this reason the novel climaxes in its 
plethora of mistaken identities and final sortings-out of relation, all of 
which are comically encapsulated in Parson Adams's nocturnal misad­
ventures. Vanity prevents one from seeing himself and others clearly, 
and from that vice only Joseph and Fanny are free, though the vanity of 
others has made the two of them the victims of misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation throughout their adventures. Their final appearance 
before the justice (4.5) dramatizes this: treated as vagrants and criminals 
because of Lady Booby's vanity, they are freed and reappraised because 
of her nephew's familial pride. No one sees them in themselves, only in 
relation to a complex of factors engaging or endangering their own pride 
and self-esteem. Adams and Fanny's early appearance before a justice 
almost overtly states this: (2.11) the issue of the hearing becomes 
Adams's identity, and to the query "What's your name?" Adams, an­
swering another challenge to his vanity and not the relevant question, 
responds, "It is Aeschylus, and I will maintain it." Vanity, as Fielding 
insists throughout the book, fogs the mind and the perceptions, makes us 
see ourselves and others falsely — and the only viable correctives to 
vanity are self-knowledge, constancy, and active charity joined to­
gether. Prudence merely serves vanity, and the others disjunct are 
powerless against it, as is Joseph by himself— discharged, robbed, and 
beaten — or Fanny — deceived and nearly raped — or Adams — 
deceived, put upon, made a butt of. Together they triumph in the novel's 
understated and inevitable denouement when, in one of Fielding's mo­
ments of crystallized significance, Parson Adams marries Joseph and 
Fanny. 
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Again let me insist that I do not mean to imply that Fielding is in any 
way alluding to Spenser. I do not think that an awareness of the presence 
of Spenserian elements is important to understanding Joseph An­
drews. The reasons I mention Spenser at all in connection with Fielding 
are three: first, the Faerie Queene shows the place Fielding's thematic 
materials already held in "serious romance" (not entirely serious either; 
there are many comic elements already in the Faerie Queene, and 
many more capable of comedy); second, Fielding could find in Spenser a 
usable pattern for structt ing his narrative; and third and most important, 
he could find in Spenser the techniques for making that narrative be 
meanin
 3 .ather than bear meaning. P1 A in novels or epics is usually 
talked about as a separable value: it is nice, neat, well-rounded, or it is 
loose, uneven, disjointed, and so on. It is never discussed as if the plot 
— the simple movement of the characters from place to place, episode to 
episode — in itself meant anything. It does. This does not refer to 
situational symbolism, intermittent allegory, or anything of that sort, but 
to a pervasive use of the literal statement of the plot as significant, 
intelligible, in itself; not the vehicle of meaning, but meaning itself. 
All love, the Renaissance knew, moves toward fulfillment, and the 
kind of motion it performs defines it. Rational motion is like the motion 
of the planets, circular, from east through west and back to east again. 
Animal appetite is centrifugal, a straight line breaking out of the rational 
circle; love is centripetal, a straight line breaking through the ring of 
rationality. Constancy guides these motions, holds them to their goal, 
and bends the straight lines of appetite and love into the circles of 
8reason.  That set of motions furnishes Fielding's "Harrnatton, that 
agreement of his action to his subject" (3.2); his subjects are love, lust, 
and constancy; his action is a homeward wandering — a straight line that 
the conclusion of the novel curves into a circle. So the journey itself is 
not symbolic. It is not the vehicle of meaning; it is meaning. We are not 
dealing with a system of substitutions here, with things standing for other 
things, but rather with a system of equations: love is motion, motion is a 
journey, love is a journey, and every step and episode of that journey 
exist and mean in precisely that way. This is not exactly allegory, and it 
is certainly not metaphor; but whatever you call it, it works. Consider, 
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for example, Parson Adams asleep and unknowing by Fanny's side: the 
meaning of that episode is contained perfectly in the action — or inaction 
— of it. It is not that it does not mean anything — it means, and means 
profoundly, in the context of Joseph Andrews — but that its meaning is 
perfectly crystallized in its narrative statement. Fielding has achieved, at 
this moment, and in the wedding, and in a few others in Joseph An­
drews, a perfect consonance between form and content so that his 
subject is embodied with perfect clarity, with unimpeded translucence, 
in his action. 
This notion of Harmatton, the congruence of tenor and vehicle, seems 
as central to Fielding's conception of his book as Adams implies it is to 
epic, and Fielding's manipulation of it and the narrative manner that 
develops from it are thoroughly Spenserian. This means, I think, that the 
novel proceeds by a kind of quasi-allegoresis: quasi because the process 
is, as I said before, not one whereby one thing stands for or represents 
another but rather a process of embodiment or equation. My critical 
vocabulary is inadequate to what I am trying to express here: what is at 
stake, as clearly as I can put it, is the articulation, the enunciation, of the 
figurative not through but in the literal — in the terms I have used 
elsewhere in this book, it is, metaphorically, the rejoining of spirit and 
letter, theologically, making the word flesh. 
I can only clarify by examples. Fielding often in Joseph Andrews 
forces us to appraise the litter a of his text by juxtapositions that push us 
to awareness of the value of sameness and difference. Early in the novel, 
Slipslop's awkward attempt on Joseph neatly counterpoints Lady 
Booby's more elegant try. Later in the book, in two supposedly simul­
taneous actions, Joseph and Adams, tied to the bedpost, argue about 
giving vent to the emotions, while a poet and a player argue about the 
state of the drama (3.10,11). Poet and player pass from decrying the 
poorness of the stage and blaming it, respectively, on players and poets 
to excluding each other from the general condemnation to quarreling 
about which was responsible for the failure of their last endeavor. In the 
parallel chapter, Joseph bemoans the loss of Fanny, and Parson Adams 
comforts him in such a fashion that he is even more grieved. Joseph 
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admits his obligation to accept the dispensations of Providence, but 
denies he is capable of performing it; Adams further lectures him in the 
same vein, until Joseph bursts out with a snatch of Shakespeare. The 
whole final paragraph deserves quotation: 
They refnained some time in silence; and groans and sighs 
issued from them both; at length Joseph burst out into the 
following soliloquy: 
Yes, I will bear my sorrows like a man, 
But I must also feel them as a man. 
I cannot but remember such things were, 
And were most dear to me. — 
Adams asked him what stuff that was he repeated? — To 
which he answered, they were some lines he had gotten by 
heart out of a play. — " Ay, there is nothing but heathenism to 
be learned from plays," replied he. — "I never heard of any 
plays fit for a Christian to read, but Cato and the Conscious 
Lovers; and, I must own, in the latter there are some things 
almost solemn enough for a sermon." But we shall now leave 
them a little, and inquire after the subject of their conversa­
tion. (3.11) 
The sequence apparently takes its point from the ancient metaphor of the 
world as stage or the stage as world; the two chapters simply juxtapose 
the two terms of the metaphor, leaving the reader to choose for himself 
whatever relation of tenor to vehicle he likes while pushing him to see the 
mutual equality of both.9 The two cases are not so much allegories of 
each other as they are parallels: both are concerned directly with the 
problems raised by a difficult part; both revolve around the expression of 
emotion. But the poet and the player argue because the emotion — the 
distress — was, either in the writing or the saying, expressed inade­
quately; the distress was not done justice. Adams and Joseph, on the 
other hand, argue because Joseph is expressing distress, despite the fact 
that the latter doesn't "endeavour to grieve." Adams preaches a harsh 
and highly erudite Stoicism to Joseph that seems not only inappropriate 
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to the moment but pretty well beyond the powers of a human being. The 
stage appears more real(isticP) — certainly more human —than life; life, 
as expounded and exemplified by Adams, has all the artificiality, the 
role-playing, of the stage. Adams makes life into formal declamation and 
the striking of pose, like the two highly rhetorical and attitudinizing plays 
he cites, Cato andThe Conscious Lovers, "in the latter" of which "there 
are some things almost solemn enough for a sermon." Joseph breaks the 
deadlock — for the reader, if not for Parson Adams — by appealing out 
of life to high art, out of the unfeeling life that Adams at this point 
expounds to the rich humanity of Shakespeare. He merges life and art in 
the moment when artistic utterance becomes the only valid expression of 
what he really feels; although Parson Adams damns the play, Joseph 
does the distress of it justice. How you handle life and how you handle a 
role are the questions of the two chapters, and humanly is Shakespeare's 
and Joseph's and Fielding's answer. Parson Adams's assertions that 
"there is nothing but heathenism to be learned from plays" and that he 
"never heard of any plays fit for a Christian to read, but Cato and the 
Conscious Lovers'1 sound more than odd from one whose prize posses­
sion has been an edition of Aeschylus, and we may very well wonder 
what it all means. The tension in Adams between theory and practice, 
between the formulaic demands of his erudition and the spontaneity of 
his own feelings, remains unresolved in Joseph Andrews; Adams is still 
at the end of the novel a schizoid figure who cannot rationally master, as 
he knows he ought, what he so passionately feels. He appeals to the 
wrong authorities, to the aloofness of Stoicism and the ritual of Aes­
chylus to order and restrain a life that resists both. Joseph's turning to 
Shakespeare shows the inadequacy of that kind of art to contain real life 
just as Adams's throwing his Aeschylus in the fire out of joyous excite­
ment dramatizes the same thing. The richness, diversity, and irregular­
ity of Shakespeare offer the only adequate merging of art and life, the 
only adequate vehicle for the actions of real people in a real world. As 
opposed to Adams's Aeschylus, Seneca, Cicero, and Homer, Shake­
speare is well within the reach and capacity of Fielding's "mere English 
reader." In the bedroom farce that moves the novel to its final unravel­
ing, Adams can only call upon the deus ex machina of witchcraft, 
whereas Joseph can recognize a wrong turning. That, and these two 
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chapters, are not allegories for something else: like Shakespeare's plays, 
they are the thing itself. 
Parson Adams provides the formulaic center of the novel, the man 
who generates theories to explain what is going on around him. The fact 
that his theories are always inadequate to explain, much less to control, 
the events of the book aligns him in conception and function with 
Gulliver and the narrator of A Tale of a Tub and with the yet unborn 
Walter Shandy — which is one very clear reason why Parson Adams is 
not and cannot be the hero of the book. He shows in himself the 
irrelevance of theory to reality, the futility of trying to force life into a 
mold rather than looking at it clearly. For this reason, I think, Fielding 
has equipped him with a harsh theoretical Stoicism that contradicts 
directly the warmth of his own feelings as well as a "masterpiece" against 
vanity that must underscore his own very real vanity about his pastoral 
and pedagogic abilities. Similarly, Wilson appears in his own story in 
the same way; he is a man who has tried all of the theoretical approaches 
to life, from sensuality to reason to literature, from activity to retirement, 
from public to private, from gentleman to imprisoned debtor, from the 
fixity of reason to total commitment to fortune. His story functions in the 
novel as a succinct Rasselas, exploring all of the possible choices of 
ways of life according to eighteenth-century preconceptions or theories. 
Fielding uses the Wilson episode as a comic descent to hell in parodic 
relation to the Aeneid: Adams, Joseph, and Fanny, frightened by what 
they take to be ghosts, flee down a steep hill and across a river, enter the 
house of a man who is in fact Joseph's father, hear from him an 
autobiography that is a paradigm of the knowledge needful for survival in 
the world and that contains the essential clues to Joseph's identity. 
Joseph, however, sleeps through it all, and all practical knowledge is 
wasted on Parson Adams. What^e eventually learn from it, however, is 
who Joseph is and what he must become: we see in it the inadequacy of 
Parson Adams's theory of private education, the ludicrousness of his 
system of physiognomy, and the irrelevance of his "book traveling" to 
form a man capable of dealing with reality. We understand, simply, what 
the protagonists of mock epic never learn, that you cannot substitute 
theory for life. Parson Adams's pronouncement that Wilson's life is 
Edenic, despite the vicious neighboring squire and the killing of the 
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spaniel, simply confirms him as a mock-epic figure and an inadequate 
guide, an earthly Anchises from whose erroneous tutelage Joseph must 
break free.10 
Fanny's role in the novel illustrates in a similar way this process by 
which Fielding realizes the figurative in the literal. Since Fanny provides 
the main impetus for Joseph's single major act (leaving London for the 
country) and many subsequent lesser ones, she is obviously a crucial 
figure in our understanding of the novel (though you might not be able to 
judge that from the dearth of readers' comments about her). Physically, 
Fielding describes her as the female counterpart of Joseph: they are 
obviously, in a meaningful phrase, made for each other. It would be 
simplest merely to juxtapose the two descriptions. 
Mr. Joseph Andrews was now in the one-and-twentieth 
year of his age. He was of the highest degree of middle 
stature. His limbs were put together with great elegance and 
no less strength. His legs and thighs were formed in the 
exactest proportion. His shoulders were broad and brawny; 
but yet his arms hung so easily, that he had all the symptoms 
of strength without the least clumsiness. His hair was of a 
nut-brown colour, and was displayed in wanton ringlets down 
his back. His forehead was high, his eyes dark, and as full of 
sweetness as of fire. His nose a little inclined to the Roman. 
His teeth white and even. His lips full, red, and soft. His 
beard was only rough on his chin and upper lip; but his 
cheeks, in which his blood glowed, were overspread with a 
thick down. His countenance had a tenderness joined with a 
sensibility inexpressible. Add to this the most perfect neat­
ness in his dress, and an air which, to those who have not seen 
many noblemen, would give an idea of nobility. (L8) 
Fanny was now in the nineteenth year of her age; she was 
tall, and delicately shaped; but not one of those slender young 
women who seem rather intended to hang up in the hall of an 
anatomist than for any other purpose. On the contrary, she 
was so plump that she seemed bursting through her tight 
stays, especially in the part which confined her swelling 
breasts. Nor did her hips want the assistance of a hoop to 
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extend them. The exact shape of her arms denoted the form of 
those limbs which she concealed; and though they were a 
little reddened by her labour, yet, if her sleeve slipt above her 
elbow, or her handkerchief discovered any part of her neck, a 
whiteness appeared which the finest Italian paint would be 
unable to reach. Her hair was of a chestnut brown, and nature 
had been extremely lavish to her of it, which she had cut, and 
on Sundays used to curl down her neck in the modern fashion. 
Her forehead was high, her eyebrows arched, and rather full 
than otherwise. Her eyes black and sparkling; her nose just 
inclining to the Roman; her lips red and moist, and her 
underlip, according to the opinion of the ladies, too pouting. 
Her teeth were white, but not exactly even. The small-pox 
had left one only mark on her chin, which was so large, it 
might have been mistaken for a dimple, had not her left cheek 
produced one so near a neighbour to it, that the former served 
only for a foil to the latter. Her complexion was fair, a little 
injured by the sun, but overspread with such a bloom that the 
finest ladies would have exchanged all their white for it; add to 
these a countenance in which, though she was extremely 
bashful, a sensibility appeared almost incredible; and a 
sweetness, whenever she smiled, beyond either imitation or 
description. To conclude all, she had a natural gentility, 
superior to the acquisition of art, and which surprised all who 
beheld her. (2.12) 
This physical similarity, of course, matches a general moral similarity: 
both are pure, honest, devoted to each other, and acquiescent to their lot 
in life. But there are other differences as well as those that spring from 
gender and the roles and limitations that imposes. Fanny is shy, retiring, 
sparing of speech (even when she does talk, Fielding tends to report it 
indirectly rather than by direct quotation), normally undemonstrative, 
and quite unassertive. She is also illiterate — which is more than a 
sardonic comment on Pamela's epistolary prolixity. Despite the fact that 
she is a strapping country girl, she remains the essentially helpless and 
passive target for a series of would-be rapists and molesters that includes 
the diminutive Didapper. While being hurried off "towards the squire's 
house, where [she] was to be offered up a sacrifice to the lust of a 
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ravisher," she alternately weeps, implores aid from passersby, and 
protests most improbably against the captain's references to Joseph as 
"that pitiful fellow" and to her own "fondness for men." Clearly, she 
embodies more than the object of Joseph's love; she stands in a relation 
of total dependence to him, not just for her safety but even for activity, 
for speech, for literacy. Except for her original move to join Joseph, Fan­
ny does nothing in the book that is not impelled directly by another, and 
even that is motivated by her concern for him. Joseph is her active 
principle, she his goal and source of direction. The full dimensions of her 
role are perhaps signaled by her surname, Goodwill, though I do not take 
this in any rigorous sense. Peter Pounce, shortly after rescuing her, 
modifies Parson Adams's definition of charity — "a generous disposition 
to relieve the distressed" — to "not so much consist in the act as in the 
disposition to do it" (3.13). Fanny is something like that, well-disposed 
but in herself powerless to aGi, though able to generate action in others. 
She is the mainspring of Joseph's virtues as she is of many others' 
basenesses — as object, morally neutral, though capable of exciting to 
either good or evil; as subject, disposed to good though impotent to do it. 
She plays the "unmoved mover" of the novel, the source of constancy 
and goal of love, toward which still point Joseph Andrews and the novel 
inexorably move. Fielding ludicrously hyperbolizes this in a comic 
reprise of his implicit comparison of her to Galatea and himself to 
Pygmalion (2.12), where he has Joseph frozen and fixed by the sight of 
Fanny's bosom, which "was more capable of converting a man into a 
statue than of being imitated by the greatest master of that art" (4.7). So, 
too, when they are wed: "She was soon undrest; for she had no jewels to 
deposit in their caskets, nor fine laces to fold with the nicest exactness. 
Undressing to her was properly discovering, not putting off, ornaments: 
for, as all her charms were the gifts of nature, she could divest herself of 
none. . .  . Joseph no sooner heard she was in bed than he fled with the 
utmost eagerness to her. A minute carried him into her arms, where we 
shall leave this happy couple to enjoy the private rewards of their 
constancy. . . .  " Shortly after, Joseph and Fanny join the Wilsons in 
their retirement, rounding the physical journey of the novel into its 
perfected circle and returning Joseph to his true home. The prominence 
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of vicissitude, inconstancy, changes of fortune, and even the fickle 
goddess herself in Wilson's history make his home a haven of stability 
and permanence and a refuge from change and bustle. To this stillness 
Joseph and Fanny, immediately fertile in their union, retire. The novel 
closes with quiet insistence on this sabbath from change, the permanence 
of the achieved stillness after motion: 
Joseph remains blest with his Fanny, whom he doats on 
with the utmost tenderness, which is all returned on her side. 
The happiness of this couple is a perpetual fountain of plea­
sure to their fond parents; and, what is particularly remark­
able, he declares he will imitate them in their retirement; nor 
will be prevailed on by any booksellers, or their authors, to 
makes his appearance in high-life. (4.16) 
II 
In Tom Jones, Fielding moves much closer to the traditional epic. 
The novel's much-remarked-upon plot falls with almost perfect sym­
metry into the ancient palindrome.11 Tom, in his pursuit and attainment 
of Sophia, emulates literally and allegorically both Aeneas and Odys­
seus; Fielding's epigraph reinforces these correspondences; "Mores 
hominum multorum vidit." Sophia herself amalgamates into her role 
portions of Penelope — fidelity; Athena — the wisdom for which she is 
named; Venus — the love she feels and inspires; and Lavinia — the wife 
and prize. An outline of the plot of Tom Jones is the skeleton of epic, 
from the strange birth of the hero through his exile and labors to his 
triumphant return. Tom Jones manages to be comic epic in both Dante's 
sense and Joseph Andrews's sense. In so being, it redefines and re­
creates epic as genre in a new, complex, and viable manner, with a 
vitality that Fielding could never again reach, despite the richness and 
penetration he was later to bring to Amelia, 
Fielding continues the constancy theme of Joseph Andrews in the 
plot of Tom Jones, making of it the nub of Tom's relations with Sophia. 
Here the concept and its handling are far more complex than they were in 
the earlier novel. Even on the simplest literal level, Tom violates 
constancy in his amours with Molly Seagrim and Jenny Waters and Lady 
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Bellaston as Joseph never does; and if Tom is constant as he claims to 
be, he must be constant to something beyond Sophia's physical form. 
The great reconciliation scene between the two plays intriguingly with 
these notions.12 After the withdrawal of Squires Allworthy and Western, 
Jones asks Sophia to forgive him: she responds by appealing to his own 
justice "to pass sentence on your own conduct" (18.12). She then 
accuses him of inconstancy: "What happiness can I assure myself of with 
a man capable of so much inconstancy?7' Tom in turn protests that his 
love is sincere, that had he possessed the slightest hope of her, "it would 
not have been in the power of any other woman to have inspired a thought 
which the severest chastity could have condemned. Inconstancy to 
you!" Sophia responds to this by saying that only time will give proof of 
the sincerity of his repentance: "After what is past, sir, can you expect I 
should take you upon your word?" The central dialogue of the whole 
scene follows, for which we need the exact words of the text: 
He replied, "Don't believe me upon my word; I have a 
better security, a pledge for my constancy, which it is impos­
sible to see and to doubt." — "What is that?" said Sophia, a 
little surprised. — "I will show you, my charming angel," 
cried Jones, seizing her hand and carrying her to the glass. 
"There, behold it there in that lovely figure, in that face, that 
shape, those eyes, that mind which shines through these eyes. 
Can the man who shall be in possession of these be incon­
stant? Impossible! my Sophia; they would fix a Dorimant, a 
Lord Rochester. You could not doubt it, if you could see 
yourself with any eyes but your own." — Sophia blushed and 
half smiled; but, forcing again her brow into a frown — "If I 
am to judge," said she, "of the future by the past, my image 
will no more remain in your heart when I am out of your sight, 
than it will in this glass when I am out of the room." — "By 
Heaven, by all that is sacred!" said Jones, "it never was out of 
my heart. The delicacy of your sex cannot conceive the 
grossness of ours, nor how little one sort of amour has to do 
with the heart." — "I will never marry a man," replied 
Sophia, very gravely, "who shall not learn refinement enough 
to be as incapable as I am myself of making such a distinc­
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tion." — "I will learn it," said Jones. "I have learnt it already. 
The first moment of hope that my Sophia might be my wife 
taught it me at once; and all the rest of her sex from that 
moment became as little the objects of desire to my sense as 
of passion to my heart." —''Well," said Sophia, uthe proof of 
this must be from time. Your situation, Mr. Jones, is now 
altered, and I assure you I have great satisfaction in the 
alteration. You will now want no opportunity of being near 
me, and convincing me that your mind is altered too. "(18.12) 
Sophia promises that she will eventually, after this probationary period, 
marry Tom: he ecstatically kisses her, and they are interrupted by Squire 
Western's explosion into the room demanding an immediate wedding, to 
which importunate parental directive Sophia becomingly agrees. The 
chapter closes with general joy and congratulations. 
Tom appeals to the idea of Sophia as proof of his constancy — to her 
image in the glass (with all that that should mean to us after the long 
history of the image itself and of reflective relationships in mock epic and 
epic), to the mind that her physical form manifests, to her image in his 
heart. His plea explicitly distinguishes between the physical Sophia and 
the idea of Sophia, between his own physical errancies and his spiritual 
constancy: for Sophia, that distinction is not valid, and Tom must learn 
that his physical fidelity must reflect his spiritual devotion just as 
Sophia's physical existence mirrors her spiritual perfections. One of the 
first facts Fielding told us about Sophia constitutes almost the last lesson 
Tom must master in the novel: to merge totally the flesh and the spirit. 
Her pure and eloquent blood 
Spoke in her cheeks, and so distinctly wrought 
That one might almost say her body thought. 
(4.2) 
As Sophia is, so must Tom become, body mirroring mind, both embody­
ing and enacting the virtues Sophia possesses and Tom pursues. At the 
very end of the novel, Fielding assures us that he has done this: "What­
ever in the nature of Jones had a tendency to vice, has been corrected by 
continual conversation with [Squire Allworthy], and by his union with 
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the lovely and virtuous Sophia" (18.13). Tom Jones must become the 
permanent mirror of Sophia's perfections, and the constancy he must 
develop is fidelity to that elaborate amalgam of virtues: that alone will 
wed him to Sophia and transform him from mere Tom Jones into Tom 
Allworthy. 
Fielding rediscovered one basic fact about epic that guaranteed him a 
place in any history of epic or any other literature: the key to its 
complexity is its total simplicity; the entrance into myth and universality 
is through uniqueness and individuality. One can safely postulate, 
without the benefit of very much statistical research, that there were not 
very many foundlings in eighteenth-century England who were adopted 
by wealthy landowners or who married the prize catch of the county; yet 
for all that, Tom — to borrow a phrase from a later book in this same 
tradition — "is one of us." So the woman he loves, loses, leaves, 
pursues, and ultimately weds is Sophia. The sheer directness of that 
quasi-allegorical, "gothick" conception diverts attention from what 
Fielding is actually doing, just as the bland simplicity of Fielding's 
earlier citation of "the celebrated Dr. Donne['s]" description of his 
version of the female Wisdom figure (the verses quoted above, from The 
Anniversaries) masks the equation he is there making. Is Sophia wis­
dom? Certainly, or Fielding would not have called her that; but how she 
is wisdom and in what sense she is wisdom are questions far more 
problematical. She certainly does not appear to be wisdom in the same 
sense that Una is holiness: it is not her primary level of existence or 
signification in the novel. Rather, she becomes wisdom by what she does 
and by what is done about her; even more than in Joseph Andrews, the 
narrative events provide the mode for significance. Static symbols have 
little place in Fielding's novel except among the minor characters — 
Thwackum, for instance. For the reader, Tom's relationship with Sophia 
begins when Blifil releases the pet bird Tom had given her (4.3-4). The 
episode, ending with Tom's falling from a tree into the canal and the 
bird's falling to a hawk, provides a comic miniature centered in problems 
of justice and mercy, liberty and confinement, real and dissembled 
motive. The discussion among Thwackum, Square, a lawyer, and the 
two squires that follows it makes two facets of the situation clear: no one 
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sees Blifil's real motive for his action (Thwackum and Square are 
blinded by devotion to their own theories of conduct, Airworthy by his 
softheartedness, and neither Western nor the lawyer are interested in 
motive, only in results), and the rather ponderous ethical issue at stake in 
this trivial event is justice. The law of nature legislates freedom for all 
creatures as the highest good; Christian equity demands that we do as we 
would be done to. Human law is silent in the case, since it is nullius in 
bono. All of this is true, but it takes Squire Western's simplicity to put it 
in perspective. 
"Well," says the squire, "if it be nullus bonus, let us drink 
about, and talk a little of the state of the nation, or some such 
discourse that we all understand; for I am sure I don't under­
stand a word of this. It may be learning and sense for aught I 
know; but you shall never persuade me into it. Pox! you have 
neither of you mentioned a word of that poor lad who deserves 
to be commended: to venture breaking his neck to oblige my 
girl was a generous-spirited action: I have learning enough to 
see that. D—n me, here's Tom's health! I shall love the boy for 
it the longest day I have to live." (4.4) 
The trouble with all the views expressed is that they are all partial ones, 
all singling out one aspect of justice and offering that as the whole, 
whereas justice itself, the crown of the virtues, embraces a whole gamut 
of considerations, from prudence and self-knowledge through to the 
duties owing to society and to God. The practice of justice is wisdom in 
its highest form, as any reader of Charron's De la Sagesse would have 
known.13 Sophia is already being linked with wisdom in this sense by the 
predictive analogue of this episode: Blifil's machinations in the name of 
justice "free" and ultimately destroy an object of Sophia's affection, a 
small bird not accidentally named Tommy, and set up for the rest of the 
novel both narrative problems about the human Tom's fate and thematic 
problems of definition about justice, liberty, and confinement. These are 
the central concerns of the novel itself that will reach their climax in the 
parallel actions of Tom freed from prison and — the scene discussed 
before — Tom distinguishing apparent from real motive before Sophia's 
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mirror. Sophia becomes wisdom by being inextricably involved in 
Tom's progress through these concerns; she is wisdom in the sense that 
the attainment of wisdom involves the practice of justice and mercy, "the 
natural beauty of virtue" and "the divine power of grace" (3.3), liberty 
and confinement, truth and self-knowledge. That is to say, the wisdom 
Fielding concerns himself with in Tom Jones is not mere prudence but a 
much larger virtue composed of speculative and practical, theological 
and profane elements. It is, in short, much more closely allied with the 
wisdom of the epic tradition than it is with the practicality of Moll 
Flanders: Fielding's Sophia derives from the same complex of ideas as 
does Bernardus's or Landino's explanation of Venus, or Pope's parodic 
goddess Dulness. Fielding leaves no doubt about the richness of the 
figure he is drawing: in the middle of his elaborate introduction of her 
(4.2), sandwiched between a quotation from Suckling and a quotation 
from Horace, he quotes from, and compares her directly to, the heroine 
of Donne's Anniversaries, that complex ashe" who can only be under­
stood as Donne's version of the traditional wisdom figure.14 Fielding 
very deliberately and very explicitly places himself and his creatures in 
the mainstream of epic tradition: "this heroic, historical, prosaic poem" 
(4.1) domesticates epic in England as it had never been before. 
The complexity of Sophia's role and Tom's relation to it does not 
demand that she be specific things but that she do certain things, that, for 
instance, she have the intelligence to refuse both Blifil and Fellamar, and 
the courage to do it; that she free herself from the confinement and 
restriction her father, her aunt, and Lady Bellaston seek to impose on 
her; that at Upton she remind Tom of what he is losing and spur him to 
seek it. She enables Tom to discover himself, not only in that through his 
pursuit of her he finds himself to be Allworthy's nephew, but also in that 
through her he becomes aware that what he does defines him and 
consequently seeks to change his actions. In their climactic interview, 
Sophia gives Tom a lesson in the whole gamut of virtues — justice, 
mercy, honor, constancy, temperance — before both are moved by the 
purely appetitive and unreflecting Squire Western to the union that both 
desire but which an ambiguous prudence inhibits. Like Joseph An­
drews, Tom Jones ends with the transcending of prudence. Tom and 
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Sophia at the end of the novel re-create very closely the conditions of the 
icon of wisdom that prefaces Charron's De la Sagesse: 
Sagesse is represented as a beautiful woman, naked, quia 
puram naturam sequitur, and standing firmly on the cube of 
Justice. Her face is healthy, joyful, and radiantly imposing. 
On her head are branches of laurel and olive, symbolizing the 
fruits of wisdom: victorious self-mastery and tranquillity. 
Around her is the empty space of sapiential liberty. Her arms 
are crossed as though she were embracing herself. This sig­
nifies the wise man's independence and self-sufficiency. Like 
Sapientia in the Wisdom and Fortune which illustrates 
Bovillus' De sapiente, she is looking at herself in a mirror, 
"because she always looks at and knows herself." To her right 
we read the device, Je ne scay; to the left, Paix et pen. 
Chained below her feet are four women: Passion, her face in a 
hideous grimace; wild-eyed Opinion, supported by the heads 
of the fickle and inconstant mob; Superstition, her hands 
clasped like a kitchen maid, trembling with fear; and Science, 
artificial, acquired, pedantic, and arrogant, the archenemy of 
wisdom, who reads in a book the words ouy and non — 
dogmatic knowledge crushed by the laughing skepticism of 
the wise homme de bien. This is Charron's wisdom, an 
imitation of nature whose imperatives are skepticism and 
preud'hommie, whose cause and obligation is man's own 
nature, whose method is the active practice of justice, whose 
fruits are constancy, tranquillity, and an imperturbable 
virtue.15 
Most of what is present there iconographically is present in Tom Jones 
narratively and dramatically. The handsome Tom and lovely Sophia are 
both freed from the restraints and confinements that have plagued them 
throughout the novel. Both of them have attained literal and figurative 
self-knowledge, most emphatically displayed in the mirror scene we 
have been discussing. Tom has achieved mastery over his passions 
(dramatized in his prudent retreat from Mrs. Fitzpatrick's transparent 
hints). Both have triumphed over opinion, jointly in the persistence of 
their love for each other, singly in Sophia's separation from her maid, 
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Honour, who has joined Lady Bellaston, with whom honor resides in 
London, and in Tom's graduation from the several inadequate notions of 
honor exemplified by such groups as the soldiers with whom he origi­
nally joined and the gypsies. He has conquered superstition in the 
graphic form of Partridge, whose faults he now sees clearly; in its larger 
manifestation as ignorance, he has been combatting it throughout the 
book. The capitulation of arrogant and pedantic science is marked by 
Square's letter of retraction and Allworthy's finally seeing through the 
viciousness of Thwackum, as well as political Aunt Western's with­
drawal from the action of the novel. The marriage of Tom and Sophia 
conforms to the dictates of nature in almost every conceivable sense of 
the phrase; and Fielding presents it in the novel as almost coincident with 
Tom's final distribution of justice and mercy to Blifil, Thwackum, 
Lawyer Dowling, Partridge, Jenny Waters, and the Seagrim family. For 
the remainder of Charron's attributes, the final paragraph of the novel 
speaks for itself: 
To conclude, as there are not to be found a worthier man 
and woman, than this fond couple, so neither can any be 
imagined more happy. They preserve the purest and ten­
derest affection for each other, an affection daily increased 
and confirmed by mutual endearments, and mutual esteem. 
Nor is their conduct towards their relations and friends less 
amiable than towards one another. And such is their conde­
scension, their indulgence, and their beneficence to those 
below them, that there is not a neighbor, a tenant, or a 
servant, who doth not most gratefully bless the day when Mr. 
Jones was married to his Sophia. (18.13) 
The mirror scene illustrates perfectly Fielding's ability to realize the 
figurative in the literal. Sophia, for all her spirit, functions to restrain 
Tom (during the period in which their love ripened, Tom was partially 
confined to bed and much restricted in his activities by a broken arm 
acquired in Sophia's service), to confine and channel his energies, sexual 
and otherwise. When unrestrained by Sophia, Tom has been limited by 
his own ignorance of himself and by his own passions, up until the 
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moment of his literal confinement in prison, when the true nature of his 
follies is borne in upon him. Sophia herself, of course, though free of 
Tom's limitations, has been the victim of many physical confinements 
and quasi-imprisonments throughout the book. The whole ambiguity of 
liberty and confinement was early encapsulated in the novel by Blifil's 
release of the bird: confined it was safe; free, it perished. The core 
question obviously becomes: confinement for what? and freedom for 
what? For Tom and Sophia, true liberty and proper confinement are 
clearly simultaneously defined as the fulfillment of their mutual love. 
But they are both restrained from achieving that by prudence, until 
Squire Western breaks the deadlock for them. Squire Western has 
throughout the novel acted something like pure, undirected will, reach­
ing out for one object after another, but chiefly preoccupied with the 
hunt, the bottle, and the bed; he traced an erratic path in his pursuit of 
Sophia and was easily diverted by foxes and by hospitality. Most of 
Sophia's acts are traceable to her acceptance or rejection of his willful­
ness. So then, are we to understand, when she at Western's urging agrees 
to marry Tom, that we have just seen an allegory of the will and the 
judgment, or of appetite and wisdom, or some such thing? Perhaps. Why 
not? That is, after all, what happens on the literal level of the story — but 
that is exactly why, I think, we cannot say that Tom Jones is an 
allegory. Sophia is not judgment or wisdom, though she does embody 
and enact both of those, and we do not come to understand this scene or 
any in the book by extrapolating from fixed values but rather by evaluat­
ing the dynamic interactions of very fluid characters. What the charac­
ters are is what they do (and vice versa): Sophia proceeds straight from 
Somerset to London according to a preconceived and thought-out plan 
with a known end; Tom wanders aimlessly, trying out one scheme after 
another until Sophia recalls him to himself and provides him with a goal 
and a direction; Squire Western begins with a goal but loses both his way 
and his interest in short order. That requires no allegorization to under­
stand: it is clear both literally and figuratively at the same time. You have 
only to compare this with, say, the episode of the Red Crosse Knight's 
leaving the road to seek shelter from a rainstorm in a wood to see the 
differences between allegorical method and Fielding's mode of figurative 
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narration. On the simple literal level, the Red Crosse Knight acts in a 
perfectly normal and morally neutral manner; there is nothing wrong 
with sheltering oneself from the rain. But our full understanding of that 
act is conditioned and dictated by our knowledge of the static allegorical 
correspondences: this is the Red Crosse Knight, that is, Holiness, and 
holiness is leaving the path, that is, deviating from the plain way of truth 
into error. This is what the episode means in the allegory; and though it is 
not incompatible with the narrative, it is not coincident with it. Rather, it 
is prior to the narrative, directs its shape, and dictates its meaning. In 
Fielding, such a situation almost never occurs: there are practically no 
static symbolic or allegorical characters to impose fixed meanings, and 
we are never called upon to reinterpret a scene in the light of its figurative 
sense because the figurative and the literal almost always coincide. Epic 
allegoresis, whatever form it takes — Bernardus's, Landino's, Spenser's 
— operates out of and within a fixed value system, a cosmos well-
regulated enough to provide unchanging reference points from which 
writer and reader could triangulate the significance of any unknowns. 
Fielding has divorced himself from that; in effect, he has accepted the 
challenge of MacFlecknoe, of A Tale of A Tub, ofThe Dunciad. He 
has confronted the problems of subjectively generated significance, of 
the cosmos understood as flux, of pervasive corporeality, all of which 
overwhelmed traditional epic, and answered them with a mode of figura­
tive narration that takes dynamic flux as its base of meaning and out of 
the interplay of events generates objective significance, while at the 
same time wedding that meaning to the body of language. The overall 
narrative technique that generates meaning out of plot essentially dupli­
cates the technique by which individual characters — Sophia for in­
stance — come to embody meaning. He achieves linguistically the kind 
of proper incarnation of thing-in-word and word-in-thing that has been 
the implicit property of epic from at least Virgil forward; he achieves 
literarily the adaptation of epic, with most of its appurtenances intact, to 
the unmapped new world of change and flow. It is an act of cultural 
reclamation almost without parallel in literature or any other art. (Not 
the least striking aspect of Fielding's achievement is the success with 
which he translated large quantities of characteristically epic exegesis 
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into the overt narration of his revitalized form. There is not time or space 
to catalogue all of these things, but a few examples are in order: the 
childhood and adolescence of his hero realize, on the literal level, what 
the ages-of-man theory had seen on the allegorical; Paradise Hall, Black 
George, and Tom's expulsion therefrom recapitulate mythically both the 
Eden story of Milton and the Troy episodes of the Aeneid as understood 
by the commentators; the movement from country to city back to 
country explicitly captures the thought-action-contemplation or 
retirement-activity-retirement pattern of the commentators' explana­
tions.) 
As I said before, the plot of Tom Jones forms an almost perfect 
paradigm of epic, especially as understood and elaborated by the kinds 
of commentators we have discussed. Fielding manages to bring under 
control the tendency of the allegorical explanation to supplant the epic 
tale by overtly incorporating aspects of what would normally be the 
allegory into his narrative — Tom's childhood, for instance, and his 
ability to withstand the contradictorily erroneous teachings of Thwack-
um and Square, while his doppelganger Blifil, in fine mock-epic fashion, 
steers a parodic mean between their doctrines. (As with Parson Adams's 
role in Joseph Andrews, Fielding in Tom Jones manages to employ and 
to counterpoint epic and mock-epic patterns.) The novel moves as 
Bemardus's Aeneid moves, from childhood to maturity and knowledge, 
and also as Landino's Aeneid moves, from an ambiguous home where 
the hero is unproductively at rest in the flesh out into the active world and 
at last to a real home and the possession of wisdom. It is important to 
realize that Fielding remains faithful to the core of the epic tradition and 
antipathetic to contemporary notions of wisdom and prudence (as active, 
practical, and pragmatic virtue)16 in allowing his hero to pass through the 
active life to come to rest in retirement and contemplation. The whole 
point of the Aeneid and the Odyssey (even, in an ironic mode, of the 
Iliad) lies in the achievement of order, the reestablishment of stability: 
rest after motion is the goal of epic, whether it be in the narrative or the 
allegory, public or private, individual or social. 
Tom Jones contrives to achieve that rest in almost all its aspects. 
Tom, Sophia, Squire Western, and Squire Allworthy retire to the coun­
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try and lives of personal tranquillity, abandoning the city, which the 
popular town-country opposition had made the locus of the active life. 
Epic tradition made cities both that and the locus of temptation — Troy, 
the city of the flesh; Carthage, both the active life and the temptation of 
Dido — and Milton's treatment in particular made cities almost one of 
the direct results of the Fall and the chief site of human misery, next to 
which the country seemed still at least slightly Edenic. Tom, Jones, in 
these senses, plays itself out across a properly epic landscape: Paradise 
Hall, badly misnamed, is its Troy, an earthly paradise at best, where 
despite a benign but by no means omniscient or infallible Squire Al­
lworthy, vanity, pettiness, greed, lust, and jealousy provide the basic 
motivations for most of the characters. For Tom to remain here is for 
Tom to remain ignorant, passive, sterile: he does not know who or what 
he is, who acts upon him or why, what the real state of the world is. He is 
a stranger in his own home, different from its other inhabitants — more 
potent than Allworthy, better than all the rest. So his expulsion from the 
false familial order of Paradise Hall becomes an entrance into the 
possibility of other orders to which, potentially or hypothetically, he 
may belong. His acquisition of his putative father Partridge is a sign of 
that, though like Aeneas and Anchises he will not find his real home until 
that "father" is removed. He tries or sees a number of societies, all with 
varying social codes based in one way or another on the slippery concept 
of honor, and all insufficient: the navy (he initially plans to go to sea), the 
army, the gypsies, the beau monde of London itself, as personified by 
Lady Bellaston.17 It is obviously not mere chance that Lord Fellamar's 
plans for Tom should involve fulfillment of his own original plan 
(Fellamar means to have him taken by a press gang and sent to sea); that 
they are frustrated by Tom's arrest and imprisonment is no irony, but a 
literal working-out of Tom's true state. Without wisdom, without self-
knowledge, he is in prison and has been in prison all along. The real 
irony is that in prison — in a forced state of rest, his motion stopped — 
Tom becomes free: in prison he discovers both his paternity and his own 
nature; at rest, he discovers his capacity for action.18 After this his 
attainment of Sophia is ensured: starting with real self-knowledge (liter­
ally the knowledge that he is Allworthy's nephew and BhfiFs half­
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brother) he can proceed to the acquisition and execution of justice and 
mercy and from here, by virtue of marriage to Sophia, to the constancy 
he has so desperately needed. His retirement to the country is a with­
drawal from activity to rest, from change to constancy, from confusion to 
clarity. There, in limited realm of his family and estate — in private, as 
the eighteenth century would have said — he practices the virtues he has 
acquired and exorcises the vices he was born with. 
Although the action of Tom Jones is confined to a few individuals and 
families, the scope of the novel is much greater than that. I don't mean by 
this the common notion of Fielding's amazing spectrum of types and 
panorama of England and English life. Rather, I am referring to the 
intricate use Fielding has made of the historical fact of the 1745 uprising 
on behalf of Prince Charles Edward, "the young Pretender." Fielding 
uses this as an ambivalent analogue to his main action. First mention of 
the '45 occurs with the arrival of political Aunt Western, and it coincides 
with the initial confusion among Sophia, Squire Western, and his sister 
as to whom Sophia loves and who is to pay court to her. At this point, 
Tom is apparently the Pretender, seeking Sophia's hand and her father's 
estate, and his exile soon after seems to confirm this. But we, the 
readers, although ignorant of Tom's true birth, also know that Blifil 
certainly pretends to Sophia's affections and that his goal really is her 
father's estate. Once on the road, of course, the complications multiply: 
Tom attempts to join a troop of soldiers going to fight for the crown; the 
Jacobite Partridge believes he plans to support the Pretender; the Man on 
the Hill gives them an account of his unfortunate involvement in an 
earlier rebellion; Sophia is mistaken for the Pretender's mistress, Jenny 
Cameron. Insofar as she loves Tom, she is the Pretender's mistress; 
insofar as her family obliges her to Blifil, she is also the Pretender's 
mistress. Aunt Western, with her basic political and social differences 
from her Jacobite brother and her constant political turn of phrase, serves 
as the convenient crossover point from the political analogue to the main 
plot: by her constant use of words like alliances, treaties, tactics, and so 
on, she makes the public disturbances and the private ones metaphors for 
each other, synecdoche and metonomy for the same basic attempt at 
usurpation. The predictive value of our knowledge of the outcome of the 
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rebellion would seem to doom Tom — he was, after all, "born to be 
hanged" — until the point at which he and we learn who he really is and , 
consequently, who the Pretender and usurper really is. So the defeat of 
the Pretender and the restoration of public order under what Fielding felt 
a rightful monarch parallels exactly the restoration of private order under 
the rightful heir. The cause of justice and English liberties — public and 
personal — triumph over the pretensions of absolutism — political and 
moral. Tom's and Sophia's "condescension, their indulgence, and their 
beneficence to those below them" (18.13), which close the novel, are the 
private models of those virtues restored to English public life. For this 
reason, in what seems to me a casual masterstroke of significance, Tom 
does not return to Paradise Hall but settles rather on the neighboring 
estate of Squire Western, which the old foxhunter abdicates to him — 
Tom, who has played Aeneas to Blifil's Turnus in their struggle for 
Lavinia (Sophia) attains his Hesperia, the Western lands that were 
Aeneas's fated goal, and yet another Troy-novant rises on English soil. 
In that marvelous understated moment, classical epic makes a home in 
English literature. At least one phase of the translatio studii has 
achieved its own rest from wandering. 
I l  l 
With Amelia, Fielding moves on to the logical culmination of his 
work; after the comic romance of Joseph Andrews and the comic epic of 
Tom Jones, he here attempts the serious epic in prose with Virgil's 
Aeneid as his confessed model.19 Overt parallels between the two works 
abound, in terms of both character and situation. Miss Matthews corre­
sponds to Dido, Colonel James to Turnus, Amelia at different points to 
both Creusa and Lavinia. Booth's recitation of his past to Miss Matthews 
approximates Aeneas's similar recounting to Dido. The sea journey and 
Gibralter adventures relate closely to the battles at Troy and Aeneas's 
wanderings; in these and in Booth's subsequent mishaps the unselfish 
Atkinson plays "fides Achates" to his Aeneas. Fielding also shifts 
emphases, carefully using the Aeneid as a foil. The threatened duel 
between Booth and Colonel James, which would furnish a climax and a 
Fielding 217 
demonstration of the hero's individual virtus in the manner of Aeneas's 
battle with Turnus, never takes place, but much examination of the 
whole ethic of dueling does. Book 4 of Amelia ought, because of 
parallels already established, to correspond to book 4 of the Aeneid; but 
although Miss Matthews does early and easily seduce Booth, most of the 
book is taken up by Booth's reunion with Amelia and problems with 
Colonel James (raised by Miss Matthews, to be sure) and by the ominous 
introduction of the Noble Lord. Far from being the slothful hero luxuriat­
ing in his mistress's love and recalled to duty only by a divine messenger, 
Booth's conscience quickly and thoroughly discomforts him for his one 
week of inconstancy. Indeed, even the metamorphosis of Mercury into 
Dr. Harrison's letter warning Booth against vanity and improvidence is 
part of this playing-off of Fielding's creation against Virgil's paradigm.20 
Equally important to an understanding of Fielding's accomplishment 
in Amelia, however, is an awareness that he has also employed Milton's 
Paradise Lost as a foil in a similar manner. From Booth's first entry into 
the "not improperly called infernal" (1.10) region of Newgate to the point 
at which, as Dr. Harrison phrases it, "the devil hath thought proper to set 
you free" (12.5), Fielding has set up a network of correspondences and 
counterpoints between his own work and Milton's epic. As these are 
somewhat elaborate and affect directly the development and meaning of 
the novel, it would be best to discuss the most important ones sequen­
tially and in detail. Fielding is constructing Amelia out of the materials 
of the epic tradition, and he is relying on our recognition of the materials 
themselves, the uses he has put them to, and the relations those uses set 
up with the tradition to make his points. He innovates traditionally, and 
by what he does changes both the epic tradition and our angle of sight 
upon it. 
The opening sequence of events in Amelia indicates the complex use 
Fielding intends to make of Paradise Lost. Milton's poem opens with 
the fall of Satan and the confinement of the devils in Hell; Fielding's 
novel begins with Booth's apparently unjust imprisonment (he is com­
mitted essentially because he is poor) in Newgate, which is, as Fielding 
says here (1.10) and elsewhere, Hell. The Council of Demons in Pan­
demonium and the difficulty of breaking the bonds of Hell are aptly 
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parodied and re-created in the dinner conversation in Miss Matthews's 
quarters (1.10), and the roles of Miss Matthews and Colonel James 
(grudging and indirect, to be sure) in effecting Booth's release comically 
miniaturize the actions of Sin and Death in freeing Satan from Hell. One 
of the greater ironies of Fielding's treatment of Booth lies in the fact that 
this process of parallelism identifies him with Satan, or at least, as Dr. 
Harrison's previously quoted remark indicates, one of his agents or 
victims. However gross the miscarriage of justice that committed Booth 
to Newgate in the first place, in the ethical system of the novel he belongs 
there. He is one of the devils, not because of his subsequent liaison with 
Miss Matthews, but because of the radical intellectual flaw that permits 
him to indulge that mere weakness of the flesh. Booth "did not absolutely 
deny the existence of a God, yet he entirely denied His providence"; he 
believes "that every man acted merely from the force of that passion 
which was uppermost in his mind, and could do no otherwise" (1.3). 
Booth's conversations with Robinson (from which the remarks above are 
taken) about athe necessity arising from the impulse of fate, and the 
necessity arising from the impulse of passion" (1.3) and with the 
Methodist pickpocket about grace and crime accomplish two things in 
the novel. By parodying the songs and disputations of Milton's demons, 
who acomplain[ed] that Fate / Free Virtue should enthrall to Force or 
Chance" (2.550-51) and "reason'd high / Of Providence, Foreknowl­
edge, Will, and Fate I . .  . I Vain Wisdom all, and false Philosophie" 
(2.558-59, 565), they confirm the linking of Booth and Satan. In 
addition, they define the terms of the novel and the scope of its concerns: 
fate and free will, fortune and ruling passion, liberty of action and the 
moral neutrality or merit of those actions furnish the central themes of 
Amelia, from its exordium (1.1), which like the invocation of Paradise 
Lost raises basic questions about Fortune, Fate, Free Will, and Provi­
dence, right down to Booth's final liberation from prison and repayment 
of all his debts. Booth is in prison because he thinks he is in prison; he 
must obey his dominant passion. His good actions produce no effect, 
because, as he later tells Dr. Harrison, "as men appeared to me to act 
entirely from their passions, their actions would have neither merit nor 
demerit" (12.5). Booth is a kind of secular Methodist, denying the worth 
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of works and lacking a redeeming faith. Throughout the novel, he 
remains in prison, either literally or confined within the Verge of Court 
or within his own mind. His own sense of "honor" will not allow him to 
confess his derelictions to Amelia and repent; neither will it allow him to 
act efficaciously. The prison is the central symbol of Amelia and the 
arena of its action.21 Because Booth's will is malformed, he is impris­
oned; when, by reading Barrow's sermons, his will is reformed, he is 
freed — and not accidentally, the tamperings with Mrs. Harris's will are 
discovered and corrected. Booth and Amelia have been thrall to that will 
all through the novel, locked in poverty by its forged deformation just as 
they have been locked in failure and futility by Booth's deformed will 
and his sensitive "honor": the one is the external correlative of the other, 
and correcting both of them are cognate acts. Booth converted and freed, 
Amelia prepared for good fortune and for her rightful inheritance are 
Fielding's version of Adam and Eve repentant and resigned, awaiting the 
redemption that is their promised heritage. The Booths' escape from the 
prison of London into the semi-Edenic countryside ironically recapitu­
lates the banishment from Paradise that made all the Londons possible. 
Booth is Satanic in the novel insofar as he is his own hell and his own 
prisoner; other characters are Satanic in much more primary ways. Miss 
Matthews, for instance, and the Noble Lord both assail the Booths and 
attempt to break up their marriage, as do Mrs. Ellison and Colonel 
James. Even Dr. Harrison attempts briefly to separate Booth from 
Amelia, and to that extent becomes a tool villain. One of the central 
episodes in the novel defines what is really at stake in the marriage of the 
Booths and why, consequently, so many of the forces of Hell are bent on 
destroying that marriage. Mrs. Ellison offers Amelia a masquerade 
ticket for the Noble Lord; Booth, whose suspicions have been aroused 
by comments from Colonel and Mrs. James, peremptorily forbids her to 
accept it. Amelia complies, and Mrs. Ellison leaves. In the chapter that 
follows (6.6), Booth explains his reasons for this prohibition and Amelia 
defends herself from what she takes to be demeaning implications about 
her virtue and intelligence — "Good Heavens! did I ever expect to hear 
this? I can appeal to Heaven, nay, I will appeal to yourself, Mr. Booth, if 
I have ever done anything to deserve such a suspicion. If ever any action 
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of mine; nay, if ever any thought, had stained the innocence of my soul, I 
could be contented." " 0  , Mr. Booth! Mr. Booth! you must well know 
that a woman's virtue is always her sufficient guard. No husband, 
without suspecting that, can suspect any danger from those snares you 
mention. . . .  " "What is it you fear? — you mention not force, but 
snares. Is not this to confess, at least, that you have some doubt of my 
understanding? do you then really imagine me so weak as to be cheated 
of my virtue? — am I to be deceived into an affection for a man before I 
perceive the least inward hint of my danger? No, Mr. Booth, believe me, 
a woman must be a fool indeed who can have in earnest such an excuse 
for her actions. I have not, I think, any very high opinion of my 
judgment, but so far I shall rely upon it, that no man breathing could 
have any such designs as you have apprehended without my im­
mediately seeing them; and how I should then act I hope my whole 
conduct to you hath sufficiently declared." This domestic drama to 
modern ears borders on soap opera, but its point is far more serious than 
that. Fielding's situation recreates exactly what happens in the climactic 
ninth book of Paradise Lost, when Eve proposes to Adam that they 
work apart: Adam objects, and dialogue very like that between Booth 
and Amelia ensues. I will quote only one passage of Eve's arguments; the 
similarity to Amelia's will, I hope, be quite evident: 
Offspring of Heav'n and Earth, and all Earth's Lord, 
That such an Enemy we have, who seeks 
Our ruin, both by thee inform'd I learn, 
And from the parting Angel over-heard 
As in a shady nook I stood behind, 
Just then return'd at shut of Ev'ning Flow'rs. 
But that thou shouldst my firmness therefore doubt 
To God or thee, because we have a foe 
My tempt it, I expected not to hear. 
His violence thou fear'st not, being such, 
As wee, not capable of death or pain, 
Can either not receive, or can repel. 
His fraud is then thy fear, which plain infers 
Thy equal fear that my firm Faith and Love 
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Can by his fraud be shak'n or seduc't; 
Thoughts, which how found they harbor in thy breast, 
Adam, misthought of her to thee so dear? 
(9.273-89) 
The immediate result of both episodes is identical: both Adam and Booth 
capitulate; Eve goes to work alone, and Amelia accepts the masquerade 
ticket. The disastrous effects that follow in Paradise Lost are averted in 
Amelia by the intervention of Mrs. Bennet, whose tale of her own 
seduction in like circumstances sufficiently warns Amelia of her danger. 
But the use of Paradise Lost as foil for this episode alters the dimensions 
of the drama. It is not merely that Paradise Lost provides, in some of its 
scenes, a model for domestic epic, but that the marriage of the Booths 
comes to share some of the importance of the marriage of Adam and Eve. 
With all these mighty engines, with Satan himself (through his human 
agents, with whom Mrs. Bennet identifies him [7.7]) engaged in attack­
ing it, there must be more involved than the happiness of two individu­
als, however handsome and admirable. 
What appears to be involved is something analogous to the establish­
ment of Rome in the Aeneid or the providential plan for humanity 
revealed in the last two books of Paradise Lost. Through the Booths and 
the values they embody, Fielding directly deals with the problem of the 
Christian commonwealth: through Booth and Amelia and Dr. Harrison, 
he delineates all the difficulties incident to practicing real Christianity in 
a world of real evil. The novel opens with an episode of law and justice, 
both crudely and cruelly applied, and ends with the Booths at last freed 
from the law and given true justice: between those points Fielding tackles 
directly the questions of freedom and law, merit and justice, forgiveness 
and revenge, as they apply both to the individual and to the common­
wealth. Captain Booth himself is the focal point for all this, since as 
private individual — Amelia's husband — and as public official — an 
officer in the service of the crown — he must balance and adjudicate the 
welter of responsibilities that fall to him. Booth fails initially precisely 
because, for all his good intentions, his theory of the dominant passion 
makes him incapable of assuming responsibility. His actions in his own 
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eyes always remain morally neutral, and their outcome is determined 
only by chance. For the greater part of the novel, Booth is literally a 
Soldier of Fortune (so his penchant for gambling) and not a Christian 
Soldier. Only when Barrow's sermons convert him to true belief does he 
break free from the wheel of fortune and into a world of individual 
responsibility and consequently of causation and effect, where Provi­
dence, as Dr. Harrison remarks (12.7), "hath done you the justice at last 
which it will, one day or other, render to all men." Immediately before 
this, Booth has sunk to his lowest ebb — imprisoned once again, almost 
destitute, pitifully dependent that his giving his last fifty pounds to a 
political functionary will win him a commission. "Thus did this poor 
man support his hopes by a dependence on that ticket which he had so 
dearly purchased of one who pretended to manage the wheels in the great 
state lottery of preferment. A lottery, indeed, which hath this to recom­
mend it — that many poor wretches feed their imaginations with the 
prospect of a prize during their whole lives, and never discover that they 
have drawn a blank." (12.2). The "great state lottery of preferment" 
enmeshes all of society in its turnings, from the Captain Trents and old 
lieutenants through to the lawyer Murphys and the sister Bettys — and 
there is no Lady Philosophy here to rescue Booth as there was to save 
Wilson. The governmental system so based obviously operates amor­
ally — law and justice are hollow concepts, cards to be played to gain 
advantages over others. Merit, as a nobleman makes clear to Dr. 
Harrison, furnishes no recommendation for office or promotion, and his 
passionate defense of a commonwealth based on strict justice and the 
rewarding of merit produces only the following supercilious retort: "This 
is all mere Utopia," cries His Lordship, "the chimerical system of 
Plato's commonwealth, with which we amused ourselves at the univer­
sity; politics which are inconsistent with the state of human affairs." 
(11.2). I think it is significant of the extent to which Fielding's reformist 
thought had gone that, in response to this and other of the lord's 
declarations of the impossibility of preferring men by merit, he has Dr. 
Harrison cite honorifically the example of Oliver Cromwell — "and it 
was chiefly owing to the avoiding this error that Oliver Cromwell carried 
the reputation of England higher than it ever was at any other time" 
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(11.2). Coupled with Dr. Harrison's earlier remarks about the role of 
the clergy and the importance of the example of their lives (9.9-10), as 
well as with Dr. Harrison's own crucial role in managing and unraveling 
the lives and fortunes of the Booths, these sentiments seem to point 
strongly in the directions of republicanism, reform, and something that 
smacks of theocracy. Dr. Harrison's Christianity is radical — at least in 
the context of Amelia — in that he accepts literally the biblical injunc­
tion to "love your enemies" and has consequently recast, in his own 
mind at least, the whole concept of law: 
"But if this be the meaning," cries the son, "there must be 
an end of all law and justice, for I do not see how any man can 
prosecute his enemy in a court of justice." 
"Pardon me, sir," cries the doctor. "Indeed, as an enemy 
merely, and from a spirit of revenge, he cannot, and he ought 
not to prosecute him; but as an offender against the laws of his 
country he may, and it is his duty to do so. Is there any spirit 
of revenge in the magistrates or officers of justice when they 
punish criminals? Why do such, ordinarily I mean, concern 
themselves in inflicting punishments, but because it is their 
duty? and why may not a private man deliver an offender into 
the hands of justice, from the same laudable motive? Re­
venge, indeed, of all kinds is strictly prohibited; wherefore, 
as we are not to execute it with our own hands, so neither are 
we to make use of the law as the instrument of private malice, 
and to worry each other with inveteracy and rancor. And 
where is the great difficulty in obeying this wise, this gener­
ous, this noble precept?" (9.8) 
Law such as Harrison envisions constitutes a total antithesis to law as 
seen and practiced by the other characters of the novel, and one of the 
signs in the book of the triumph of his views can be found in Captain 
Booth's and Amelia's joining him in the actual practice of such law — I 
refer, of course, to their joint distribution of justice and mercy to Mur­
phy, Robinson, and Miss Harris at the end of the book. That is doubly 
significant in that it marks both the efficacy of Booth's conversion and a 
partial purgation of a corrupt society. The estate of the Booths and their 
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posterity both typifies and promises the completion of that regeneration: 
Booth and Amelia, like Adam and Eve, have learned of, and been 
reconciled to, God's providential plan, and have taken their places in it 
as progenitors of a regenerate race. Their family is the nucleus and 
prototype of Dr. Harrison's Christian commonwealth; he is the spiritual 
father of their incipient "mere Utopia." 
Behind all this lies a fundamental concept that gives form to the novel. 
As I remarked before, Captain Booth is a kind of secular Methodist, and 
his early encounters in prison with the free-thinking Robinson and the 
Methodist pickpocket (1.3—5) set up some of the moral terms of the 
novel — the law, under which they all are bound; the meritoriousness of 
works, which Booth disbelieves; faith, which Booth must acquire; 
justification, which can only flow from the latter two; and freedom, 
which is a consequence of justification. Not surprisingly, given 
Fielding's long-standing concern with Methodism and what he consid­
ered the pernicious doctrine of justification by faith alone (for which, in 
Amelia, he makes the hypocritical pickpocket the spokesman), these are 
all catchwords and concerns of Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans, 
which provided the central document in the quarrel of orthodoxy with 
Methodism. Fielding's concern with these issues here, however, ranges 
far beyond his earlier concentration on active charity, just as his use of 
constancy in Amelia as part of a large complex of virtues transcends his 
earlier, straightforward treatment of it. Like Dr. Harrison's radically 
literal understanding of Christ's commands, Fielding undertakes a simi­
larly literal exploration of the Pauline epistle, whose meaning, in his 
view, Methodism and contemporary English mores have narrowed and 
perverted. Saint Paul talks of freedom from the law and transcendence of 
it in Christian liberty, and this is the core of Fielding's novel. English 
lawT as misapplied by a heathen society, becomes the eighteenth-century 
manifestation of Mosaic law, and the true Christian must free himself 
from bondage to it. The law works only to awaken consciousness of sin, 
which it does for Booth, but no man is saved by the law. The law leads 
only to death, as it does for lawyer Murphy. Not accidentally, one of the 
novel's few enthusiasts for "the constitution, that is the law and liberty" 
(8.2) is the despicable bailiff Bondum, into whose hands Booth is often 
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conveyed and under whose notion of law and'liberty Booth suffers. 
Booth is confined by other kinds of law too, the law of honor for one, 
which "a man of honor wears . .  . by his side" according to Colonel 
Bath (9.3). Fielding devotes a good portion of Amelia to extricating 
Booth from the trap of this concept of honor, which seems to embody 
aspects of trial by combat, the law of Talion, and simple unchristian 
vengeance. Appropriately, Colonel Bath, who lives by the sword, dies 
by the sword. He is beset as well by "the laws of nature," which he 
encounters at the very beginning of the novel in the person of Justice 
Thrasher, who, "if he was ignorant of the laws of England, . . . 
perfectly well understood that fundamental principle . .  . by which the 
duty of self-love is so strongly enforced, and every man is taught to 
consider himself as the centre of gravity, and to attract all things thither" 
(1.2). That law, of course, commits Booth to Newgate in the first place. 
Varying ideas of freedom correspond to these different notions of law. 
Primarily, freedom is bought, in this society, by wealth or position or 
power; and it is freedom in terms of the society — that is, freedom to 
acquire greater wealth, position, and power, and to manipulate and 
exploit those who want them. That, too, is a kind of bondage, as is the 
freedom offered by the Methodist, the freedom of election, which makes 
a rhetorical distinction between "the days of sin and the days of grace," 
but which neither affects his conduct nor effects his release from New-
gate or from corruption. Finally, Stoicism — in the person of the 
philosophic debtor (8.10) — purports to offer freedom from the vicis­
situdes of fortune; but all it can really accomplish is to make imprison­
ment more endurable, and the emotional and intellectual detachment 
that even that little requires Fielding quickly shows to be humanly 
impossible for the debtor, just as it was for Parson Adams. The only real 
release from the pervasive corruption of society and the doom of the law 
lies in acceptance of a radically anarchic Christian liberty that transcends 
Mosaic law and all the ephemeral human laws that furnish its avatars and 
incarnations. "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made 
me free from the law of sin and death" (Romans 13:2). " . .  . The 
creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into 
the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Romans 8:21). That liberty 
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is achieved, according to Paul, only through the faith that Booth acquires 
by reading Barrow's sermons and by what Paul calls "the Spirit of 
adoption" (Romans 8:14), whereby "we are the children of God: And if 
children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ" (Romans 
8:16-17). Dr. Harrison accomplishes the necessary adoption by his 
constant references to, and treatment of, Amelia as his daughter, of 
which practice he makes an elaborate explanation to his visiting friend 
and clergyman son (9.8), and by referring to Booth for the first time, 
shortly after his conversion, as "My child" (12.7). At that same time, he 
announces to Booth that "your sufferings are all at an end, and Provi­
dence hath done you the justice at last which it will, one day or other, 
render to all men. You will hear all presently; but I can now only tell you 
that your sister is discovered and the estate is your own." What follows in 
the novel confirms this: Amelia very shortly receives her inheritance, 
and subsequently (almost at the end of the novel) Dr. Harrison declares 
"that he will leave his whole fortune, except some few charities, among 
Amelia's children" (12.9). 
All this constitutes the same kind of realization of the figurative in the 
literal that I have argued was Fielding's technique in Joseph Andrews 
and Tom Jones. Here he has specifically worked with literalizations of 
the metaphors of the Epistle to the Romans — which, being canonical, 
Fielding and many other pious readers would be likely to treat as more 
than metaphoric anyway. He has given them in his fiction the same kind 
of efficacy they have in Scripture, where they function simultaneously as 
facts and metaphors, literally true statements and images for other 
things. By so doing, he breaks epic free of the trap of allegory and 
restores to it literarily the kind of autonomy and validity it had been 
steadily losing to the omnivorous habit of abstraction. For himself, he 
accomplishes a perfect fusion of his humane concerns and his religious 
consciousness. The reforming London magistrate and the serious Chris­
tian unite to form the story of man saved from the corruption of society 
and the bondage of sin to live, not in Somerset or Hesperia, but in 
Paradise Regained. Fielding's vision in this last novel is radical and 
millennial: society from top to bottom stinks with corruption, and its 
only hope of salvation rests with the Booths and Amelias, with the 
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regenerate few whose families are the seedbed and nucleus for a new 
society of love. He has adopted what we would call now a radical 
position: implicitly, facing a society where, as Amelia insists, law 
means bondage, sin, and death, he has become a Christian anarchist 
urging the withdrawal of the few — into what we would now call 
communes — outside the law and above the law, outside of society and 
antithetical to it. Like Adam and Eve, Booth and Amelia must populate 
the earth anew with the inheritors of the promised redemption. 
Such an understanding of Amelia is dictated by Fielding's careful 
manipulation of the traditional palindromatic structure of epic. He does 
not use merely the general pattern, but specifically the intricate inter­
locking sort of pattern Milton employed in Paradise Lost. And use is 
not the right verb: in Amelia, as in Paradise Lost, the structure em­
bodies the argument. Its symmetries disclose Providence. At the center 
of the novel, in books 6 and 7, stand the masquerade at Ranelagh and its 
concomitants, the threat of seduction by the Noble Lord and the destruc­
tion of the Booths' marriage as Mrs. Bennet's had been destroyed. 
Around this central Satanic attempt and failure to separate and seduce 
Fielding's Augustan Adam and Eve, the other events of the novel circle, 
concentric rings of events around that dramatic core:22 
Book 5 Book 8 
A. Warning about Noble Lord's A. Warning about James's de-
designs signs 
B. Booth's scuffle with Bailiff B. Booth's duel with Colonel 
Bath 
C. Reconciliation with Colonel C. Reconciliation with Dr. Harri-
James son 
Book 4 Book 9 
A. Booth seduced by Miss Matth­ A. James's designs on Amelia 
ews 
B. Booth freed from prison and B. Booth freed from prison and 
rejoined to Amelia rejoined to Amelia. 
C. Harrison's censure of Booth's C. Harrison's censure of Booth's 
conduct in the country conduct in the city 
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D. James promises help in obtain­
ing a commission 
E. Visit from Mrs. James 
F  . The oratorio and the strange 
man 
G. Mrs. Ellison's hypocrisy 
Book 3 
A. Atkinson promoted to sergeant 
B. Amelia's honor: Bath and 
Bagillard 
C. Booth's imprudence as farmer 
D. Marriage of James and Bath's 
sister 
Book 2 
A. Harrison Booth's champion 
B. Booth abnegates self to Amelia 
C. Hebbers dying and recovering 
Book 1 
A. Miss Matthews and Hebbers 
B. Robinson 
C. Imprisonment 
D. Justice Thrasher 
D. James promises help in obtain­
ing a commission 
E. Visit from Mrs. James 
F. Vauxhall and the bucks 
G. Harrison's friends' hypocrisy 
Book 10 
A. Atkinson promoted to Captain 
B. Amelia's honor: Bath, Harri­
son, James 
C. Booth's imprudence in card 
game 
D. Letter about adultery and mar­
riage to James 
Book 11 
A. Harrison Booth's champion 
B. Booth confesses to Amelia 
C. Atkinson dying and recovering 
Book 12 
A. Sister Betty and Lawyer Mur­
phy 
B. Robinson 
C. Freedom 
D. Justice of Providence 
Amelia moves, like Paradise Lost, from imprisonment, sin, and hell 
to the freedom of a providentially ordered world, from the inhumanity of 
the law and the predatory creatures of it to the newly won humanity of its 
chastened and strengthened hero and heroine. Amelia is no more a 
paragon than her husband: a daughter of Eve, she shares Eve's vanities 
and Eve's weaknesses, and she avoids Eve's sin only through the actions 
of her surrogate, Mrs. Bennet.23 Like Captain Booth, she both watches 
and plays in a complex drama that hell and heaven stage for them and 
around them, a human comedy for them, a divine tragedy for many 
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others. Fielding has reached back through the abstractions and rationali­
zations that had accumulated around epic to the living core of the 
tradition and set in motion once more a human Aeneas, a human Eve, 
fallible and vulnerable, to work out their destinies among real people 
rather than cardboard personae. In the radical simplicity of his vision of 
the family as the seedbed of society and of the bond of love between one 
man and one woman as its nurturing force, he approached the kind of 
luminous regularity that makes the works of Homer and Virgil and Dante 
so all-encompassing. Amelia is domestic drama, but all the world is in 
it, just as all the world was enfolded in the domestic drama of Adam and 
Eve. 
Life may as properly be called an art as any other; and the 
great incidents in it are no more to be considered as mere 
accidents than the several members of a fine statue or a noble 
poem. The critics in all these are not content with seeing 
anything to be great without knowing why and how it came to 
be so. By examining carefully the several gradations which 
conduce to bring every model to perfection, we leam truly to 
know that science in which the model is formed: as histories 
of this kind, therefore, may properly be called models of 
Human Life, so, by observing minutely the several incidents 
which tend to the catastrophe or completion of the whole, and 
the minute causes whence those incidents are produced, we 
shall best be instructed in this most useful of all arts, which I 
callthe Art of Life. (1.1) 
The "Art of Life" is what the epic had always been and what Fielding 
made it again — a handbook for life, and a poem made of life. It is just 
that simple, and just that complex. The heart of epic, and the heart of 
Amelia, is the simultaneous everything-and-nothing of suffering and 
triumphant humanity, the joyous freedom hidden in the dark of the 
prison, the single small act of the single small will that alters the shape of 
the cosmos. That is what Amelia, and epic, are all about. 
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IV 
In the course of his discussion of Milton in The Descent from 
Heaven, Thomas Greene enumerates three causes of the demise of epic. 
In thus fulfilling the seventeenth-century tendency to shift the 
political medium from violence to morality, Milton im­
plicitly rejected, it seems to me, part of the basis of epic itself 
— the balance of objective and subjective action, the balance 
of executive and deliberative. In the closing books of 
Paradise Lost, the books which define human heroism, the 
executive episodes almost disappear. This rejection need not 
in itself involve grounds for criticism. But it is important to 
see how the last of the great poems in conventional epic dress 
contained within itself, not accidently but essentially, the 
seeds of the genre's destruction. One of these seeds was the 
internalization of action, the preference for things invisible. A 
second was the questioning of the hero's independence; a 
third was the detaching of heroism from the community, the 
City of man in this world, (p. 407) 
As should be clear from the earlier chapters of this book, I agree 
substantially about the nature of these destructive elements, although I 
think their seeds were well planted in the genre long before Milton. What 
I want to emphasize here is how, particuarly in Amelia, Fielding has 
nullified these elements, how he has in effect jumped back over this 
malignant growth within epic itself to an earlier and sounder understand­
ing of the genre. Fielding has restored a sense of community to epic, and 
has certainly returned epic to the community: for all of the diabolical 
engines turned to encompass the Booths' ruin, the action of Amelia plays 
itself out in the very heart of "the City of man in this world" — and even if 
the novel concludes with an escape from that city, it is a withdrawal that 
contains the promise of a future salvation for that city and that world. So, 
too, with Fielding's treatment of "things invisible": the novel fully 
embodies anything that properly fits that category in things very visible 
indeed — the prison, the Court, the Noble Lord. The question of the 
Fielding 231 
hero's independence furnishes the whole point of the novel; it is Booth's 
discovery of that that constitutes its resolution. Booth's conversion 
restores epic firmly and finally to the world of living men: no angels 
enlighten him, even though "an angel might be thought to guide the pen" 
(12.S) of Dr. Barrow: no " Almighty, nodding, gave Consent; / [or] Peals 
of Thunder shook the Firmament" (Absalom and Achitophel, 
1026-27) to ratify his resolution. Booth's change of heart and mind 
antithesizes David's final stand in Absalom and Achitophel: there 
"Godlike David" conformed himself to the immutability of the God 
whose image he bore to promulgate divine law; in Amelia a very human 
Captain Booth realizes his own freedom in order to escape from disas­
trously human law. As the figurative manifests itself in the literal in 
Fielding's novels, so does the divine incarnate itself in the human. 
Booth's conversion is his acceptance of human responsibility, of his 
own accountability for his acts: after this, epic heroes and novel heroes 
can blame neither God nor fate for what they do. Fielding has newly 
recreated the epic hero as a responsible agent, freely choosing and 
shaping his own life amidst the anarchic liberty of a universe of flux and 
change. The gods of epic have withdrawn, and a human world, at last, 
lies all before us. 
1. See Hagin, The Epic Hero. 
2. In this and some of what follows, I am indebted to John M. Steadman's excellent 
"Felicity and End in Renaissance Epic and Ethics," JHI 23 (1962): 117-32. 
3. See Eugene Rice's The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). 
4. This will be discussed below. 
5. A somewhat similar understanding of this scene has been suggested by Maurice 
Johnson: Fielding's Art of Fiction (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 53-55 and pp. 61-62. 
6. The two scenes have interesting similarities: in both the woman is "on stage," the 
man "off," though in The Libation Bearers the male overhears the female rather than 
vice versa. Electra finds clues (lock of hair, footprints) that lead her to hope Orestes is 
near; but when he appears, she greets him with mixed elation and skepticism, culminat­
ing in her asking directly if he is Orestes. The scene climaxes in Orestes' identifying 
himself and formally naming Electra and claiming her as his sister. If Fielding is playing 
with the similarities at all, the whole scene becomes delightfully ironic in the light of the 
later momentary revelation that Fanny and Joseph are sister and brother. 
7. See for example Homer Goldberg's fine study of Fielding's assimilation of previous 
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continental fiction, The Art of Joseph Andrews (Chicago. 1969). Goldberg's descrip­
tion of the continental background of Fielding's first novel seems to me perfectly 
compatible with my claim for its epic genealogy, first because both sets of materials have 
already passed through the common experience of romance and second because most of 
the changes Fielding makes in his adaptations of the continental materials work to 
re-align them with traditional epic materials. 
8. See John Freccero's "Donne's 'Valediction: Forbidding Mourning'," ELH 30 
(1963): 335-76; and A. R. Cirillo, "Spenser's Myth of Love: A Study of the Faerie 
Queene, Books III and IV," Ph.D. diss., The Jo'hns Hopkins University, 1964. 
9. Maurice Johnson discusses the chapters in a slightly different fashion than what 
follows: see Fielding's Art of Fiction, pp. 61-71. 
10. Landino so understands Anchises: he is the father of Aeneas's body, and his 
understanding is fleshly. Thus when Aeneas is told by Apollo to seek his ancient mother, 
Anchises takes this to mean Crete, which Landino identifies as the physical origin of the 
Trojans, rather than Italy, which is their spiritual origin. Thus Aeneas wanders aimlessly 
until he celebrates the funeral games in Anchises' honor, which signifies the burial of 
sensuality in himself; after that he proceeds directly to his goal. 
11. The structural parallels break down loosely as follows: 
18 
Discovery of Tom; Allworthy raises him Discovery of Tom's parents and his real 
as his own. Blifil marries Bridget; his relation to Allworthy. Blifil banished. 
brother banished. Tom marries Sophia. 
17 
False accusation of Partridge False accusation of Tom 
3 16 
Tom aids Black George. Thwackum and Black George aids Tom. Fellamar and 
Square woo Bridget. First mention of Blifil woo Sophia. Sophia breaks with 
Sophia. Tom. 
4 15 
Tom's involvement with Molly Seagrim. Tom's involvement with Lady Bellaston. 
5 14 
Sophia tends Tom during illness. Molly's Lady Bellaston visits Tom during feigned 
pregnancy and Tom's love for Sophia. illness. Nancy's pregnancy and 
Nightingale's betrothal. 
13 
Aunt Western confuses Tom and Blifil; Mrs. Fitzpatrick confuses Tom and Blifil. Sophia in her charge. Sophia in Lady Beilaston's charge. 
12 
Tom loses way. Army and rebels: army Squire Western had lost his way. Puppets 
and honor. Partridge and gypsy woman and rebels. Gypsies and honor. 
8 11 
Man of the Hill's story. Tom joined by Mrs. Fitzpatrick's story. Sophia joined by 
Partridge. Mrs. Fitzpatrick and Irish Lord. 
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9 10 
Upton: Mrs. Waters; fray. Arrival of lady Upton: Mrs. Waters; fray. Arrival of 
and maid. Sophia and Honour. 
Like other epic structures I have described, Tom Jones also falls into three large units: 
First Six Books Second Six Books Third Six Books 
Tom's putative parents Partridge and Mrs. Waters Tom's true parents 
Tom's education Various societies; the Man Lady Bellaston, Nightin­
of the Hill gale, the Andersons 
Sophia and Molly Sophia and Mrs. Waters Sophia and Lady Bellaston 
Home and dismissal Exile and wanderings End of wanderings; reac­
ceptance; return home. 
12. In my discussion of Sophia's role in Tom Jones, I have utilized many suggestions 
from Martin Battestin's important essay, "Fielding's Definition of Wisdom: Some 
Functions of Ambiguity and Emblem inTom Jones," ELH 35 (1968): 188-217. The 
principal differences between our readings of the book, however, derive directly from our 
differing understandings of Fielding's concept of wisdom. 
13. For a full discussion of the importance of Charron's work and of the relation of 
wisdom and justice, see Rice's The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, especially pp. 178 ff. 
14. For information about Donne's treatment of the figure, see the introduction to 
Frank Mauley's John Donne: The Anniversaries (Baltimore, 1963), pp. 10—50. 
15. Quoted from Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, pp. 206-7. 
16. It is on this point that I most fundamentally disagree with Battestin's article. 
17. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the novel, see Jessie Rhodes Chambers, 
"The Allegorical Journey in Joseph Andrews andTom Jones." (Ph.D. diss., The Johns 
Hopkins University, 1960). 
18. Fielding will exploit the locus and the symbol of the prison much more thoroughly 
in Amelia, to be discussed below. 
19. See The Covent Garden Journal, No. 8.28 January 1752, ed. G. E. Jensen, 2 
vols. (New York. 1964)' 1:186. 
20. These parallels and their significance are discussed in George Sherburn's 
"Fielding's Amelia: An Interpretation," ELH 3 (1936), and most importantly, in L. H. 
Rowen's "The Influence of the A eneid on Fielding's Ameli a," MLN 71 (1956): 330-36. 
21. For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the novel, see Peter V. Le Page, "The 
Prison and the Dark Beauty of 'Amelia,' " Criticism 9 (1967): 337-54. 
22. Also, like Paradise Lost, Amelia, has subsidiary palindromes within this large 
framework: the two units of six books are similarly symmetrical within themselves, as are 
also the yet smaller units of three books each. 
23. Mrs. Bennet is her surrogate not only in this respect but also by marrying 
Atkinson, who loves Amelia, and also by sharing some of Eve's traits — most notably, 
the desire for intellectual superiority to her husband. In this same respect, she also seems 
to approximate the arrogance of Charron's scientia, which the wise man repudiates. 
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